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Abstract
Privacy has recently gained an importance beyond the ﬁeld of cryptography. In that regard,
the main goal behind this thesis is to enhance privacy protection. All of the necessary math-
ematical and cryptographic preliminaries are introduced at the start of this thesis. We then
show in Part I how to improve set membership and range proofs, which are cryptographic
primitives enabling better privacy protection. Part II shows how to improve the standards for
Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTDs), such as biometric passports.
Regarding set membership proofs, we provide an efﬁcient protocol based on the Boneh-
Boyen signature scheme. We show that alternative signature schemes can be used and we
provide a general protocol description that can be applied for any secure signature scheme.
We also show that signature schemes in our design can be replaced by cryptographic accu-
mulators. For range proofs, we provide interactive solutions where the range is divided in
a base u and the u-ary digits are handled by one of our set membership proofs. A general
construction is also provided for any set membership proof. We additionally explain how to
handle arbitrary ranges with either two range proofs or with an improved solution based on
sumset representation. These efﬁcient solutions achieve, to date, the lowest asymptotical
communication load. Furthermore, this thesis shows that the ﬁrst efﬁcient non-interactive
range proof is insecure. This thesis thus provides the ﬁrst efﬁcient and secure non-interactive
range proof.
In the case of MRTDs, two standards exist: one produced by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) and the other by the European Union, which is called the Extended
Access Control (EAC). Although this thesis focuses on the EAC, which is supposed to solve all
privacy concerns, it shows that both standards fail to provide complete privacy protection.
Lastly, we provide several solutions to improve them.
Keywords: cryptography, privacy, set membership, range proof, machine readable travel
document, MRTD, sumset representation, proof of knowledge, zero-knowledge, NIZK, sigma
protocol, commitment, public key cryptography, digital signature, cryptographic accumulator,
biometric passport, electronic passport, extended access control, EAC, terminal revocation.
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Résumé
Les problèmes liés à la sphère privée ont gagné cette dernière décénie une importance qui
va au-delà du domaine de la cryptographie. De ce fait, l’enjeux principale de cette thèse est
d’amméliorer la protection de la sphère privée. Dans un premier temps, les prérequis mathé-
matiques et cryptographiques seront expliqués. La première partie de cette thèse se consacre
donc à l’amélioration de primitives cryptographiques liées à la sphère privée (appartenance à
un ensemble, appartenance à un intervalle). La seconde partie de cette thèse se concentre sur
l’amélioration des standards régissant les documents de voyage lisible à distance (MRTDs)
tels que les passeports biométriques.
En ce qui concerne l’appartenance à un ensemble, notre solution se base sur les signa-
tures numériques proposées par Boneh et Boyen. Nous montrons par la suite que notre
construction peut s’adapter à d’autres signatures numériques, ainsi qu’aux accumulateurs
cryptographiques. Pour ce qui est de l’appartenance à un intervalle, nous proposons des
solutions interactives où l’intervalle est decomposé en base u et où les subdivisions sont
résolues par des apartenances à un ensemble, notamment celles que nous élaborons. Nous
expliquons aussi comment prendre en charge des intervalles arbitraires soit en combinant
deux appartenances à un intervalle, soit grâce à une unique apartenance basée sur une re-
présentation par somme d’ensembles. Jusqu’à présent, ces solutions sont les plus efﬁcaces
asymptotiquement vis à vis des communications. Nous prouvons également que le premier
protocole pour une appartenance non-interactive à un intervalle est défaillant. Ainsi nous
proposons la première alternative sécurisée.
Dans le cas des MRTDs, deux standards existent. Le premier est sous la responsabilité
de l’Organisation de l’Aviation Civile Internationale (OACI), tandis que le second, appelé
Controle d’Accès Étendu (EAC), a été mandaté par l’Union Européenne. Bien que cette thèse
se concentre à l’étude de l’EAC, nous fournissons une analyse de la sécurité liée à la sphère
privée des deux standards. Des solutions pour les améliorer sont aussi fournies.
Mots Clés : cryptographie, sphère privée, appartenance à un ensemble, appartenance à un
intervalle, document de voyage lisible à distance, MRTD, représentation par somme d’en-
sembles, preuve de connaissance, preuve à divulgation nulle, NIZK, protocole sigma, mise
en gage, cryptographie asymétrique, signature numérique, accumulateur cryptographique,
passeport biométrique, passeport électronique, contrôle d’accès étendu, EAC, révocation de
terminaux.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The intuitive concept of privacy is the ability of a person to control her personal information
dissemination. With the development of electronic services (e-voting, e-taxes, e-cash, . . . ),
and with the introduction of internet social networks such as Facebook and Google+, concerns
about privacy increased signiﬁcantly. Privacy is of even greater concern when children are
involved. In that regard, social networks have limited their access to children above 13 years
old. This is further conﬁrmed by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which
launched the Child Online Protection (COP) Initiative [ITU15]. Furthermore, this concern
about privacy is being strengthened by the threat of identity theft.
The ﬁrst and main issue of interest in this thesis, targets speciﬁc cryptographic protocols called
set membership and range proofs, which consist of proving that a secret element belongs to a
public set. These protocols are considered building blocks in cryptography and need to meet
several security requirements, such as revealing absolutely no information about the element,
except its membership of the public set. Set membership proofs allow users to prove that
their committed secret belongs to a small public set of elements, whilst keeping their secret
hidden. A typical example can be given in the case of e-voting, where users are the voters,
their committed secret is their vote in their secret ballot, and the public set is, for instance, the
public list of candidates in an election. By using a set membership proof, voters can show the
validity of their vote without revealing the vote itself. Note that for set membership proofs,
the public set is usually of a small size with no speciﬁc structure. Range proofs are a special
case of set membership proofs, where the public set is an integer interval of possibly large
size. Moreover, as the elements in an integer interval occur in consecutive order, special
techniques can be applied to improve efﬁciency. Range proofs could thus be used to enforce
age restrictions when combined with certiﬁed electronic identities.
The second issue of concern is the privacy relating to Machine Readable Travel Documents
(MRTDs) such as biometric passports. MRTDs hold the details of our certiﬁed national identity.
These are privacy sensitive and thus need to be protected accordingly. The initial standards
1
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regarding MRTDs focused on border control surveillance security and set aside privacy. As
a consequence, an unlimited right was given to terminals, the reading devices of border
controls, to read the data of any MRTD. Several attempts have been made later in order to
provide better privacy, notably by deﬁning a new standard called the Extended Access Control
(EAC). Unfortunately, major ﬂaws remained due to the hardware choices for MRTDs. One
of the ﬂaws that is studied in this thesis, concerns the revocation of the rights belonging
to the terminal of a border patrol. Indeed, the standards for biometric passports have no
proper revocation mechanism for border patrols. This problem is referred to as the terminal
revocation problem.
1.1 Motivation
The initial motivation behind set membership and range proofs as a cryptographic building
block, came from the way cryptographers traditionally deﬁned and constructed cryptographic
protocols [Gol01, Gol04]. Informally, a cryptographic protocol is a secure protocol that im-
plements a speciﬁc functionality. However, the deﬁnition of security is often based on an
idealized model of potential adversaries. One common example is the security model that
restricts the behavior of adversaries by disallowing them to actively disrupt the procedure
of protocols. In this model, adversaries are only allowed to gather information from honest
communications. Therefore, they are called semi-honest. However, in order to provide security
against any type of adversaries, honest communications need to be enforced. Set membership
and range proofs help enforce honest communication by providing a means of verifying that
private parameters are chosen from the correct corresponding sets.
Further important applications were later found for set membership and range proofs. For
instance, they have an important impact on several online services, such as in the case of
e-services (electronic voting, electronic taxation, ...). For electronic voting, a set membership
proof can be used to prove that a ballot is valid without revealing the value of the ballot. This
is of particular interest to countries that have compulsory voting [IIDEA02], such as Brazil
and Australia. In electronic taxation, range proofs could be used to attest range taxation for
incomes and wealth, without leaking any other information. Whereas Switzerland has some
initial projects regarding e-services [ODIHR12], some countries such as Estonia have already
rolled out complete systems [EEC15], despite security ﬂaws [SFD+14].
Set membership and range proofs also occur in the context of anonymous credentials [BNF12,
GGM14]. Assume that a user is issued a credential containing a number of attributes such as
nationality. Furthermore assume that the user needs to prove she is from a European country.
As the list of European countries is public, the user has to show that she possesses a credential
containing one of those countries as a nationality, without leaking her speciﬁc country. This
can be simply achieved with the help of set membership proofs. Furthermore, range proofs
applied to age can also bring a solution in the framework of the Child Online Protection (COP)
2
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Initiative [ITU15]. For example, a user with passport credentials or with a certiﬁed electronic
identity (eID) might wish to prove that her age is within some range, such as greater than 18,
or between 13 and 18 in the case of a teen-community website. Therefore, internet platforms
and websites with age restrictions can enforce these restrictions by applying range proofs on
the age contained within an eID. The COP Initiative was launched in 2008 by the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) with the objective of protecting children in the online world.
Range proofs also have an important implication in e-cash and in e-auction scenarios, where
participants are required to prove solvency, with the constraint that they are not willing to
provide the exact amount present in their bank accounts for obvious privacy concerns. Lastly,
some cryptographic protocols require the freshness of some conﬁdential timestamps to be
checked, which is a direct application of range proofs.
Regarding MRTDs, privacy is a big concern for their owners. For instance in Switzerland,
49.9% of electors voted against the introduction of the biometric passport on the 17th May
2009 [FCoS09], presumably for privacy reasons. The importance of providing a good survey on
the standards for MRTDs (such as the EAC) is motivated by the fact that the available standards
neglect privacy and revocation issues. This carelessness induces serious security threats. In
the case of terminal revocation, any stolen border patrol reader will be able to stealthy read
all the private information contained in passports without the consent of the holder nor his
awareness. Stolen data can help an attacker in the process of identity theft, and even allow him
to circumvent biometric protections such as face and ﬁngerprint recognition. Furthermore,
a stolen terminal can be set to collect the data of all surrounding MRTDs, which will allow
an attacker to build a rogue database of stolen identities. Lastly, a stolen terminal coupled
with a monitoring system gives an attacker the ability to monitor a location for speciﬁc targets,
whether speciﬁc individuals or some speciﬁc group of persons (selected, for instance, by
nationality). This last threat is of major concern as it could be the scenario of an untraceable
terrorist attack. Assume that an attacker chooses to target citizens of a speciﬁc country, and
sets its system in a large transit hub (such as an airport) or in a large transport vehicle (such as
an airplane). The rogue terminal will scan its surroundings, and when the requirements set by
the attacker are met (for instance a large group of a targeted nationality), the terrorist attack
would be triggered. Moreover, once the system of this scenario has been set up, the attacker
can walk away freely before the attack is triggered. Hence, the terminal revocation problem
raises the issue of targeted terrorist attacks.
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1.2 Results and Contributions
This thesis incorporates the results of ﬁve publications from the author [CCs08, CLs10, CLZ12,
CV09, Cha13] (see Section 1.4), together with some extensions, corrections, and unpublished
results.
Regarding set membership proofs, this thesis presents several efﬁcient interactive solutions,
where “interactive” informally means that both participants exchange messages to com-
plete the protocol. The ﬁrst solution is a protocol based on the Boneh-Boyen signature
scheme [BB04], which remains at the time of writing the most efﬁcient protocol for set
membership proofs. This thesis also shows that alternative signature schemes can be em-
ployed, by providing a set membership proof based on the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature
scheme [CL02b]. Although the idea of using the alternative signature scheme from Camenisch-
Lysyanskaya was presented in [CCs08], the construction and details of the protocol are exclu-
sively presented in this thesis. Furthermore, this thesis also provides a general construction
for any secure signature scheme. Lastly and as described in [CL02a], this thesis shows that
set membership proofs can be based on cryptographic accumulators instead of signature
schemes, with the example of the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya accumulator.
This thesis provides one of the ﬁrst classiﬁcations of range proofs. Then, with the use of the
set membership proofs mentioned above, interactive range proofs are constructed for ranges
of the type
[
0,u
)
, where the elements of the range are decomposed in base u. This thesis
provides a concrete construction with the Boneh-Boyen based set membership proof, as well
as a general protocol for any set membership proof. This thesis then argues how to use known
methods (OR and AND compositions) in order to handle arbitrary ranges. Moreover, this
thesis exclusively provides the details for handling arbitrary ranges with the AND composition.
The details for the OR composition have been set aside as several drawbacks were overlooked
in [CCs08] and are explained in this thesis. Another unpublished result is the construction of
a range proof based on a variant of the set membership proof of Arfaoui et al. [ALT+15a]. It
should be noted that this last protocol can be deduced from our general protocol.
Furthermore, this thesis shows that number consecutiveness in range proofs can be further
exploited with a better decomposition. This thesis improves the decomposition introduced
in [LAN02] to obtain a sumset representation of integer intervals. It should also be noted that
the bound for the decomposition achieved in this thesis is better than the published results
from [CLs10]. Thus, by combining this new representation of integers with novel properties
and theorems from the number theory ﬁeld, as well as new results in additive combinatorics,
this thesis provides the most efﬁcient interactive range proof.
As some e-services forbid interactions, this thesis develops the ﬁrst efﬁcient and secure non-
interactive range proof, without random oracles, which has been published in [CLZ12]. Note
that “non-interactive” protocols informally restrict communications to one single transmitted
message. Furthermore, “random oracles” are theoretical entities that map given inputs to
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perfectly random outputs. Random oracles are often employed to prove the security of non-
interactive protocols. However their use is controversial as some security issues regarding their
concrete implementation were raised in [CGH98, CGH04]. Note as well that minor details
from [CLZ12] are corrected in this thesis. This thesis also shows that one of the ﬁrst attempts to
produce a secure and efﬁcient non-interactive range proof [YHM+09] is intrinsically insecure.
In the case of MRTDs, this thesis ﬁrst recalls the threats linked to Radio Frequency IDentiﬁ-
cation (RFID) chips, which were chosen as a hardware component in the implementation of
MRTDs. RFID chips, also called RFID tags, are hardware components that use electromagnetic
ﬁelds to wirelessly transmit data. This thesis then surveys the two existing standards for
MRTDs and their updates. The ﬁrst standard [ICAO08] was produced by the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and this thesis shows that this standard possesses serious
weaknesses regarding the data privacy of MRTDs. This thesis then surveys the alternative
standard proposed by the German Federal Ofﬁce for Information Security (BSI), called the
Extended Access Control (EAC), at the request of the European Union. Despite some security
advantages such as anti-cloning protection, this thesis shows that privacy concerns remain
the same in the ﬁrst version of the EAC [BSI08a], as in the ICAO standard. Finally, this thesis
surveys the current EAC version (EACv2 [BSI15a, BSI15b, BSI15c, BSI15d]) and demonstrate
that despite some claims [Nit09] as to the security improvements it brings, several ﬂaws re-
garding privacy are still of concern, notably the terminal revocation problem. These surveys
are updated to match the latest version of the EAC (February 2015), as the versions studied in
the initial publications [CV09, Cha13] precede the latest version.
Lastly, this thesis provides several solutions as to how to enhance the different standards
for MRTDs. The ﬁrst solution that is provided, performs a minor hardware upgrade on
MRTDs with the introduction of an RFID switch, that will allow the use of the RFID chip
only when needed. The second solution that this thesis suggests in [CV09], was to replace
some components of the ICAO standard with its more secure counterpart described in the
EACv2. This suggestion was accepted in February 2013 by the ICAO working group in charge
of the ICAO standard [ICAO13], and will be enforced in January 2018. This thesis also suggests
a minor behavioral improvement for holders of MRTDs, to reduce the threat of terminals
with expired certiﬁcates. As MRTDs only have an approximation of the current date, this
minor behavioral improvement consists of updating this approximative date more often,
especially before traveling. Finally, the major contribution that this thesis provides regarding
MRTDs, is the elaboration of a signiﬁcant solution for terminal revocation, that only require
upgrading the underlying protocol. The details of this solution are provided as an extension
of [Cha13] and its main idea consists of enforcing terminal collaboration in order to achieve
the authentication of terminals.
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1.3 Thesis Outline
In order to explain the core elements of this thesis, Chapter 2 introduces the required essential
preliminaries. Notations and some basic deﬁnitions are provided in Section 2.1. The security
models of the protocols described in this thesis, as well as their security assumptions, are
explained and deﬁned in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 is devoted to deﬁning proofs, arguments,
proofs of knowledge, and their corresponding security properties, which constitute set mem-
bership and range proofs. Section 2.4 describes all of the cryptographic primitives that are
used as building blocks for our solutions. Section 2.5 is devoted to threshold cryptography, as
it is the basis of our solution for terminal revocation.
The core of this thesis is then divided into two main parts. Part I focuses on set membership
and range proofs. Part II studies the case of the Extended Access Control and Machine
Readable Travel Documents (MRTDs).
Part I
Chapter 3 provides results regarding set membership proofs.
The description and deﬁnition of this primitive is given in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 describes
prior and related work. Then, the Boneh-Boyen signature scheme based set membership
proof is explained in Section 3.3, together with its security proof and efﬁciency analysis. Set
membership proofs based on alternative signature schemes are discussed in Section 3.4, with
a concrete solution based on the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme, and with a gen-
eralization for any signature scheme. Cryptographic accumulators based set membership
proofs are explained in Section 3.5 with the example of the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya dynamic
accumulator.
Chapter 4 focuses on results for interactive range proofs.
The description and deﬁnition of this primitive is given in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 describes
prior work, related work, and provides a classiﬁcation for interactive range proofs. Section 4.3
is dedicated to our results regarding interactive range proofs based on set membership proofs,
including a range proof for range
[
0,u
)
using our Boneh-Boyen signature scheme based
set membership proof, its security proof and efﬁciency analysis, methods on how to handle
arbitrary ranges with their respective security and efﬁciency analysis, a description of how
to construct a range proof based on any secure set membership proof, and an example of
such a construction based on a variant of the Arfaoui et al. set membership proof. Section 4.4
explains and proves the decomposition of integer intervals into a sumset representation. The
sumset based range proof, together with its security and efﬁciency analysis, is thus described
in Section 4.5, which concludes with a concrete example and efﬁciency comparisons between
state of the art interactive range proofs.
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Chapter 5 explains the result of this thesis regarding non-interactive range proofs.
The explanation of this primitive and its deﬁnitions are given in Section 5.1. Section 5.2 gives
an overview of prior and more recent work, as well as related work. Furthermore, the Yuen
et al. non-interactive range proof is proven insecure in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 provides an
equality subargument (between a lifted BBS encryption and a knowledge commitment) and its
security proof, which are necessary for our non-interactive range proof. The latter is presented
in Section 5.5, together with its security and efﬁciency proofs.
Part II
Chapter 6 surveys Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTDs) and their related standards.
After a brief introduction in Section 6.1, Section 6.2 presents prior and related work. The
threats relating to the standard for RFID chips are recalled in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 surveys
the ICAO standard for MRTDs. Section 6.5 brieﬂy surveys the ﬁrst version of the EAC standard
for MRTDs. More details on the EAC standard are provided with a survey of its second version
in Section 6.6. The conclusions of these surveys are provided in Section 6.7.
Chapter 7 mainly aims at providing enhancements to the EAC standard.
After a brief introduction in Section 7.1, Section 7.2 presents prior and related enhancements
for MRTDs. Section 7.3 recommends the incorporation of a small hardware improvement in
the form of an RFID switch in new MRTDs. Section 7.4 explains an enhancement of the ICAO
standard, which has been accepted by the relevant ICAO working group. Section 7.5 provides
a small recommendation on behavioral practices for MRTDs holders. Section 7.6 explains a
suggested solution, together with its security and efﬁciency analysis, for the resolution of the
terminal revocation problem.
Lastly, the conclusions of this thesis are provided in Chapter 8.
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1.4 List of Publications by the Author
The publications by the author that were included in this thesis, are listed in the following.
Each of them is described brieﬂy and the contributions made by the author speciﬁed. Special
presentations of these publications are also mentioned.
[CCs08] Jan Camenisch, Raﬁk Chaabouni, and abhi shelat1.
Efﬁcient protocols for set membership and range proofs.
In Josef Pieprzyk, editor, ASIACRYPT, volume 5350 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 234-252. Springer, 2008
[CV09] Raﬁk Chaabouni and Serge Vaudenay.
The extended access control for machine readable travel documents.
In Arslan Brömme, Christoph Busch, and Detlef Hühnlein, editors, BIOSIG, vol-
ume 155 of LNI, pages 93-103. GI, 2009.
[CLs10] Raﬁk Chaabouni, Helger Lipmaa, and abhi shelat1.
Additive combinatorics and discrete logarithm based range protocols.
In Ron Steinfeld and Philip Hawkes, editors, ACISP, volume 6168 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 336–351. Springer, 2010.
[CLZ12] Raﬁk Chaabouni, Helger Lipmaa, and Bingsheng Zhang.
A non-interactive range proof with constant communication.
In Angelos D. Keromytis, editor, Financial Cryptography, volume 7397 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 179–199. Springer, 2012.
[Cha13] Raﬁk Chaabouni.
Solving terminal revocation in EAC by augmenting terminal authentication.
In Arslan Brömme and Christoph Busch, editors, BIOSIG, volume 212 of LNI,
pages 273–280. GI, 2013.
Publications [CCs08, CLs10, CLZ12] relate to set membership and range proofs.
Publications [CV09, Cha13] relate to Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTDs) and the
Extended Access Control (EAC).
Publication [CCs08] introduced the concept of signature based set membership proofs with
efﬁcient secure protocols, and used them to construct efﬁcient secure interactive range proofs.
Inspired by Berry Schoenmakers [Sch01, Sch05], the author proposed the application of a u-
ary decomposition for range proofs, where the digits would be proven with a set membership
proof. This publication was presented at the Asiacrypt 2008 conference.
Publication [CLs10] improved the concept of decomposition for range proofs, with a multi-
base decomposition called the sumset representation of integer intervals. This resulted in
1Note that abhi shelat requires his name to be written in lower case.
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an efﬁciency gain by a factor of roughly 2, when handling arbitrary ranges. The sumset
decomposition is a generalization of the binary sumset decomposition introduced in [LAN02].
The author provided corrections to the general sumset decomposition as the generalization
was intricate. This publication was presented at the ACISP conference in 2010.
Publication [CLZ12] proved the ﬁrst attempt to produce a secure efﬁcient non-interactive
range proof without random oracles [YHM+09] to be insecure, and provided a novel protocol
as an answer. The insecurity proof of [YHM+09] was achieved by the author. This publication
was presented at the Financial Cryptography conference in 2012.
Publication [CV09] is a general survey of the standards forMRTDs. This publication also stated
the remaining problems of these standards and suggested some improvements. The author
studied the different standards, analyzed them, identiﬁed some of the remaining problems,
and elaborated the suggested improvements. This publication was ﬁrst presented at the
BIOSIG conference in 2009. The author was then also invited by the Arab ICT Organization to
present this publication at the First Arab Forum on “e-transactions Security & the Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI)”, in 2010.
Publication [Cha13] provided a solution to the terminal revocation problem present in the
EAC. This solution is based on the threshold RSA signature of Shoup [Sho00] and only requires
a software upgrade. This single-authored publication was presented at the BIOSIG conference
in 2013.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
This chapter will introduce the various notations and deﬁnitions, as well as the important
preliminaries necessary for understanding the construction of our protocols. Section 2.1
introduces general notations as well as the Bachmann-Landau notations (also known as the
big O notation), deﬁnes the notion of indistinguishability, recalls bilinear groups, and lastly
deﬁnes some speciﬁc notions of combinatorics. The security models, which prove the security
of the solutions presented in this thesis, are explained in Section 2.2. The deﬁnitions relating
to cryptographic proofs, arguments, and proofs of knowledge are provided in Section 2.3,
together with some deﬁnitions for related security properties (zero-knowledge, witness hiding,
witness indistinguishability). Section 2.4 recalls some common deﬁnitions regarding different
protocols and building blocks used in cryptography, as well as some speciﬁc protocols used
in this thesis as building blocks. Lastly, Section 2.5 is dedicated to the notion of threshold
cryptography, which will be essential for the solution provided in Chapter 7.
Beside the original citations, three main references were used to compile the majority of the
deﬁnitions and notions presented in this chapter:
• “A Classical Introduction to Cryptography” by Serge Vaudenay [Vau06],
• the “Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security” [vTJ11],
• and the “Foundations of Cryptography” by Oded Goldreich [Gol01, Gol04].
2.1 Notations and Deﬁnitions
The goal of this section is to clarify notations and to recall some basic deﬁnitions in mathe-
matics and in cryptography, that will be necessary for understanding the following chapters.
Regarding notations, probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms will be denoted by PPT algo-
rithms. Interactive Turing Machines will be denoted as ITM (see Section 2.3.1). The size of
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a set F will be denoted |F|. The absolute value of an element x will be denoted |x|. The bit
length of an element x will be denoted ‖x‖. The bit length of an element taken in a group
G will be denoted ‖G‖. The primordial security parameter will be denoted by κ. In some
cases, a secondary security parameter will be needed. It will be denoted k and will usually be
dependent on κ. Moreover, security parameters will be expressed in the unary numeral system,
where a number n is represented by a n-long sequence of 1, denoted by 1n . Z+ denotes the set
of positive integers excluding 0. For n ∈N,Zn denotes the cyclic group of order n. Z∗n denotes
the multiplicative group of all invertible elements inZn . The set {xi }i∈I is the set of elements
xi indexed by the countable index set I.
The next two deﬁnitions recall the notions of safe prime and of quadratic residuosity. It is
important to not confuse safe primes with strong primes. A strong prime p is a large prime
such that p−1 and p+1 have a large prime factor. Moreover, the large prime factor q of p−1
is such that q−1 also has a large prime factor.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Safe prime)
A safe prime p is a prime number equal to p = 2q+1, where q is another prime number. In
the case of a safe prime p = 2q+1, q is called a Sophie-Germain prime.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Quadratic residuosity)
A quadratic residue modulo n is an element a ∈Z∗n such that ∃b ∈Z∗n : a ≡ b2 (mod n). The
set of all quadratic residues modulo n is denoted QRn ⊆Z∗n.
2.1.1 Bachmann-Landau notations
The Bachmann-Landau notations provide notations that describe the asymptotic growth of
functions. Five distinctive asymptotical growths for a function f (n) can be distinguished,
regarding the function g (n) to which it is being compared to: O
(
g (n)
)
, o
(
g (n)
)
, Ω
(
g (n)
)
,
ω
(
g (n)
)
, and Θ
(
g (n)
)
.
Deﬁnition 2.3 (O(·) notation)
Let f (n) and g (n) be two functions. The notation f (n)=O (g (n)) or f (n) ∈O (g (n))means
that f is asymptotically dominated by g , up to a constant factor:
∃A > 0, ∃n0, ∀n >n0 :
∣∣ f (n)∣∣	 A · ∣∣g (n)∣∣ .
Deﬁnition 2.4 (o(·) notation)
Let f (n) and g (n) be two functions. The notation f (n)= o (g (n)) or f (n) ∈ o (g (n))means
that f is asymptotically dominated by g :
∀A > 0, ∃n0, ∀n > n0 :
∣∣ f (n)∣∣	 A · ∣∣g (n)∣∣ .
Note that o
(
g (n)
)
implies O
(
g (n)
)
.
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Deﬁnition 2.5 (Ω(·) notation)
Let f (n) and g (n) be two functions. The notation f (n)=Ω(g (n)) or f (n) ∈Ω(g (n))means
that f asymptotically dominates g , up to a constant factor:
∃A > 0, ∃n0, ∀n > n0 :
∣∣ f (n)∣∣
 A · ∣∣g (n)∣∣ .
Note that f (n)=Ω(g (n))⇐⇒ g (n)=O ( f (n)).
Deﬁnition 2.6 (ω(·) notation)
Let f (n) and g (n) be two functions. The notation f (n)=ω(g (n)) or f (n) ∈ω(g (n))means
that f asymptotically dominates g :
∀A > 0, ∃n0, ∀n > n0 :
∣∣ f (n)∣∣
 A · ∣∣g (n)∣∣ .
Note that ω
(
g (n)
)
impliesΩ
(
g (n)
)
.
Deﬁnition 2.7 (Θ(·) notation)
Let f (n) and g (n) be two functions. The notation f (n)=Θ(g (n)) or f (n) ∈Θ(g (n))means
that f is asymptotically bounded by g :
∃A1 > 0, ∃A2 > 0, ∃n0, ∀n >n0 : A1 · g (n)	 f (n)	 A2 · g (n).
Note that Θ
(
g (n)
)
implies both O
(
g (n)
)
andΩ
(
g (n)
)
.
2.1.2 Indistinguishability
The indistinguishability property is an essential measure that is used for security proofs.
Informally, this measure aims to assess the distance between two distributions. In order to do
so, it relies on a distinguisher algorithm and on the notion of negligible functions.
Deﬁnition 2.8 (Family)
A family is a sequence of random variables indexed by a countable index set. For instance the
family X = {Xi }i∈I is the sequence of random variables Xi indexed by the countable index set
I.
Deﬁnition 2.9 (Distinguisher)
A distinguisher D is a PPT algorithm that takes some input and outputs either 1 or 0. It
is used to compare two given families X , Y of random variables with identical index set I .
The distance between X and Y is the family of Pr[D (Xn ,1n)= 1]−Pr[D (Yn ,1n)= 1] for n ∈ I .
When Y is the family of random variables with uniform distribution, this becomes a measure
of the randomness of X . Furthermore, the notation D (Xn ,1n) will be used to include an
emphasis on the security parameter and on the index set.
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Deﬁnition 2.10 (Negligible)
A function f :N→ [0,1] is said to be negligible in n if for every positive polynomial p(·), there
exists a n0 ∈N such that for every n > n0, the following holds:
f (n)< 1
p(n)
.
Indistinguishability between two families reﬂects how close they are in terms of their respec-
tive random variable. Three levels of indistinguishability precision can be differentiated:
computational, statistical and perfect.
Deﬁnition 2.11 (Computational Indistinguishability)
Two families Xn, Yn with identical index set N are said to be computationally indistin-
guishable if for any distinguisher D, the function |Pr[D (Xn ,1n)= 1]−Pr[D (Yn ,1n)= 1]| is
negligible in n. In other words, for every positive polynomial p(·), there exists an index n0 ∈N
such that for every n > n0, the following holds:
∣∣Pr[D (Xn ,1n)= 1]−Pr[D (Yn ,1n)= 1]∣∣< 1
p(n)
.
To express that two families are computationally indistinguishable, the following notation is
used:
{Xn}=c {Yn}.
Deﬁnition 2.12 (Statistical Indistinguishability)
Let Xn, Yn be two families over a ﬁnite domain X and with identical index set N. These
families are said to be statistically indistinguishable if their statistical distance is negligible
in n. Hence, the two families Xn, Yn are statistically indistinguishable if, for every positive
polynomial p(·), there exists an index n0 ∈N such that for every n > n0 and every element
a ∈X , the following holds:
1
2
∑
a∈X
|Pr[Xn = a]−Pr[Yn = a]| < 1
p(n)
.
To express that two families are statistically indistinguishable, the following notation is used:
{Xn}=s {Yn}.
Deﬁnition 2.13 (Perfect Indistinguishability)
Two families Xn, Yn with identical index setN are said to be perfectly indistinguishable if for
every element a ∈ Xn and every index n ∈N, the following holds:
Pr[Xn = a]= Pr[Yn = a] .
To express that two families are perfectly indistinguishable, the following notation is used:
{Xn}=p {Yn}.
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2.1.3 Bilinear Groups
Bilinear groups are special algebraic groups that deﬁne a function e, called a bilinear map or a
pairing function. The properties of this latter function are essential in many cryptographic
applications. Let PGa(1κ) be an asymmetric bilinear group generator that on input 1κ outputs
a description of a bilinear group parambp := (p,G1,G2,GT,e)←PGa(1κ) such that p is a κ-bit
prime,G1,G2 andGT are multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p, and e :G1×G2 →GT
is an admissible bilinear map (pairing). LetG∗1 =G1 \{1},G∗2 =G2 \{1} and let g1 ∈G∗1 , g2 ∈G∗2
be generators ofG1 andG2 respectively. The admissible bilinear map e is such that
• for all a,b ∈Zp it holds that e(g a1 ,gb2 )= e(g1,g2)ab ;
• e(g1,g2) = 1 generatesGT;
• it is efﬁcient to decide membership inG1,G2 andGT;
• group operations and the bilinear map are efﬁciently computable;
• generators are efﬁciently samplable, and the descriptions of the groups and group
elements are O(κ) bit long.
Furthermore, in the case of symmetric bilinear groups,G2 =G1. Moreover, the (symmetric)
bilinear group generator will be denotedPG(1κ). If not speciﬁed, bilinear groups will imply the
symmetric case. It is important to notice that following the results of [GPS08, AMOR14, GKZ14],
symmetric bilinear groups are now considered either insecure or unpractical, and therefore
the asymmetric case should be enforced in practice. This thesis kept the use of symmetric
pairings for Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 in an effort to remain easy to understand. Their use was
nevertheless dropped in Chapter 5.
2.1.4 Combinatorics
Chapter 5 requires an understanding of several notions of combinatorics and additive com-
binatorics that are explained hereafter. The following additive combinatorics deﬁnitions are
taken from [TV06]. Let Λ, Λ1 and Λ2 be subsets of some additive group, such asZ orZn .
Deﬁnition 2.14 (Sum set)
The sum set of Λ1 and Λ2 is Λ1+Λ2 = {λ1+λ2 :λ1 ∈Λ1∧λ2 ∈Λ2}.
Deﬁnition 2.15 (Difference set)
The difference set of Λ1 and Λ2 is Λ1−Λ2 = {λ1−λ2 :λ1 ∈Λ1∧λ2 ∈Λ2}.
Deﬁnition 2.16 (Iterated sumset)
The iterated sumset of Λ by s ∈Z+ is sΛ= {∑si=1λi :λi ∈Λ}.
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Deﬁnition 2.17 (Dilation)
The dilation of Λ by s ∈Z+ is s ·Λ= {sλ :λ ∈Λ}.
Deﬁnition 2.18 (Restricted sumset)
The restricted sumset of Λ is 2̂Λ= {λ1+λ2 :λ1 ∈Λ∧λ2 ∈Λ∧λ1 =λ2}⊆Λ+Λ.
Deﬁnition 2.19 (Progression-free set)
A set Λ = {λi } ⊂ Z+ is a progression free set, if no three of its elements are in arithmetic
progression, so that λi +λ j = 2λk only if i = j = k.
Let r3(N ) denote the cardinality of the largest progression free set that belongs to {1, . . . ,N }.
Elkin showed in [Elk10] that
r3(N )=Ω
((
N · log1/42 N
)
/22

2log2 N
)
.
It is also known from [San11] that r3(N )=O(N (loglogN )5/ logN ). Thus, the minimal N such
that r3(N )=n is ω(n), while according to Elkin, N =n1+o(1).
Theorem 2.1 ([Lip12a](Theorem 1, Section 3))
For any n > 0, there exists N = n1+o(1), such that {1, . . . ,N } contains a progression free subset
Λ of odd integers of cardinality n.
2.2 Security Models
Cryptographic primitives and protocols should convince users that they are secure. In order
to conﬁrm that, exact mathematical proofs are desirable. When achieved, they are called
security proofs. Unfortunately, perfect security is not always feasible [Gol01] and often leads
to inefﬁcient protocols. To produce efﬁcient but nonetheless secure cryptographic protocols,
the security proofs rely on security models that deﬁne time and computational restrictions,
as well as any additional advantages. Hereafter, three of the most used models are explained.
The standard model is the most common model used. It focuses on time and computational
restrictions by means of complexity assumptions called computational hardness assumptions.
The random oracle model introduces the advantage of random functions. Note that this is
different from random sampling. The common reference string model provides a speciﬁc
bit string to participants of a cryptographic protocol. Finally, knowledge assumptions are
non-standard restrictions that give evidence about the “knowledge” of the prover.
2.2.1 Standard Model
The standard model, as deﬁned by Naccache in the “Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Secu-
rity” [vTJ11], assumes that the adversaries are only probabilistic and computationally bounded
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in polynomial time. They are thus called probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversaries.
Therefore, this model deﬁnes security based on mathematical problems which are considered
hard to solve in polynomial time. To meet this criteria, these problems rely on complexity
assumptions called computational hardness assumptions. The security is then guaranteed
as long as its corresponding computational hardness assumptions hold (i.e. as long as the
corresponding mathematical problems remain hard to solve). Security is thus deﬁned with
arguments of security instead of proofs of security. Nevertheless, the cryptographic literature
refers to them as security proofs. This abuse of terminology will be kept in this thesis as well.
2.2.2 Computational Hardness Assumptions
Computational hardness assumptions, as mentioned above, are complexity assumptions
where some speciﬁc mathematical problems are assumed to be computationally hard to
resolve in polynomial time. Alternative complexity assumptions are sometimes used such as
decisional hardness assumptions, where the veracity of a statement is computationally hard to
attest in polynomial time.
Computational Hardness Assumption A computationally hard problem is a mathematical
problem that is computationally hard to solve under certain parameters, generated by the
algorithm of the challenger Cgen. The computational hardness assumption is thus deﬁned
regarding a computationally hard problem and Cgen. A computational hardness assumption
states that given Cgen and for any PPT adversaryA , the adversary is able to solve the corre-
sponding computationally hard problem with a probability that is negligible in terms of the
security parameter κ.
Decisional Hardness Assumption A decisional hard problem is a mathematical problem
that requires a distinguisherD to decide on the veracity of a statement under certain parame-
ters, generated by the algorithm of the challenger Cgen. The decisional hardness assumption
is deﬁned regarding a decisional hard problem, Cgen, and a distinguisher D. A decisional
hardness assumption states that given Cgen and for any distinguisherD, the distinguisher is
able to solve the corresponding decisional hard problem with a distance probability that is
negligible in terms of the security parameter κ.
Historically, the two best studied computationally hard problems in cryptography are the
factorization problem and the discrete logarithm problem (DLog problem). Both of these
problems led to the establishment of subsequent computationally hard problems.
Computationally Hard Problem 2.1 (Factorization Problem)
Given n, the product of two prime numbers, ﬁnd its factorization as n = p ·q. The related
computational hardness assumption is thus called the factorization assumption.
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Computationally Hardness Assumption 2.1 (Factorization Assumption)
Let Cgen output (n,p,q) on input 1κ such that
∥∥p∥∥= ∥∥q∥∥=κ and n = pq. The factorization
assumption relative to Cgen states that for any PPT adversaryA ,
Pr
[
(n,p,q)←Cgen (1κ) , (p,q)←A (n) : n = pq
]
is negligible in κ.
Note that the 768-bit number named “RSA-768” (from the RSA cryptosystem) was factored
in 2009 by Kleinjung et al. in [KAF+10]. Thus, 1024-bit numbers are now considered at risk.
Furthermore, the now famous RSA public key cryptosystem [RSA78] (see Section 2.4.3 for a
reminder of public key cryptosystems) was introduced in 1978 by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman.
The computational hardness assumption associated with this cryptosystem, was followed
by several important ones including the strong RSA assumption, which is necessary for the
set membership proofs presented in sections 3.4 and 3.5. Recall that an RSA modulus n is
equal to the product of two large primes p and q , hence n = pq . The RSA ciphertext c of a
message m is obtained by computing c =me (mod n), where e is coprime to ((p−1)(q−1)).
Deciphering c is achieved by computing m = cd (mod n), where d is part of the secret key as
d = e−1 (mod (p−1)(q−1)).
Computationally Hard Problem 2.2 (RSA Problem [RSA78])
Given an RSA public key (n,e) with e > 1, and an RSA ciphertext c, ﬁnd a message m such
that c =me (mod n).
Computationally Hardness Assumption 2.2 (RSA Assumption)
Let Cgen output (n,p,q,e,c) on input 1κ such that p,q are primes,
∥∥p∥∥ = ∥∥q∥∥ = κ, n = pq,
e > 1 is coprime to ((p−1)(q−1)), and c ∈R Zn. The RSA assumption relative to Cgen states
that for any PPT adversaryA ,
Pr
[
(n,p,q,e,c)←Cgen (1κ) , (m)←A (n,e,c) : c =me (mod n)
]
is negligible in κ.
Computationally Hard Problem 2.3 (Strong RSA Problem [FO97])
Given an RSA modulus n and an RSA ciphertext c, ﬁnd a pair (m, e) such that e > 1 and
c =me (mod n). The related computational hardness assumption is called the Strong RSA
assumption.
Computationally Hardness Assumption 2.3 (Strong RSA Assumption)
Let Cgen output (n,p,q,c) on input 1κ such that p,q are primes,
∥∥p∥∥= ∥∥q∥∥=κ, n = pq, and
c ∈R Zn. The strong RSA assumption relative to Cgen states that for any PPT adversaryA ,
Pr
[
(n,p,q,c)←Cgen (1κ) , (m,e)←A (n,c) : c =me (mod n) ∧ e > 1
]
is negligible in κ.
Another subsequent result is the decisional composite residuosity assumption, which was
introduced by Paillier in [Pai99] as a conjecture.
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Decisional Hard Problem 2.4 (DCR Problem [Pai99])
Assuming that n is an RSA modulus (n = pq), and given a number x, decide if x is an nth
residue modulo n2, that is if there exists a number y ∈Z∗
n2
such that x = yn (mod n2). The
related decisional hardness assumption is called the DCR assumption.
Decisional Hardness Assumption 2.4 (DCR Assumption [Pai99])
Let Cgen output (n,p,q, y,z) on input 1κ such that p,q are primes,
∥∥p∥∥= ∥∥q∥∥= κ, n = pq,
and y,z are uniformly random variables taken independently inZn2 . Let x = yn (mod n2).
The DCR assumption relative to Cgen, states that the distributions x and z are computation-
ally indistinguishable in terms of the security parameter κ.
The discrete logarithm (DLog) problem is deﬁned as follows:
Computationally Hard Problem 2.5 (Discrete Logarithm (DLog) Problem)
Given a ﬁnite (multiplicative) abelian groupG, a generator g ofG, and a random element y ∈
G, ﬁnd the smallest integer x such that y = g x. Moreover, x is called the discrete logarithm of y
as x = logg y. The related computational hardness assumption is called the DLog assumption.
Computationally Hardness Assumption 2.5 (DLog Assumption)
Let Cgen output (G,p,g , y) on input 1κ such that
∥∥p∥∥=κ, g has order p, g generatesG, and
y ∈R G. The DLog assumption relative to Cgen states that for any PPT adversaryA ,
Pr
[
(G,p,g , y)←Cgen (1κ) , x ←A (G,p,g , y) : y = g x
]
is negligible in κ.
Although Shoup showed in [Sho97] that the computational complexity in recovering x is of
Ω
(
q
)
where qis the largest prime dividing the group order when only using group operations,
Bouvier et al. announced in [BGI+14], that they were able to solve the DLog problem for a
group Zp , with p being a 596-bit safe prime by using the speciﬁc properties of Zp (and by
using the number ﬁeld sieve algorithm).
Difﬁe and Hellman introduced in [DH76] the Difﬁe-Hellman (DH) problem. Initially, this
problem related to their key agreement protocol, where two parties interact with each other in
order to set up a common secret key over some insecure communication channel. Moreover,
the DH problem opened the way to several related problems that were used in numerous
protocols, including the set membership proof presented in Section 3.3, and the range proofs
presented in Chapter 4 and in Chapter 5.
Computationally Hard Problem 2.6 (Difﬁe-Hellman (DH) Problem)
Given a ﬁnite (multiplicative) abelian groupG, a generator g ofG, and random elements
g x , g y ∈G, compute g xy . The related computational hardness assumption is called the DH
assumption.
Computationally Hardness Assumption 2.6 (DH Assumption)
Let Cgen output (G,p,g ,x, y) on input 1κ such that
∥∥p∥∥ = κ, g has order p, g generates G,
and x, y are random elements in the group order. The DH assumption relative to Cgen states
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that for any PPT adversaryA ,
Pr
[
(G,p,g ,x, y)←Cgen (1κ) , h ←A (G,p,g ,g x ,g y ) : h = g xy
]
is negligible in κ.
The DH problem is considered hard for groupsG=Z∗p with large prime p ([Vau06]), where
the size of p should be as large as for the DLog problem.
Decisional Hard Problem 2.7 (Decisional Difﬁe-Hellman (DDH) Problem)
Given a ﬁnite (multiplicative) abelian group G, a generator g of G, and three elements
g x , g y , g z ∈G, decide if z ?= xy. The related computational hardness assumption is called
the DDH assumption.
Decisional Hardness Assumption 2.7 (DDH Assumption)
Let Cgen output (G,p,g ,x, y,z) on input 1κ such that
∥∥p∥∥= κ, g has order p, g generatesG,
and x, y,z are uniformly random variables taken independently inZp . The DDH assumption
relative to Cgen states that the distributions
(
g x ,g y ,g xy
)
and
(
g x ,g y ,g z
)
are computationally
indistinguishable in terms of the security parameter κ.
It is important to note here, that the DDH assumption does not hold forG=Z∗p , where p is
prime, as the Legendre symbol, which identiﬁes quadratic residues, provides information on
the decisional problem z
?= xy . Nevertheless, ifG is selected as the set of kth power residues
modulo a large prime p, such that (
p−1)
k is also a large prime, then the DDH assumption is
believed to hold. These groups are called Schnorr groups. Furthermore, Schnorr groups with
k = 2 are the set of quadratic residues QRp for a safe prime p.
Computationally Hard Problem 2.8 (q-Strong DH (q-SDH) Problem [BB04])
Assume that G1 and G2 are two cyclic groups of prime order p, where G1 =G2 is possible.
Assume that the two generators g1 and g2 respectively generate G1 and G2. The q-Strong
Difﬁe-Hellman problem consists of outputting a pair
(
c,g 1/(x+c)1
)
, where c ∈Z∗p, given the
tuple
(
g1, g2, g x2 , . . . , g
(xq)
2
)
, where x ∈R Z∗p. In order to deﬁneG1 andG2, the q-SDH prob-
lem is often associated with the asymmetric pairing generatorPGa(1κ). In the case ofG1 =G2,
the q-SDH problem is thus associated with the symmetric pairing generator PG(1κ). The
related computational hardness assumption is called the q-SDH assumption.
Computationally Hardness Assumption 2.8 (q-SDH Assumption)
Let Cgen output (G1,G2,p,g1,g2,x,q) on input 1κ such that p is prime,
∥∥p∥∥= κ, g1,g2 have
order p, g1 generates G1, g2 generates G2, x ∈R Z∗p, and q ∈N. The q-SDH assumption
relative to Cgen states that for any PPT adversaryA ,
Pr
[
(G1,G2,p,g1,g2,x,q)←Cgen (1κ) , (c, s)←A
(
G1,G2,p,g1,g2,g x2 , . . . , g
(xq)
2
)
:
s = g 1/(x+c)1
]
is negligible in κ.
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A recent study by Cheon [Che06] shows a “weakness" in the q-SDH assumption. His results
imply that the SDH problem has a computational complexity reduced by a factor of

q from
that of the discrete logarithmproblem. Hence the generic computational complexity to recover
x is O
(√|G2|/q) group operations instead ofΩ(√|G2|) as claimed in [Sho97]. Nevertheless,
this “weakness" is not relevant when q is a very small number compared to |G2|. In this thesis,
it is assumed that q is less than 15 bits, whereas |G2| is either greater than 256 bits (in the case
of symmetric bilinear groups), or greater than 512 bits (in the asymmetric case).
Computationally Hard Problem 2.9 (Reverse Double Pairing Problem [AFG+10])
Assume thatG1 andG2 are asymmetric bilinear groups. Given u,v ∈G2, the reverse double
pairing problem consists of ﬁnding elements s, t ∈ G1 \ {1} such that e(s,u) = e(t ,v). The
related computational hardness assumption is called the reverse double pairing assumption.
Computationally Hardness Assumption 2.9 (Reverse Double Pairing Assumption [AFG+10])
Let Cgen output (parambp,u,v) on input 1κ such that parambp := (p,G1,G2,GT,e)←PGa(1κ),
and u,v ∈R G2. The reverse double pairing assumption relative to Cgen states that for any
PPT adversaryA ,
Pr
[
(parambp,u,v)←Cgen (1κ) , (s, t )←A (parambp,u,v) :
e(s,u)= e(t ,v) ∧ s, t ∈G1 \ {1}
]
is negligible in κ.
Furthermore, Abe et al. showed in [AFG+10] that the DDH assumption implies the reverse
double pairing assumption. Note that in [Gro11], Groth has referred to this assumption as the
“computational double pairing assumption".
Decisional Hard Problem 2.10 (Decision Linear (DLIN) Problem [BBS04])
Given a ﬁnite (multiplicative) abelian groupG of prime order p, three generators u, v, h ofG,
and three group elements ua , vb , hc ∈G, decide if a+b ?= c (mod p). The related decisional
hardness assumption is called the DLIN assumption.
Decisional Hardness Assumption 2.10 (DLIN Assumption)
Let Cgen output (G,p,u,v,h,a,b,c) on input 1κ such that p is prime,
∥∥p∥∥=κ, u,v,h are three
random generators ofG, and a,b,c are uniformly random variables taken independently in
Zp. The DLIN assumption relative to Cgen states that the distributions
(
ua ,vb ,ha+b
)
and(
ua ,vb ,hc
)
are computationally indistinguishable in κ.
Here again, the DDH assumption implies the DLIN assumption, by solving the following
request in the DLIN problem:(
u, v, h, ua , vb , hc
)
← (g x , v = 1, g , g z , 1, g y ) .
TheΛ-Power Symmetric Discrete Logarithm (Λ-PSDL) assumption is necessary for the pro-
tocols in Chapter 5. It was introduced by Lipmaa in [Lip12a] and originates from a related
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assumption in [GJM02]. Assume that an asymmetric pairing generator PGa(1κ) outputs the
parameters parambp := (p,G1,G2,GT,e)←PGa(1κ). Assume that g1 and g2 are respectively
generators ofG1 andG2. Assume that Λ= {λi }i∈Zn ⊂N such that ∀i < j : 0<λi <λ j , and that
x ∈R Z∗p \ {1}.
Computationally Hard Problem 2.11 (Λ-PSDL Problem [Lip12a])
Given parambp and
(
g x
i
1 , g
xi
2
)
i∈{0}∪Λ, compute x. The related computational hardness as-
sumption, called the Λ-PSDL assumption, states that PGa is Λ-PSDL secure.
Computationally Hardness Assumption 2.11 (Λ-PSDL Assumption [Lip12a])
LetPGa output (parambp) and Cgen output (g1,g2,Λ,x) on input 1κ. TheΛ-PSDL assumption
relative to Cgen states that PGa is Λ-PSDL secure if for any PPT adversaryA ,
Pr
[
(parambp)←PGa(1κ), (g1,g2,Λ,x)←Cgen (1κ) , x ←A
(
parambp,Λ,
(
g x
i
1 , g
xi
2
)
i∈{0}∪Λ
)]
is negligible in κ.
An alternative deﬁnition exists by restricting the input to parambp and
(
g x
i
t
)
i∈{0}∪Λ, where
t ∈ {1,2}. In this case, it is said that PGa is Λ-PDL secure inG1 for t = 1 (respectively inG2 for
t = 2). Furthermore, Lipmaa provided a proof in [Lip12a] that theΛ-PSDL assumption holds
in the generic group model for any Λ = {λi }i∈Zn ⊂N such that ∀i < j : 0 < λi < λ j . This last
model is a security model that idealizes reality. Its idealization provides to all participants, a
random encoding of a group, together with the corresponding oracles for group operations. It
should nevertheless be mentioned that this model has been criticized by Dent in [Den02], as
it posses problems when constructing concrete instantiations.
The last two problems presented hereafter are used in related prior protocols ([DJ01, dMW06]),
and are explained for purposes of clarity and comparison.
Assume the following deﬁnitions: a literal is either a boolean variable or its negation; a clause
is an expression of literals linked with disjunctions (OR: ∨); and a boolean expression is in
the conjunctive normal form (CNF), if it is an expression of clauses linked with conjunctions
(AND: ∧).
Decisional Hard Problem 2.12 (Boolean 3-Satisﬁability (3SAT) Problem)
Given a boolean expression in the CNF with at most three literals in each clause, decide if it is
satisﬁable.
The unproven exponential time hypothesis [IP99] implies that the 3SAT problem cannot be
solved in time faster than eo(n), where n is the number of variables in the corresponding
boolean expression.
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2.2.3 Random Oracle Model and Hash Functions
Some cryptographic protocols request the usage of random functions. These functions output
values that are truly random in function of the input. Unfortunately, in order to do so, they
require a true randomness source which renders them unpractical. Thus, hash functions
are used in their stead. Hash functions are deterministic functions that should meet two
conditions: they need to be efﬁciently computable in polynomial time; and it should be hard
to ﬁnd two different inputs that would induce the same output. Their aim is to be hard to
invert as well as hard to predict. Nevertheless, they raise concerns when proving security, as
their output is deterministic and not truly random.
To provide some security evidence, an extended model was presented in [BR93] by Bellare and
Rogaway: the random oracle model. In this idealized model, security is proven by replacing
hash functions with idealized random functions available to all parties, which are called
random oracles. A random oracle returns a truly random value when queried with a new
input, otherwise it returns the corresponding previously randomly drawn value. Thus, security
is proven by considering the underlying hash functions as ideal random functions. This
idealization led to several critiques from Canetti, Goldreich, and Halevi in [CGH98, CGH04],
and from Goldwasser and Kalai in [GK03]. They showed that some protocols are secure in the
random oracle model but insecure under any instantiations of hash functions. These critiques
have been minimized by Bleumer in [vTJ11], by pointing out that these cases are usually
avoided in the cryptographic literature. Counterbalancing the arguments of Bleumer, Bitansky
et al. gave more criticism against the random oracle model in [BDG+13]. They showed that
proving security for presumably safer protocols (statistically sound proofs, see Section 2.3.1)
can also be problematic in the standard model. The random oracle model is nevertheless
often preferred in the construction of some speciﬁc protocols, such as non-interactive zero-
knowledge proofs (see Section 2.3.6), due to its practicality when deploying corresponding
protocols. In particular, the random oracle model does not require any trusted third party, and
often protocols constructed in this model are more efﬁcient. For these reasons, this model is
frequently relied on by some practitioners to construct their protocols.
Hash functions in practice take arbitrary length inputs and output ﬁxed length results. Hash
functions can either be instantiated with a key (they are thus called keyed hash functions) or
without (unkeyed hash functions).
Although unkeyed hash functions are preferably used, keyed hash functions are used to pro-
duce Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithms. A MAC algorithm solves the problem
of authenticating a large message over an insecure channel. This problem also includes check-
ing the integrity of messages. The solution provided consists of sharing a secret common key
between the sender and the receiver, and using this key to produce a small hash digest (called
a MAC value or simply a MAC) that will be appended to the message. Informally, the security
is based on the difﬁculty of recovering the secret key, as well as the difﬁculty of producing a
MAC value without the knowledge of the secret key.
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Regarding unkeyed hash functions, three security properties need to be presented.
(First) Preimage Resistance: Given a hash digest y , ﬁnding x such that y = h(x) must be
computationally infeasible.
Second Preimage Resistance: Given a message x and its corresponding hash digest h(x),
ﬁnding a second different message x ′ = x such that h(x)= h(x ′) must be computation-
ally infeasible.
Collision Resistance: Finding two different messages x = x ′, such that h(x)= h(x ′) must be
computationally infeasible.
Hash functions that satisfy both the ﬁrst and second preimage resistance security properties,
are called one-way hash functions. If they additionally satisfy the collision resistance security
property, they are then called collision resistant (or collision intractable) hash functions. Un-
der certain conditions detailed by Rogaway and Shrimpton in [RS04], the collision resistance
property implies both the ﬁrst and second preimage resistance properties.
One of the most important standards regarding hash functions, is provided by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) with the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) family
of hash functions ([NIST15a, NIST15b]). The latest update of the SHA family is referred to
as SHA-3 [NIST15b]. This update is the result of a public competition won by Bertoni et
al. with their hash function named Keccak [BDPA13]. At present, it is not meant to replace
the preceding update SHA-2 [NIST15a], and it is considered an alternative standard. Note
that SHA-512 corresponds to the hash function in SHA-2 that outputs 512-bit hash digests.
Although available in [NIST15a, NIST15b], details of the design of the SHA family are not
relevant for this thesis.
2.2.4 Common Reference String Model
In some settings a trusted third party is necessary at the beginning of cryptographic protocols,
to provide a trusted common setup for the parameters of protocols. This happens for instance
in the case where participants distrust each others but still need some trusted common
parameters. To cover this necessity, the Common Reference String (CRS) model [BFM88]
provides all participants with the same setup parameters. These parameters can take various
forms, such as a uniformly random bit string, or descriptions of parameters (public keys with
discarded secret keys, bit lengths, distributions, functions, elements, or sets taken from public
distributions, ...). These common setup parameters form a set that is called the common
reference string (crs). The main application of the CRS model appears in the construction
of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, as explained in Section 2.3.6. In situations where
a higher level of trust in cryptography is needed, and participants cannot rely on unproven
heuristics such as in the random oracle model, the CRS model offers a good alternative,
although it requires a trusted third party to generate the crs. The CRS model will thus be used
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to construct the non-interactive protocols presented in Chapter 5. Although this model allows
the achievement of efﬁcient results once participants have access to the crs, it is important to
keep in mind that the crs itself needs to be transmitted. Thus its size should be kept as small
as possible.
2.2.5 Knowledge Assumptions
Knowledge assumptions, which should not be confused with proofs of knowledge (see Sec-
tion 2.3.3), deﬁne the inference between the ability to perform some speciﬁc computations
(without interaction) and the knowledge required to perform these computations. Informally,
assume that some computations Γ can be performed solely with the help of a secret element
sk. Then the knowledge assumption states that if the adversary can compute Γ, then it can be
inferred that the adversary “knows” sk.
The ﬁrst knowledge assumption was introduced in 1991 by Damgård in [Dam91]. In 2008,
Canetti and Dakdouk gave, in [CD08], a ﬁrst abstraction of knowledge assumption with the
notion of extractable functions, where the extractability property of these function ensures
the knowledge assumption. Extractable functions are either one-way or collision resistant
functions (similarly to hash functions). Furthermore, they assume the existence of an extractor
XA deﬁned for a PPT ITM A (see Section 2.3.1), such that when given the same inputs
(including the random tape) and code ofA , XA outputs a preimage.
Although some speciﬁc knowledge assumptions are well deﬁned and accepted, the general
deﬁnition of a knowledge assumption has not yet been formally set and is still debated within
the cryptographic community [GS12b, BCPR14]. The following deﬁnition attempts to provide
some indications as to how to deﬁne knowledge assumptions, and should not be considered a
formally matured deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.20 (Knowledge Assumption)
Assume thatA is a PPT ITM with1 auxiliary input x and random tape r . The length of the
auxiliary input x is restricted to a polynomial in the security parameter κ (see [BCPR14] for
more details), and is either partially or completely generated by the algorithm of the chal-
lenger Cgen. Moreover, x is sometimes referred to as the auxiliary information. A knowledge
assumption is deﬁned with respect to an extractable one-way function f , and states that
for any A (x,r ) that achieves the computation of f and outputs y in the image of f , there
exists an extractor XA (x,r, y) that takes as input (x,r, y) and outputs a preimage of y with
probability
(
1−μ(‖x‖)), where μ is a negligible function in the length of x.
Note that in [GS12b], f is called a Knowledge Commitment Protocol instead of an extractable
function. Lastly, both [GS12b] and [BCPR14] noted that some restrictions need to be added
1The exact quantiﬁcation of x and r depends on the speciﬁc knowledge assumption.
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to this latter deﬁnition, regarding the length and the nature of the auxiliary input x. Impos-
sibility results occur when these restrictions are not made. Nevertheless, several knowledge
assumptions were proven secure in the generic group model. Recall that this last model is an
idealization of reality, as is the random oracle model, and that it has been criticized by Dent
in [Den02] for having the same problems as the random oracle model.
This overview on knowledge assumptions aims to introduce the Λ-Power Knowledge of Expo-
nent (Λ-PKE) assumption that will be used in Chapter 5, and which was initially formalized
in [Lip12a]. Given the parameters of an asymmetric bilinear pairing parambp generated by
an asymmetric pairing generator PGa(1κ), the Λ-PKE security is deﬁned for eitherG1 orG2.
Furthermore, assume that the corresponding generator is g , that (α̂, x) is a pair of secret pa-
rameters, and that Λ= {λi }i∈Zn ⊂N such that ∀i < j : 0<λi <λ j . The Λ-PKE then informally
states that given
(
g x
i
, g α̂x
i
)
i∈{0}∪Λ, it is infeasible to produce a pair (c, ĉ) such that ĉ = c
α̂,
without knowing variables (ai )i∈{0}∪Λ such that c =
∏
i∈{0}∪Λ
(
g x
i
)ai
. Assume that g1 and g2 are
respectively generators of G1 and G2.
Knowledge Assumption 2.1 (Λ-PKE [Lip12a])
Let t ∈ {1,2} determine which group (G1 or G2) the Λ-PKE security is deﬁned for. Let PGa
output (parambp) on input (1κ) and Cgen output (gt ,Λ, α̂,x) on input (parambp,1κ). The Λ-
PKE assumption relative to Cgen, states that PGa isΛ-PKE secure inG1 for t = 1 (respectively
inG2 for t = 2), if for any PPT adversaryA there exists a PPT extractor algorithm XA such
that
Pr
⎡⎢⎢⎣
(parambp)←PGa(1κ), (gt ,Λ, α̂,x)←Cgen
(
parambp,1κ
)
,(
(c, ĉ) ; (ai )i∈{0}∪Λ
)← (A ∥ XA )(parambp, (g xit , g α̂xit )i∈{0}∪Λ) :
ĉ = cα̂ ∧ c =∏i∈{0}∪Λ (g xit )ai
⎤⎥⎥⎦ is negligible in κ,
where the notation
(
y ; z
)← (A ∥ XA ) (χ) means that with the same random tape and on
input χ, the adversaryA outputs y and the extractor XA outputs z.
Moreover, the Λ-PKE assumption is derived from the q-PKE assumption of Groth [Gro10],
where Λ is replaced by the set {1, . . . , q}. Groth proved in [Gro10] that the q-PKE assumption
holds in the generic group model, and his proof naturally extends to the case of Λ. Note
that historically, the q-PKE assumption derives from the Knowledge-of-Exponent (KEA3)
assumption of Bellare and Palacio [BP04], which itself comes from the Knowledge-of-Exponent
(KEA) assumption of Damgård [Dam91]
2.3 Proofs and Arguments
Although ambiguous, proofs (or proof systems) and arguments refer here to some speciﬁc
protocol constructions, and should not be confused with security proofs. A proof system
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usually involves two types of participants: provers and veriﬁers. Sometimes, a trusted third
party is also involved. The goal of a proof system is to convince PPT veriﬁers of the veracity of
a statement held by provers. Arguments are a weaker version of proof systems, where provers
are limited to being PPT. An additional variant of proof systems, called a proof of knowledge
(PK), requires provers to know a witness of the statement being proven.
Furthermore, proofs may have a supplementary security property that limits the amount
of information that veriﬁers can obtain. The zero-knowledge (ZK) security property states
that apart from the veracity of the statement, no information is obtained by veriﬁers. Weaker
notions exist such as witness hiding (WH) and witness indistinguishability (WI), where the
security is focused on how much information veriﬁers are able to obtain regarding the witness
of provers. The last characterization of proofs and arguments targets their interaction model.
The latter can be either interactive or non-interactive depending on whether provers and
veriﬁers are allowed to reply to messages exchanged, or if a single message is sent from the
prover to potential veriﬁers.
Last but not least, arguments are often wrongly called proofs in the cryptographic literature,
especially regarding range proofs (see chapters 4 and 5). Although this abuse of terminology is
also used in the rest of this thesis, the distinction will be preserved in this section.
2.3.1 Interactive Proofs
An interactive proof protocol, sometimes called an interactive proof system, aims to convince
some veriﬁers of the veracity of a statement to which provers hold some secret evidence. In
order to convince veriﬁers, it is assumed that more than one message is exchanged, hence
the interactive designation. If the protocol succeeds to convince veriﬁers, then it is said that
veriﬁers accept the veracity of the statement being proven, or simply that veriﬁers accept. The
size of the proof protocol should be relatively small and its veriﬁcation should be efﬁcient.
This is formalized with the complexity classN P.
Deﬁnition 2.21 (Complexity ClassN P [Gol01] (Deﬁnition 1.3.2, Section 1.3))
A formal language LR for a relation R is the set of elements x, called words, that are con-
strained by the set of rules deﬁned by the relation R. A language LR is in the complexity class
N P if there exists a boolean relation R ⊆ {0,1}∗ × {0,1}∗ and a polynomial p such that R can
be recognized in deterministic polynomial time, and x ∈ LR if and only if there exists a w such
that ‖w‖ 	 p(‖x‖) and (x,w) ∈R.
Statements are thus of the form x ∈ LR , where the common input is x and where provers hold
a witness w such that (x,w) ∈ R. Formally, provers and veriﬁers are deﬁned as interactive
Turing machines (ITMs), where veriﬁers are PPT ITMs and provers are unrestricted ITMs. The
complete formal deﬁnition of an ITM is described by Goldreich in [Gol01], and brieﬂy recalled
here.
27
Chapter 2. Preliminaries
Deﬁnition 2.22 (Interactive Turing Machine [Gol01] (Deﬁnition 4.2.1, Section 4.2))
An interactive Turing machine (ITM) is a deterministic multi-tape Turing machine. ITMs
are considered in pairs. Moreover, apart from the basic tapes of a Turing machine (read-only
input tape, read-only random tape, read-and-write work tape, and write-only output tape),
ITMs additionally have two communication tapes (read-only input communication tape, and
write-only output communication tape) and an active/idle indication tape (read-and-write
switch tape). The additional tapes model the interaction process. The input communication
tape of an ITM corresponds to the output communication tape of the other ITM. The switch
tape determines which ITM is active and which is idle.
Lastly, the security proof of interactive proof protocols is obtained from two security condi-
tions: completeness and soundness. The completeness condition states that for any honest
prover and any honest veriﬁer, if x ∈ LR , veriﬁers accepts the veracity of the statement being
proven with a probability of at leastC . In general, protocols with perfect completeness are pre-
ferred, which implies that C = 1. Informally, this means that the protocol will always succeed
with honest interactions. The soundness condition states that for any (potentially malicious)
prover and any honest veriﬁer, if x ∉ LR , veriﬁers will accept the veracity of the statement being
proven with probability at mostS , whereS is ideally negligible. This condition prevents any
malicious provers from convincing veriﬁers of a false statement. Note that the probabilities
C andS are called, respectively, the completeness error and the soundness error. They are
deﬁned by the means of functions in the length of x or equivalently in the security parameter
κ, and are respectively named completeness and soundness bounds. The formal deﬁnition
of an interactive proof can be found in [Gol01], in the deﬁnition of “Generalized Interactive
Proof ” (Deﬁnition 4.2.6, Section 4.2). The following is an informal reminder of that deﬁnition,
where the existence of a setup algorithm, in charge of generating the inputs of P and V , will be
implicitly assumed.
Deﬁnition 2.23 (Interactive Proof)
Assume that a generator algorithm Pgen (1κ) selects a pair (x,w) in the relation R. An interac-
tive proof for language LR, is the composition of a veriﬁer V and a prover P, such that V is
PPT ITM with input x (bounded in length by the security parameter κ), P is an unrestricted
ITM with provided input (x,w) ∈R, and where the completeness and soundness conditions
with respect to LR hold. The interactive proof is thus denoted (P,V )LR or simply (P,V ) if LR is
clear from the context.
2.3.2 Interactive Argument
Interactive arguments, also known as computationally sound proof systems, are interactive
proof protocols where malicious provers in the soundness notion are restricted to being PPT
ITMs. This restriction also applies to adversaries. Therefore, the (computational) soundness is
deﬁned for all (including malicious) PPT provers, where cheating is feasible with negligible
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probability in the security parameter κ. In general, the security is based on computational
hardness assumptions, as these assumptions assume PPT adversaries.
2.3.3 Proofs of Knowledge (PK)
The deﬁnition of proofs of knowledge was initiated by the work of Feige, Fiat, and Shamir
in [FFS88]. It was then developed by the work of Bellare and Goldreich in [BG92], and extended
by Goldreich in [Gol01]. Informally, a proof of knowledge is an interactive proof such that
the soundness condition additionally requires that the veriﬁer V accepts only if the prover
P “knows” x ∈ LR . This concept of knowledge is captured with the help of a PPT ITM, called
the knowledge extractor K , such that when given access to a successful prover P , K outputs a
witness for x ∈ LR . Note that in the cryptographic literature regarding proofs of knowledge, P is
often assumed to be PPT. Although the term arguments of knowledge would be more suitable,
these protocols are still referred to as proofs of knowledge.
Deﬁnition 2.24 (Proof of Knowledge [Gol01] (Deﬁnition 4.7.2, Section 4.7.1))
A proof of knowledge is an interactive argument that has the following extended soundness
condition with a knowledge error2 μ(κ).
Denote x as the common input. For the prover P, denote y as its auxiliary input, and r as its
random tape. There exists a polynomial q and a probabilistic oracle machine K such that
for every prover P, every x ∈ LR, and every y,r ∈ {0,1}∗, machine K satisﬁes the following
condition:
Denote byS the probability that the veriﬁer V accepts, on input x, when inter-
acting with the prover P. IfS >μ(κ), then, on input x and with oracle access to
P, machine K outputs a witness w for x ∈ LR within an expected number of steps
bounded by q(κ)S −μ(κ) .
The oracle machine K is called a universal knowledge extractor, or more simply a knowledge
extractor. Proofs of knowledge will be denoted PK {(w,r ) : x ∈ LR }, where the elements (w,r )
represent the elements the knowledge of which is being proved, and x ∈ LR the statement
related to the proof of knowledge.
Furthermore, note the existence of some alternative (weaker) deﬁnitions. For instance, the
running time of the extractor is commonly assumed to run in expected polynomial-time
instead of strict polynomial-time. Another notable example is the deﬁnition from [Lin01,
Lin03] where the soundness condition is replaced with a weaker version called a witness-
extended emulation. Informally, in this latter deﬁnition, the extractor K is replaced with an
emulator running in expected polynomial-time (and not PPT), which outputs an emulation of
2The knowledge errorμ is often associated to the maximum probability with which a veriﬁerV can be convinced
on input x ∈ LR .
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a successful proof produced by the adversary, together with a witness corresponding to the
emulation.
2.3.4 Zero-Knowledge (ZK)
Introduced by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackof in [GMR85, GMR89], zero-knowledge is an
important security property for proofs, arguments, and proofs of knowledge. This property
aims to protect provers against malicious veriﬁers which attempt to gain more knowledge than
that which is intended. Informally, the goal of ZK is that veriﬁers learn “no” knowledge besides
that which is intended, even when they deviate from the protocol execution. Regarding a
proof protocol where the statement x ∈ LR is being proven, ZK guarantees that veriﬁers will
only learn the veracity of the statement, without any additional knowledge, hence the term
zero-knowledge. This security property is achieved by showing that the interaction with the
prover can be efﬁciently simulated without the help of the prover, and thus without his private
inputs and without the witness w of x ∈ LR . This simulation is performed by a PPT ITM,
called the simulator. Furthermore, the collection of messages exchanged in a proof protocol is
called the transcript of the proof protocol. Hence, the goal of the simulator is to simulate the
transcript.
Deﬁnition 2.25 (Zero-Knowledge)
Let (P, V )LR be a proof protocol regarding the language LR, between a prover P and a veriﬁer
V . Let tr (P, V ∗)LR be the sequence of random variables deﬁning the transcript distribution
between any veriﬁer V ∗ and the prover P. Let trsim be the sequence of random variables
deﬁning the simulated transcript distribution, where the simulated transcript is output by
the simulator. Note that the sole input of the simulator is the common input x.
The zero-knowledge property of (P, V )LR depends on the indistinguishability relation between
tr (P, V ∗)LR and trsim. Thus the proof protocol (P, V )LR is said to be:
• perfectly zero-knowledge if for all x ∈ LR,
tr (P, V ∗)LR and trsim are perfectly indistinguishable
(
tr (P, V ∗)LR =p trsim
)
.
• statistically zero-knowledge if for all x ∈ LR,
tr (P, V ∗)LR and trsim are statistically indistinguishable
(
tr (P, V ∗)LR =s trsim
)
.
• computationally zero-knowledge if for all x ∈ LR,
tr (P, V ∗)LR and trsim are computationally indistinguishable
(
tr (P, V ∗)LR =c trsim
)
.
Recall that the indistinguishability relation is explained in Section 2.1.2. This deﬁnition of
zero-knowledge is applicable to arguments as well as to proofs of knowledge, by considering
the prover P as a PPT ITM. Furthermore, if the deﬁnition is restricted to honest veriﬁers (V ∗
is restricted to honest veriﬁers), then the security property achieved is called honest veriﬁer
zero-knowledge (HVZK). It can also be noted that more diverse forms of zero-knowledge exist
(see [Gol01], Chapter 4).
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2.3.5 Weaker ZK with witness security
Feige and Shamir introduced in [FS90] two weaker versions of zero-knowledge, where security
focuses on the witness of the statement. The ﬁrst one, called witness hiding (WH), states that
(cheating) veriﬁers are unable to compute a witness for the statement, even after interacting
with the honest prover, unless veriﬁers were able to do so prior to any interactions with the
honest prover. The second security property, called witness indistinguishability (WI), states
that (cheating) veriﬁers are unable to identify which witnesses are held by the prover, even if
all witnesses are known to the veriﬁers. Furthermore, Feige and Shamir also showed in [FS90]
that WH can be instantiated from WI protocols.
Deﬁnition 2.26 (Witness Indistinguishability [FS90] (Deﬁnition 3.1, Section 3))
Let tr
(
P(x,w), V(x,y˜)
)LR be the sequence of random variables deﬁning the transcript distribu-
tion of a proof protocol (P, V )LR , where x is the common input, w is the witness of the prover
P and y˜ is the auxiliary input that the veriﬁer V might have.
(P, V )LR is witness indistinguishable (WI) regarding LR, if for any (potentially malicious) ver-
iﬁer V ∗, for any long enough common input x, for any witnesses w1,w2 such that (x,w1) ∈R
and (x,w2) ∈ R, the following holds: tr
(
P(x,w1), V
∗
(x,y˜)
)LR
and tr
(
P(x,w2), V
∗
(x,y˜)
)LR
are per-
fectly indistinguishable.
WI is sometimes referred to as perfect witness indistinguishability to differentiate it with the
statistical case, where tr
(
P(x,w1), V
∗
(x,y˜)
)LR
and tr
(
P(x,w2), V
∗
(x,y˜)
)LR
are statistically indistin-
guishable.
2.3.6 Non-Interactive (NI) Proofs
Interactive proofs (as well as arguments and PK) also have a non-interactive (NI) variant.
The essential difference with non-interactive proofs is that all interactions consist of a single
message sent by the prover to the veriﬁer. Veriﬁers are thus passive in the sense that they send
no messages to provers. NI proofs were initially introduced in the context of non-interactive
zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs [BFM88, SMP87, BSMP91]. Furthermore, it has been shown
in [GO94] that NIZK proofs require some setup assumptions, such as provided with the CRS
or with the random oracle model. Therefore, the standard model alone is insufﬁcient for
NIZK proofs. Moreover, zero-knowledge for NIZK proofs, in the context of the CRS model, is
achieved if both the CRS and the proof can be simulated.
Deﬁnition 2.27 (NIZK Proofs)
A non-interactive argument for language LR consists of the next PPT algorithms: a CRS
generator Gencrs, a prover P, and a veriﬁer V . For crs←Gencrs(1κ), P (crs;x,w) produces an
argument π. The veriﬁer V (crs;x,π) outputs either 1 (accept) or 0 (reject).
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A non-interactive argument (Gencrs,P,V ) is perfectly complete, if for all crs← Gencrs(1κ)
and all (x,w) ∈R, V (crs;x,P (crs;x,w)) outputs 1. A non-interactive argument (Gencrs,P,V )
is computationally (adaptively) sound, if for all non-uniform PPT adversariesA ,
Pr
[
crs←Gencrs(1κ), (x,π)←A (crs) : x ∈ LR ∧V (crs;x,π) outputs 1
]
is negligible in κ.
A non-interactive argument (Gencrs,P,V ) is perfectly witness indistinguishable, if (given
that there are several possible witnesses) it is impossible to tell which witness the prover used.
That is, if crs←Gencrs(1κ) and ((x,w0), (x,w1)) ∈R2, then the distributions P (crs;x,w0) and
P (crs;x,w1) are equal.
(Gencrs,P,V ) is perfectly zero-knowledge, if there exists a polynomial-time simulator Sim =
(Sim1,Sim2) with a simulation trapdoor td, such that for all stateful interactive non-uniform
PPT adversariesA ,
Pr
[
crs←Gencrs(1κ), (x,w)←A (crs),π← P (crs;x,w) :
(x,w) ∈R∧A (crs,π) outputs 1
]
= Pr
[
(crs,td)← Sim1(1κ), (x,w)←A (crs),π← Sim2(crs,x,td) :
(x,w) ∈R∧A (crs,π) outputs 1
]
.
(Gencrs,P,V ) is computationally zero-knowledge if these two probabilities are computation-
ally indistinguishable.
Deﬁnition 2.28 (NIZK Proofs of Knowledge)
A non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge is a non-interactive zero-knowledge
argument that has the following extended soundness condition with a knowledge error2μ(κ).
Let crs be generated by the CRS generator Gencrs(1κ). The non-uniform PPT adversaryA is
given crs as input, and outputs x (the common input) together with its corresponding proof π.
Denote S as the probability that a veriﬁer V accepts on input (crs;x,π). The knowledge
extractor XA is a probabilistic oracle machine that takes as input x ∈ LR, the crs, and the
random tape ofA .
The extended soundness condition holds if there exists a polynomial q, and a knowledge
extractor XA , such that ifS >μ, then XA outputs a witness w for x ∈ LR within an expected
number of steps bounded by q(κ)S −μ(κ) .
Identically to proofs of knowledge, non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge will
be denoted NI ZK -PK {(w,r ) : x ∈ LR }.
Since their introduction, the importance of NIZK proofs rose and they are now considered an
important part of cryptography. NIZK proofs can be either constructed directly in the CRS
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model (by using, for instance, a general methodology), or by converting an interactive equiva-
lent proof using generic transformations. Notable examples of such generic transformations,
are the use of the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86], the Lindell transform [Lin15], and the CPSV
transform [CPSV16]. These three transformations are restricted to particular interactive proofs
called Σ-protocols (see Section 2.4.1) and will result in a security proven in the random oracle
model. Although the Fiat-Shamir heuristic yields very efﬁcient protocols, it is considered
controversial as some insecurity results were shown in [CGH98, CGH04]. Alternatively, the
Groth-Sahai method [GS08, GS12a] is the most popular general methodology for obtaining
a NIZK proof in the CRS model, even though this method is focused on protocols based on
bilinear pairings. Nevertheless, both the random oracle model and the CRS model will be
considered in this thesis for the sake of completeness. This will allow users to select their
protocols according to the security model they need.
2.4 Protocols and Building Blocks
This section explains the majority of the protocols and building blocks that are needed to
understand the various results of this thesis. The set membership proofs of Chapter 3 and
the interactive range proofs of Chapter 4 are all based on Σ-protocols, which are explained
in Section 2.4.1. Commitment schemes, public key cryptosystems, signature schemes, and
accumulators are respectively deﬁned in sections 2.4.2, 2.4.3, 2.4.5, and 2.4.6, together with
the speciﬁc instantiations needed for this thesis. Lastly, the non-interactive range proof
of Chapter 5 requires the lifted BBS cryptosystem, the Hadamard product argument and
the Lipmaa permutation argument, which are respectively explained in sections 2.4.4, 2.4.7,
and 2.4.8.
2.4.1 Σ-Protocols
Σ-protocols are interactive zero-knowledge proofs (or arguments) of knowledge that follow a
speciﬁc interaction pattern with special security properties. The interaction pattern consists
of three messages (a,c,r ). The ﬁrst message a is sent by the prover to the veriﬁer and is
usually a commitment to the randomness of the prover. The second message c is a sufﬁciently
large random challenge, sent by the veriﬁer to the prover. The last message r is a speciﬁc
response from the prover, that allows the veriﬁer to achieve the proof of knowledge by running
a deterministic check on his inputs and the messages exchanged.
The special security properties that need to be met are perfect completeness, special soundness,
and special honest veriﬁer zero-knowledge (SHVZK). The perfect completeness property is
identical to the one for proofs of knowledge. The special soundness property only restricts
the oracle access to the prover for the knowledge extractor. For any x ∈ LR and on any
pair of accepting interactions (a,c,r ) and (a,c ′,r ′) such that c = c ′, the knowledge extractor
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tries to output the witness w , given as input (x,a,c,c ′,r,r ′). The SHVZK property implies
the HVZK property for a transcript of the form (a,c,r ), with the additional property that,
given a uniformly chosen challenge c, the simulator outputs an accepting interaction (a,c,r ).
Moreover, computationally indistinguishability of the simulated transcript is usually assumed
in SHVZK.
Deﬁnition 2.29 (Σ-Protocols)
A Σ-protocol for language LR is an interactive zero-knowledge proofs (or arguments) of
knowledge (P,V ) where the transcript (or conversation) is of the form (a,c,r ). The messages a
and r are computed by P, and c is a challenge randomly chosen by V . The veriﬁer accepts if
φ(x,a,c,z)= 1 for some efﬁciently computable predicate φ, where x is the common input of
P and V .
A Σ-protocol must satisfy three security requirements: completeness, special soundness and
special honest veriﬁer zero-knowledge (SHVZK). A Σ-protocol is perfectly complete when
a honest prover convinces honest veriﬁers with probability 1. A Σ-protocol has the special
soundness property when the knowledge extractor K can efﬁciently recover a witness w
such that (x,w) ∈ R, from two accepting transcripts3 (a,c,r ) and (a,c ′,r ′), where c = c ′.
A Σ-protocol has the SHVZK property if there exists a PPT simulator Sim that can ﬁrst
randomly pick c∗, then ﬁnd r∗ and a∗ such that the transcript (a∗,c∗,r∗) is accepting and
the distribution (a∗,c∗,r∗) is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of
accepting transcripts between honest provers and honest veriﬁers. Finding r∗ and a∗ is
usually achieved by (randomly) picking r∗ ﬁrst, and deducing a∗ after.
The terminology of Σ-protocols was introduced by Cramer in [Cra97], although this type of
protocols was used before (as early as in [FS86]). In [CDS94], Cramer et al. showed that the
special soundness imply the standard soundness of proofs of knowledge. Furthermore, it is
possible to convert a Σ-protocol that is SHVZK to plain ZK as shown by Cramer, Damgård, and
MacKenzie in [CDM00].
2.4.2 Commitment Schemes
A commitment scheme is one of the basic cryptographic primitives. The concept of commit-
ment schemes was introduced by Blum in [Blu81] and its terminology by Even in [Eve81],
although they were implicitly used by Shamir et al. in [SRA81].
Informally, a commitment can be seen as a vault with a safe deposit box. A party, called the
committer will put his message into the safe and lock it. He will then be able to transmit the
vault with the assurance that it is safely hidden in the vault. Meanwhile, the other parties
will want to have the insurance that the committer will not be able to cheat by providing a
wrong opening sequence to another hidden safe box inside the vault, containing a message
3Recall that K has a rewindable oracle access to P .
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that is different to the initial one. Therefore there is a need to deﬁne two conﬂicting security
properties of commitments, the hiding and the binding requirements.
Thus, a commitment scheme is a protocol enabling the committer to commit to a message
of his choice. This means that the committer will be able to ﬁx his decision upon a message
and disclose that he has done so without revealing the content of his message. He will be tied
to his decision through a mathematical object called the commitment linked to his hidden
message. In a later phase, when the committer will be asked to reveal his message, the other
parties, called veriﬁers, will have the means to verify that his revealed message is indeed
unconditionally linked to his commitment. The hiding requirement prevents veriﬁers from
learning the content of the commitment. The binding requirement prevents the committer
to cheat when opening his commitment. Here, cheating means opening the commitment
to a different value than the initial message committed in the commitment. The following
deﬁnitions are inspired by the deﬁnitions of Goldreich in [Gol01].
Deﬁnition 2.30 (Commitment Scheme)
A (non-interactive) commitment scheme C is the combination of three algorithms: Gen,
Commit, and Open, representing respectively the parameters generation, the commit, and
the open algorithm. The Gen(1κ) algorithm generates parameters p for the scheme based on
a given security parameter κ. The commit algorithm Commit(p,m,r ) runs on input (p,m,r )
where m is a message string taken in the message spaceM and r is a random tape. Commit
produces a pair of values (c,o) representing respectively the commitment as a committed
string and an opening string. For simplicity, the sub-algorithm that produces the commitment
c in the commit algorithm Commit, will be denoted Com(p,m,r ) or Com(m,r ) if p is clear
from the context. The open algorithm Open(c,m,o) runs on input (c,m,o) and outputs 1 or
0, whether the commitment c successfully opens to the message m or not.
Once the commitment parameters have been generated by Gen, the committer C will run
Commit and transmit the commitment c to potential veriﬁers V . In order to open the commit-
ment, the committerC just needs to transmit the initial message m together with the opening
string o to the veriﬁers V , who will run the checking algorithm Open.
The hiding security requirement in a commitment scheme refers to the difﬁculty or impos-
sibility for an adversary to determine the message m from c. It ensures the committer that
his commitment will leak no information about his message choice. Depending on the in-
distinguishability property (see Section 2.1.2) of the commitments, three strengths of hiding
commitments exist, namely computationally, statistically, and perfectly hiding commitments.
A computationally hiding commitment is secure against a computationally bounded adversary.
A statistically hiding commitment will resist against computationally unbounded adversaries.
Lastly, there exist no adversaries able to break a perfectly hiding commitment.
Deﬁnition 2.31 (Hiding)
For a given commitment scheme C and any security parameter κ, assume that c1 and c2 are
any two commitments on different messages m1 and m2 respectively. The hiding property
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Common Input: p ←Gen(1κ).
Prover Input: (m,r ).
Commit Phase
C c  V Commiter runs (c,o)←Commit(p,m,r ) and sends c.
Open Phase
C m,o  V Commiter sends m,o.
Veriﬁer checks that Open(c,m,o)
?= 1.
Protocol 2.1 – General commitment scheme with security parameter κ
states that an adversaryA cannot distinguish a commitment to m1 from a commitment to
m2. This means that an adversary A given as input either (κ,p,c1) or (κ,p,c2), will have
a computationally, statistically, or perfectly indistinguishable output distribution. This
indistinguishability relation deﬁnes the hiding property type.
Formally, let (ci )κ denote the sequence of random variables representing the commitment
distribution from Com on input mi , and indexed with the security parameter κ. The hiding
property of the commitment scheme C depends on the indistinguishability relation between
{(c1)κ} and {(c2)κ}. A commitment scheme is said to be:
• computationally hiding
if {(c1)κ} and {(c2)κ} are computationally indistinguishable ({(c1)κ}=c {(c2)κ}).
• statistically hiding
if {(c1)κ} and {(c2)κ} are statistically indistinguishable ({(c1)κ}=s {(c2)κ}).
• perfectly hiding
if {(c1)κ} and {(c2)κ} are perfectly indistinguishable
(
{(c1)κ}=p {(c2)κ}
)
.
The binding security requirement in a commitment scheme refers to the difﬁculty or impossi-
bility of a committer opening the value of his commitment c to two different messages m1, m2.
The goal is to ensure that the committer is bound to his initial choice once his commitment is
created and published. A computationally binding commitment will bind computationally
bounded committers. Lastly, there exists no committer that can open one of his commitments
to two different messages, if his commitments are perfectly binding.
Deﬁnition 2.32 (Binding)
Denote by C ∗ the ITM representing a cheating committer with input parameter p. Denote by
β the probability that C ∗ is able to output a commitment that he can successfully open into
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two different messages m1,m2 ∈Mwith corresponding openings o1,o2:
β= Pr
[
p ←Gen(1κ) , (c,m1,m2,o1,o2)←C ∗(p) :
m1 =m2 ∧ Open(c,m1,o1)= 1 ∧ Open(c,m2,o2)= 1
]
A commitment scheme is said to be:
• computationally binding
if there exists a security parameter κ0 ∈N such that for every κ> κ0, for every positive
polynomial q(·), and for every computationally bounded PPT ITM C ∗,
β is negligible in κ: β< 1
q(κ)
.
• perfectly binding
if there exists no ITM C ∗ that is able to succeed. Hence β= 0 for all C ∗.
Deﬁnition 2.33 (Security of Commitment Schemes)
A commitment scheme C is said to be secure if it satisﬁes the hiding and binding security
requirements. The indistinguishability reached in these security requirements will deﬁne the
security level of the commitment scheme.
Notice that statistically and perfectly hiding commitments (Deﬁnition 2.31) protect against
computationally unbounded veriﬁers, whereas perfectly binding commitments (Deﬁnition 2.32)
protect against computationally unbounded committers. The following theorem states that
any two of these hiding/binding security achievements are mutually exclusive.
Theorem 2.2 (Binding and Hiding Antagonistic Protections)
Perfectly binding commitment schemes cannot be achieved simultaneously with either a
statistically or a perfectly hiding security requirement.
Proof (informal)
Suppose that a commitment schemes C achieves perfectly binding security, and either statisti-
cally or perfectly hiding security.
Then, when creating a commitment c from message m and random tape r , the perfectly
binding requirement states that a computationally unbounded committer cannot open c to
another message m′. This implies that Com is injective. Hence a computationally unbounded
adversary could compute the corresponding m and r of c, breaking the statistically/perfectly
hiding security requirement.
In order to satisfy the statistically/perfectly hiding security requirement, there must exist a
r ′ and m′ =m that leads to the same commitment c on m. However, in this case, a computa-
tionally unbounded committer will also be able to ﬁnd them, breaking the perfectly binding
security requirement.
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Pedersen Commitment
The Pedersen commitment4 presented in [Ped91] is perfectly hiding and computationally
binding. Its computational hardness assumption is based on the discrete logarithm problem
(DLog problem). In the setup phase of the commitment, the generation algorithm chooses
a group G of prime order q such that
∥∥q∥∥= κ, where κ is the security parameter. A random
element h together with a random generator g is picked in G such as logg h is unknown
(especially from the committer).
The commitment is of the form c = gmhr . Here m,r ∈Zq and computation is performed in
G . The value m represents the secret message of the committer, and r a uniformly random
number of his choice. To open the commitment, the committer simply reveals m and r , to let
the prover check that c = gmhr .
This scheme is perfectly hiding, as a commitment c could hold a commitment to any value
of m. For any m′ = m, the corresponding r ′ = r + (m−m′) logg h (mod q) yields the same
commitment c. Hence it is important to keep the value of logg h unknown. The binding
property holds as it is computationally infeasible to ﬁnd logg h, thanks to theDLog assumption.
The Pedersen commitment could also be used without the knowledge of the group order q , in
order to introduce more mathematical properties in the exponent, as will be seen later.
Fujisaki-Okamoto Commitment
This commitment was introduced by Fujisaki and Okamoto in [FO98] and reﬁned later by
Damgård and Fujisaki in [DF02]. It is a statistically hiding and computationally binding com-
mitment scheme based on the hardness of factorization. The parameters generation algorithm
Gen(1κ) outputs three elements (n,g ,h). The ﬁrst element n, of length κ, is the product of
two safe primes. n is called a special RSA modulus. h ∈QRn is picked as a quadratic residue
modulo n and g is taken from the group generated by h. It is assumed that given (n,g ,h), an
estimate on the order ofZn can be efﬁciently computed as ord (Zn)	 2B . The commitment
on a message m with randomness r ∈R Z2B+κ is computed as Com
(
(n,g ,h),m,r
) = gmhr
(mod n).
Commitments in the CRS Model
Some additional deﬁnitions are provided here for the commitment used in the non-interactive
range proof presented in Chapter 5.
A batch commitment scheme (Gen,Com) for n elements in a bilinear group consists of two PPT
algorithms: a randomized CRS generation algorithm Gen, and a randomized commitment
4Note that an earlier version with a slight modiﬁcation was also present in [CDvdG87].
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algorithmCom. Let t ∈ {1,2} determinewhich group (G1 orG2) the batch commitment scheme
is deﬁned for. Here, Gent (1κ,n) produces a common reference string crst . Depending on the
context of the commitment, assume a parameter d ∈ {1,2,3}. The commitment algorithm
Comt (crst ,a,r ), with a = (a1, . . . ,an), outputs a commitment value A inGd1 if t = 1 or inGd2 if
t = 2. Furthermore the commitment Comt (crst ,a,r ) is opened by revealing (a,r ).
A commitment scheme (Gen,Com) is computationally binding in groupG1 (respectivelyG2)
for t = 1 (respectively for t = 2), if for every non-uniform PPT adversaryA and positive integer
n (polynomial in κ), the probability
Pr
[
crst ←Gent (1κ,n), (a1,r1,a2,r2)←A (crst ) :
a1 = a2 ∧ Comt (crst ,a1,r1)=Comt (crst ,a2,r2)
]
is negligible in κ. A commitment scheme (Gen,Com) is perfectly hiding in groupG1 (respec-
tivelyG2) for t = 1 (respectively for t = 2), if for any positive integer n (polynomial in κ), for
crst ∈Gent (1κ,n), for any twomessages a1,a2, and for any randomness r1,r2, the distributions
Comt (crst ,a1,r1) and Comt (crst ,a2,r2) are equal.
A trapdoor commitment scheme has three additional efﬁcient algorithms: Gentd, Comtd,
and Opentd. The ﬁrst algorithm Gentd is the trapdoor CRS generation algorithm that takes
inputs t , n, and 1κ, and that outputs a trapdoor td and a common reference string crs∗
with the same distribution as Gent (1κ,n). The second algorithm Comtd is a randomized
trapdoor commitment that takes crs∗ and a randomizer r as inputs, and outputs the value
Comt (crs∗,0,r ). Lastly, Opentd is the trapdoor opening algorithm that takes crs∗, td, a, and r
as an input and outputs an r ′ such that Comt (crs∗,0,r )=Comt (crs∗,a,r ′).
Finally, an extractable commitment scheme is a commitment scheme (Gen,Com) with an
additional extractor E = (X1,X2) such that: X1(1κ) creates a common reference string crs∗
(indistinguishable from the real crs) and a trapdoor td ; and X2(crs∗,td, A) returns (a,r ) such
that A = Com(crs,a,r ), given that A is a valid commitment. An extractable commitment
scheme can only be computationally hiding.
Groth-Lipmaa Knowledge Commitment
The non-interactive range proof presented in Chapter 5 requires the Groth-Lipmaa knowledge
commitment scheme in the CRS model, deﬁned in [Gro10, Lip12a] and described as follows.
CRS generation:
Generate a set Λ = {λi }i∈Zn ⊂N such that ∀i < j : 0 < λi < λ j , with n polynomial in
κ. Given a bilinear group generator PG, set parambp = (p,G1,G2,GT,e)←PG(1κ). Let
g1 ∈G1 and g2 ∈G2 be generators, and choose random α̂,x ∈R Zp . Fix t ∈ {1,2}. The
common reference string is crst =
(
parambp,gt , ĝ t ,
(
gt ,λi , ĝ t ,λi
)
i∈Zn
)
, where gt ,λi = g x
λi
t ,
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and ĝ t ,λi = g α̂x
λi
t .
Commitment: To commit to a = (a0, . . . ,an−1) ∈ Znp , one chooses a random r ∈R Zp , and
computes:
Comt (crst ,a,r )= (g rt ·
n−1∏
i=0
g ait ,λi , ĝ
r
t ·
n−1∏
i=0
ĝ ait ,λi ).
Let t = 1. Fix a commitment key crs1 that in particular speciﬁes g2, ĝ2 ∈G2. A commitment
(A, Â) ∈G21 is valid, if e(A, ĝ2)= e(Â,g2). The case of t = 2 is dual.
According to [Lip12a], the Groth-Lipmaa knowledge commitment scheme is statistically
hiding and computationally binding in groupG1 for t = 1 (orG2 for t = 2) under the Λ-PSDL
assumption in the corresponding group. If the Λ-PKE assumption holds inG1 (respectively
G2), then for any PPT algorithmA that outputs some valid knowledge commitments, there
exists a non-uniform PPT extractor XA that, given the same inputs as ofA together with the
random tape ofA , extracts the contents of these commitments. This knowledge commitment
scheme is also trapdoor, with the trapdoor being td= x. After using the trapdoor commitment
to produce a commitment A ←Comt (crs,0,r )= g rt for r ∈R Zp , the committer can open it to
(a, r −∑n−1i=0 ai xλi ) for any a.
2.4.3 Public Key Cryptosystems
Also called asymmetric cryptosystems, public key cryptosystems5 enable anyone to encrypt
a message, called plaintext, for a particular recipient. However, encrypted messages, called
ciphertexts, can be decrypted only by the intended recipient. Three algorithms compose public
key cryptosystems: a PPT key generator, a PPT encryption, and a deterministic decryption.
The key generator produces two keys, a public and a secret one, for each recipients. The public
key is made public for anyone who wants to send an encrypted message to their corresponding
recipient. The secret key, also called private key, is secretly kept by its owner. The encryption
algorithm takes as input a message together with the public key of the intended recipient, and
outputs the corresponding ciphertext. The decryption algorithm requires the proper secret
key to decrypt a ciphertext into its corresponding message.
Deﬁnition 2.34 (Public Key Cryptosystem (PKC))
A public key cryptosystem is the combination of three algorithms: Gen, Enc, and Dec,
representing respectively the PPT key generator, the PPT encryption, and the deterministic
polynomial-time decryption algorithm. The key generator algorithm Gen(1κ) generates a
public key pk and a secret key sk for a speciﬁc userU , based on a given security parameter
κ. The encryption algorithm Enc(m,pk) takes as input the message m and the public key
pk. Enc(m,pk) outputs the ciphertext γ of m encrypted with pk. The decryption algorithm
Dec(γ,sk) takes as input the secret key sk and a ciphertext γ produced with the public key pk
5The term “cryptosystem” has sometimes ambiguous meaning in the cryptographic literature. In this thesis it
will refer to encryption schemes.
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corresponding to sk. Dec(γ,sk) outputs the decryption m of γ. A public key cryptosystem is
said to be correct if for every pair (pk,sk) generated by Gen,
Pr
[
(pk,sk)←Gen(1κ) , m =Dec(Enc(m,pk),sk)]= 1.
Although several notions of security exist for public key cryptosystems, only semantic security
against chosen plaintext attacks will be brieﬂy explained hereafter. More details can be found
in Chapter 9 of [Vau06] and in Section 5.4 of [Gol04]. Semantic security was introduced by
Goldwasser and Micali in [GM84] and captures the notion that ciphertexts reveal no infor-
mation on their plaintext. The latter notion is illustrated by the indistinguishability property
of ciphertexts of different messages, even when the plaintexts are chosen by the adversary.
Therefore, semantic security against chosen plaintext attacks is referred to as IND-CPA security.
Deﬁnition 2.35 (IND-CPA [Vau06] (Section 9.3.7))
Semantic security against chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) in the context of public key
cryptosystems is deﬁned through the following game for a PPT adversary. The challenger
generates a fresh key pair and gives the public key to the adversary, enabling him to perform
encryption on any messages of his choice. The adversary selects two different plaintexts
(m1,m2) and sends them to the challenger. The challenger randomly chooses one of the
messages, encrypts it, and sends the resulting ciphertext to the adversary. Then, the adversary
attempts to guess which message from (m1,m2) has been encrypted.
A public key cryptosystem is IND-CPA if in the previous game, adversaries have negligible
probability (in the security parameter κ) to distinguish between an encryption of m1 and an
encryption of m2.
2.4.4 BBS Cryptosystem
Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham introduced in [BBS04] a cryptosystem based on the DLIN prob-
lem (see Section 2.2.2), which they called the linear encryption. In this thesis, it will be
referred to as the BBS cryptosystem. Their scheme assumes the presence of a description
of a bilinear group (p,G1,G2,GT,e) with a generator g1 of G1. The secret key is composed
by the pair sk= (sk1,sk2) such that sk1,sk2 ∈R Z∗p . The corresponding public key is the triplet
pk= (g1, f ,h)= (g1,g 1/sk11 ,g 1/sk21 ). To encrypt a message m ∈G1 with randomness r f ,rh ∈Z∗p ,
the encryption algorithm outputs the ciphertext c = (c1,c2,c3)=
(
m · g r f +rh1 , f r f , hrh
)
. To de-
crypt a ciphertext c = (c1,c2,c3), the decryption algorithm outputs c1
(
csk12 · csk23
)−1
. Assuming
the DLIN assumption holds, the BBS cryptosystem is semantically secure against a chosen
plaintext attack (IND-CPA secure).
Lipmaa and Zhang proposed in [LZ12] a lifted version of the BBS cryptosystem. The modiﬁca-
tion brought by this lifted version, is to move the message m in the exponent of c1, thus the
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encryption becomes c = (c1,c2,c3)=
(
g
m+r f +rh
1 , f
r f , hrh
)
. To decrypt, the discrete logarithm
of c1
(
csk12 · csk23
)−1
is returned. Therefore, decryption for large messages m is infeasible due to
the DLog assumption. For the decryption to succeed, it is thus necessary for m to be small.
Identically to the BBS cryptosystem, this lifted version is IND-CPA secure under the DLIN
assumption.
2.4.5 Digital Signature Schemes
A digital signature scheme, sometimes formally called public-key signature scheme, is a
scheme used to convince any veriﬁer that a given user has “seen and approved” a given mes-
sage. The concept of seeing and approving a message is sometimes referred to as validating a
message. Moreover, the result of this validation process should be universally veriﬁable. More
details on digital signature schemes can be found in Section 10.1 of [Vau06] and in Chapter 6
of [Gol04].
Deﬁnition 2.36 (Digital Signature Scheme)
A digital signature scheme is the collection of three PPT algorithm
(
Gen, Sign, Verif
)
, respec-
tively the key generator, the signature and the veriﬁcation algorithms. The key generator
Gen(1κ) outputs
(
sk, pk
)
that correspond respectively to the secret and private key of the sig-
nature scheme. LetM be the message space of the signature scheme. The signature algorithm
Sign(sk, m) takes as input the secret key of the signature scheme, a message m ∈M to be
signed, and outputs the signatureσ. The veriﬁcation algorithm Verif(pk, m, σ) takes as input
the public key of the signature scheme, a message m, and a signature σ to be veriﬁed. If the
veriﬁcation of the signature σ is correct, then Verif outputs 1, otherwise it outputs 0. Where
the veriﬁcation of the signature is correct, the signature is said to be valid. A digital signature
scheme is said to be correct if for every pair (pk,sk) generated by Gen,
Pr
[
(pk,sk)←Gen(1κ) , Verif(pk, m, Sign(sk, m))= 1]= 1.
The security of signature schemes is based on two properties: unforgeability, and non-
repudiation. The unforgeability of signatures is the security property that protects against
forging (ﬁnding or computing) a valid signature on a message m ∈Mwithout the secret key
(see Section 6.1.4 of [Gol04]). This latter type of attack is called a signature forgery and is
divided into several classes depending on the inputs and advantages of the attacker [Vau06].
Non-repudiation prevents signers from denying their valid signatures. As there is no for-
mal deﬁnition for non-repudiation, and several interpretations for this notion co-exist, the
following informal deﬁnition is given as a general understanding of it.
Deﬁnition 2.37 (Unforgeability)
A digital signature scheme
(
Gen, Sign, Verif
)
is said to be (existentially) unforgeable if the
following holds: any PPT adversary given pk will succeed to output a valid signature for a
message m that has not been signed previously, with at most a negligible probability in κ.
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Deﬁnition 2.38 (Non-repudiation)
Given a valid signature σ on m that veriﬁes with the public key pk corresponding to sk, a
non-repudiable digital signature scheme forbids the signer from denying having signed m, if
he is the sole holder of sk.
A naïve example of a digital signature scheme is the plain RSA signature scheme which is
derived from the RSA public key cryptosystem [RSA78] (see Section 2.2.2). In the plain RSA
signature scheme, a signature onmessage m is computed asσ=md (mod n). The veriﬁcation
of σ is achieved by checking that m
?=σe (mod n). Recall that the RSA modulus n = pq is the
product of two primes, and 1= ed (mod (p−1)(q−1)) where (n,e) is the public key and (n,d)
is the secret key. As explained in [Vau06] (Section 10.2.2), the plain RSA signature scheme
suffers several security ﬂaws (such as existential forgery) and needs to be modiﬁed in order to
be used as a secure digital signature scheme.
Full Domain Hash (FDH) Signature Scheme
Bellare and Rogaway introduced in [BR93, BR96] the full domain hash (FDH) signature scheme.
Its security proof was presented in the random oracle model and with the computational
hardness assumption of the RSA problem (see Section 2.2.2 for an explanation of RSA and
its related problem). The key generator Gen(1κ) runs the key generator of the RSA public
key cryptosystem and retrieves (n,e,d). It then outputs
(
sk,pk
)
such that sk = (n,d) and
pk= (n,e). Furthermore, it provides all parties an oracle access to a collision resistant hash
functionF that takes any string as input, and outputs for each new query a uniformly random
element inZ∗n . Identical queries will result in the same output. The signature σ on a message
m is obtained by computing σ = (F (m))d (mod n). The veriﬁcation process is achieved
by checking if F (m)
?= σe (mod n). Lastly, note that Coron provided in [Cor00] a stronger
security proof for the FDH signature scheme which enables the use of smaller RSA modulus.
Boneh-Boyen Signature Scheme
Boneh and Boyen introduced a signature scheme in [BB04] that is existentially unforgeable
under a weak chosen message attack. Recall that existential forgery means that the adversary is
able to produce a valid pair (m,σ) from the public key of the signature scheme, but without
any control over which m will be produced.
Deﬁnition 2.39 (Weak Chosen Message Attack)
A weak chosen message attack is deﬁned through the following game. The adversary begins
by choosing and outputting q messages
(
m1, . . . ,mq
)
, before seeing the public key (hence the
“weak” version)6. The challenger generates a fresh key pair and gives the public key to the
6In contrast, for a chosen message attack the selection of messages is done after seeing the public key.
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adversary, together with signatures
(
σ1, . . . ,σq
)
on
(
m1, . . . ,mq
)
. Then, the adversary attempts
to output a valid signature σ on a message m ∈ {m1, . . . ,mq }. If the adversary succeeds in
doing so, it is said that he wins the game.
Therefore, existential unforgeability under a weak chosen message attack means that no
PPT adversary A has non-negligible probability of winning the game of the weak chosen
message attack. Furthermore, the security of the Boneh-Boyen signature scheme is based on
the q-Strong DH problem (see Section 2.2.2).
The Boneh-Boyen signature scheme is achieved as follows. The key generator Gen(1κ) outputs
sk ∈R Z∗p and pk =
(
p,g ,G1,GT,e, y
)
, where
(
p,g ,G1,GT,e
)
are the parameters of a bilinear
pairing, and y = g sk. The signature on a message m is achieved by computing σ= g 1/(sk+m).
The veriﬁcation is thus done by checking if e(σ, y · gm) ?= e(g ,g ).
2.4.6 Cryptographic Accumulators
Benaloh and de Mare introduced the concept of cryptographic accumulators in [BdM93],
which are algorithms that concentrate a large set of values into a single small element called the
accumulator, such that for each value included in the accumulator there exists a corresponding
witness to efﬁciently prove its membership, and such that it is infeasible to ﬁnd such a witness
for elements that were not included. Research in the ﬁeld of accumulators has notably
led to the results of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya in [CL02a], with dynamic accumulators,
where elements can be added and removed at unit cost (independently of the number of
accumulated elements) even after setting up an accumulator. The following accumulator
deﬁnition is derived from [CL02a].
Deﬁnition 2.40 (Cryptographic Accumulator [CL02a])
A secure accumulator for a family of inputs {Xκ} is a family of families of functions G = {Fκ}
with the following properties:
Efﬁcient generation: There is a PPT algorithm Gen that on input 1κ produces a random
element f of Fκ, together with some auxiliary information about f , denoted t f .
Efﬁcient evaluation: f ∈ Fκ is a polynomial-size circuit7 f :Uf × Xκ →Uf that, on input
(u,x) ∈Uf × Xκ, outputs a value v ∈Uf , where Uf is an efﬁciently samplable input
domain for the function f ; and Xκ is the intended input domain whose elements are to
be accumulated.
Quasi-commutative: For allκ, for all f ∈ Fκ, for all u ∈Uf , for all x1,x2 ∈ Xκ, f ( f (u,x1),x2)=
f ( f (u,x2),x1). If X = {x1, . . . ,xm}⊂ Xκ, then f (u,X ) denotes f ( f (. . . (u,x1), . . .),xm).
7Recall that a circuit is a computationalmodel that processes inputs through a sequence of functions. See [Vol99]
for a formal deﬁnition and more details. Although polynomial-size circuits could be simulated by an ITM with an
advice string (see [AB09] and the complexity class P/pol y), the deﬁnitions of cryptographic accumulators have
historically used circuits as they are more convenient when handling functions with ﬁxed length inputs.
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Witnesses: Let v ∈Uf and x ∈ Xκ. A value w ∈Uf is called a witness for x in v under f if
v = f (w,x).
Security: LetU ′f ×X ′κ denote the domains for which the computational procedure for func-
tion f ∈ Fκ is deﬁned (thusUf ⊆U ′f , Xκ ⊆ X ′κ). For all PPT adversariesAκ,
Pr
[
f ←Gen(1κ), u ∈R Uf , (x,w,X )←Aκ( f ,Uf ,u) :
X ⊂ Xκ, w ∈U ′f , x ∈ X ′κ, x ∉ X , f (w,x)= f (u,X )
]
is negligible inκ. Moreover, note that only the legitimate accumulated values (x1, . . . ,xm)
must belong to Xκ. The forged value x can belong to a possibly larger set X ′κ.
The accumulator of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya in [CL02a] recalled hereafter, is based on the
strong RSA assumption (see Section 2.2.2). The main idea is to use modular exponentiation
to incorporate prime elements into the accumulator, which is initially picked as a quadratic
residue. Let Fκ be the family of functions that correspond to exponentiations modulo a special
RSA modulus n of length κ. Recall that a special RSA modulus is the product of two safe
primes. Choosing f ∈ Fκ amounts to choosing a random modulus n = pq of length κ, where
p = 2p ′ +1, q = 2q ′ +1, and p,p ′,q ,q ′ are all prime. Thus, the auxiliary information t f is the
factorization of n. The input domain for f is set toUf = {u ∈QRn : u = 1} andU ′f =Z∗n . Let Xκ
be the set of primes {e : e = p ′,q ′ ∧ A 	 e 	 B}, where A and B can be chosen with arbitrary
polynomial dependence on the security parameter κ, as long as 2< A and B < A2. Let Xκ be
denoted as XA,B and let X ′κ = X ′A,B be any subset of the set of integer from [2, A2−1] such that
XA,B ⊆ X ′A,B . The accumulating function f is thus
f (u,x)=ux (mod n)
and is denoted by fn,A,B (or by fn or f when it does not cause confusion) as the function f
corresponding to modulus n and domain XA,B . Lastly, note that
f ( f (u,x1),x2)= f ( f (u,x2),x1)= f (u, {x1,x2})=ux1x2 (mod n).
2.4.7 Hadamard Product Argument
Assume that (Gencom ,Com) is a knowledge commitment scheme. Recall that a Hadamard
product of two vectors a and b (of length n) is equal to their entrywise product vector c , that
is, c j = aj ·bj for j ∈Zn . In a Hadamard product argument, the prover aims to convince the
veriﬁer that for three given commitments (A, Â), (B , B̂), and (C ,Ĉ ), he knows how to open
them as (A, Â) = Com1(ĉrs1;a;ra), (B , B̂) = Com1(ĉrs1;b;rb), and (C ,Ĉ ) = Com1(ĉrs1;c ;rc ),
such that c j = aj ·bj for j ∈ Zn . The corresponding Hadamard product statement will be
denoted as

(C ,Ĉ )
= (A, Â)◦(B , B̂ ,B2), where B2 is the equivalent of B inG2: B2 ← g rb2 ·
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∏n−1
i=0 g
bi
2,λi
. Groth [Gro10] proposed an efﬁcient (weakly)8 sound and non-interactive witness
indistinguishable (NIWI) Hadamard product argument that was reﬁned by Lipmaa [Lip12a],
who used the theory of progression free sets and asymmetric pairings to optimize the argument
of Groth. Additionally, thisHadamard product argument has been further optimized in [FLZ13]
and in [Lip14a]. Protocol 2.2 has a full description of the Hadamard product argument of
Lipmaa [Lip12a]. More details can be found in [Lip11], which is the full version of [Lip12a].
The main idea of Protocol 2.2 is to construct an argument π× ← (π, π̂) such that e(g1,π) =
e(A,B2)/e(C ,D), where D is a ﬁxed public element in G2: D ←∏n−1i=0 g2,λi . Furthermore, to
prove that the prover knows how to open the commitment of the argument, π× should also
satisfy e(g1, π̂)
?= e(ĝ1,π).
System parameters: Let n = pol y(κ) be the length of the vectors in the Hadamard
product. Let Λ = {λi : i ∈Zn} be a progression free set of odd integers, such
that λi+1 >λi > 0. Let Λ̂ := {0}∪Λ∪2̂Λ.
CRS generation Gencrs×(1κ):
Let parambp := (p,G1,G2,GT,e) ← PGa(1κ). Let α̂,x ←Zp . Let g1 ←G1 \ {1}
and g2 ←G2\{1}. Denote gt ,← g xt and ĝ t ,← g α̂x

t for t ∈ {1,2} and  ∈ Λ̂. Let
D ←∏n−1i=0 g2,λi . The CRS is crs← (parambp; (g1,, ĝ1,)∈{0}∪Λ, (g2,, ĝ2,)∈Λ̂,D).
Let ĉrs1 ← (parambp; (g1,, ĝ1,)∈{0}∪Λ).
Common inputs: (A, Â,B , B̂ ,B2,C ,Ĉ ),
where (A, Â)←Com1(ĉrs1;a;ra), (B , B̂)←Com1(ĉrs1;b;rb),
B2 ← g rb2 ·
∏n−1
i=0 g
bi
2,λi
, (C ,Ĉ )←Com1(ĉrs1;c ;rc ), such that aibi = ci for i ∈Zn .
Argument generated by the prover:
NIZK-PK
{
(a,ra ,b,rb ,c ,rc ) :

(C ,Ĉ )
= (A, Â)◦(B , B̂ ,B2)}
Let I1() :=
{
(i , j ) : i , j ∈Zn ∧ j = i ∧λi +λ j = 
}
. For  ∈ 2̂Λ, the prover sets
μ ←
∑
(i , j )∈I1()(aib j − ci ). He sets π← g rarb2 ·
∏n−1
i=0 g
rabi+rbai−rc
2,λi
·∏∈2̂Λ gμ2 ,
and π̂← ĝ rarb2 ·
∏n−1
i=0 ĝ
rabi+rbai−rc
2,λi
·∏∈2̂Λ ĝμ2 . He sends π× ← (π, π̂) ∈G22 to the
veriﬁer as the argument.
Veriﬁcation
(
crs; (A, Â,B , B̂ ,B2,C ,Ĉ ),π×
)
:
The veriﬁer checks that e(A,B2)/e(C ,D)
?= e(g1,π) and e(g1, π̂) ?= e(ĝ1,π).
Protocol 2.2 – Hadamard product argument

(C ,Ĉ )
 = (A, Â) ◦ (B , B̂ ,B2)
from [Lip12a]
Theorem 2.3 ([Lip12a](Theorem 4, Section 5))
The Hadamard product argument in Protocol 2.2 is perfectly complete and perfectly witness in-
8Note that here, the soundness is expressed in the inability for a PPT adversary to output an accepting argument
together with openings to its corresponding commitments such that the restrictions for the Hadamard product
argument are violated. Therefore this notion of soundness is weaker than computational soundness, where a PPT
adversary is unable to provide an accepting argument from a false statement.
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distinguishable. If the asymmetric bilinear group generatorPGa is Λ̂-PSDL secure, then a non-
uniform PPT adversary has negligible chance of outputting inp× ← (A, Â,B , B̂ ,B2,C ,Ĉ ) and
an accepting argumentπ× ← (π, π̂) together with opening witness w× ← (a,ra ,b,rb ,c ,rc , ( f ′s )s∈Λ̂)
such that
• (A, Â)=Com1(ĉrs1;a;ra),
• (B , B̂)=Com1(ĉrs1;b;rb),
• B2 = g rb2 ·
∏n−1
i=0 g
bi
2i ,
• (C ,Ĉ )=Com1(ĉrs1;c ;rc ),
• (π, π̂)= (g
∑
s∈Λ̂ f
′
s x
s
2 , ĝ
∑
s∈Λ̂ f
′
s x
s
2 ),
• and for some i ∈Zn, ai bi = ci .
For the product argument to be useful in more complex arguments, the veriﬁer should addi-
tionally check the validity of commitments: e(A, ĝ2) = e(Â,g2), e(B , ĝ2) = e(B̂ ,g2),
e(g1,B2) = e(B ,g2), and e(C , ĝ2) = e(Ĉ ,g2). Note that ( f ′s )s∈Λ̂ is the opening of (π, π̂). This
can be seen as (π, π̂) = (∏s∈Λ̂ g f ′s2,s ,∏s∈Λ̂ ĝ f ′s2,s) and both g2,s and ĝ2,s are in the common refer-
ence string crs.
Theorem 2.4 ([Lip12a](Theorem 5, Section 5))
For any n > 0 and y = n1+o(1), letΛ⊂Zy be a progression free set of odd integers as guaranteed
by Theorem 2.1, such that |Λ| = n. The communication (argument size) of the Hadamard
product argument is 2 elements from G2. The computational complexity of the prover is
Θ(n2) scalar multiplications inZp and n1+o(1) exponentiations inG2. The computational
complexity of the veriﬁer is dominated by 5 bilinear pairings. The CRS consists of n1+o(1)
group elements.
Finally, as noted in [Lip12a], if a, b, and c are boolean vectors then the computational com-
plexity of the prover is Θ(n2) scalar additions inZp and n1+o(1) exponentiations inG2.
2.4.8 Lipmaa Permutation Argument
In a permutation argument, the prover aims to convince the veriﬁer that for a given permuta-
tion  fromZn toZn , and two commitments (A, A˜) and (B , B˜), he knows how to open them as
(A, A˜)=Com1(c˜rs1;a;ra) and (B , B˜)=Com1(c˜rs1;b;rb), such that bj = a( j ) for j ∈Zn . Denote
this non-interactive argument by 
(
(A, A˜)
)= (B , B̂ , B˜), where the commitment (B , B̂) is
equivalent to the commitment (B , B˜) with respect to the CRS ĉrs1: (B , B̂)=Com1(ĉrs1;b;rb).
Groth [Gro10] proposed an efﬁcient (weakly)9 sound and non-interactive witness indistin-
guishable (NIWI) permutation argument that was further reﬁned by Lipmaa [Lip12a], who
9Note that as for the Hadamard product argument, weakly soundness is deﬁned here as the inability for a PPT
adversary to output an accepting argument together with openings to its corresponding commitments such that
the initial restrictions are violated.
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used the theory of progression free sets and asymmetric pairings to optimize the argument of
Groth. This permutation argument has been further improved by Fauzi et al. in [FLZ13] and
the latest improvement has been provided by Lipmaa in [Lip14a]. The Lipmaa permutation
argument in [Lip12a] is described in Protocol 2.3. Further details can be found in [Lip11],
which is the full version of [Lip12a].
Let TΛ(i ,) :=
∣∣{ j ∈Zn : 2λ(i )+λ j = 2λ( j )+λi }∣∣, clearly TΛ(i ,) 
 1. The main idea of the
product argument is to prove that a(i ) = bi for i ∈Zn by using two subarguments. The ﬁrst one
shows that for separately committed a∗i , a
∗
i = TΛ(−1(i ),) ·ai for i ∈Zn , which is equivalent
to a∗
(i ) = TΛ(i ,) · a(i ). This is achieved with a Hadamard product argument (π×, π̂×) for
(A∗, Â∗)
= (A, Â)◦(T ∗, T̂ ∗,T ∗2 ). The second subargument shows that a∗(i ) = TΛ(i ,) ·bi
for i ∈ Zn and is achieved with the following veriﬁcation e(A∗,D)/e(B ,E) ?= e(g1,π) (see
section 6 of [Lip11] for the analysis of completeness). Thus, from a∗
(i ) = TΛ(i ,) · a(i ) and
a∗
(i ) = TΛ(i ,) ·bi , one obtains that a(i ) = bi for i ∈Zn . This permutation argument will be
used only with ﬁxed permutations  and thus the element E (and its counterpart E˜ in base
g˜2) can be put in the CRS. Furthermore, Fauzi et al. noticed in [FLZ13] that the elements(
T ∗, T̂ ∗,T ∗2
)
can also be put in the CRS, as they will be ﬁxed by the permutation . Last but
not least, notice that Λ̂∪ Λ˜= {0}∪ Λ˜, where Λ˜ is deﬁned in Protocol 2.3.
Theorem 2.5 ([Lip12a](Theorem 6, Section 6))
The permutation argument described in Protocol 2.3 is perfectly complete and perfectly wit-
ness indistinguishable. If the asymmetric bilinear group generatorPGa is Λ˜-PSDL secure, then
a non-uniform PPT adversary has negligible chance of outputting inpperm ← (A, A˜,B , B̂ , B˜ ,)
and an accepting argument πperm ← (A∗, Â∗,π×, π̂×,π, π˜) together with a witness
wperm ← (a,ra ,b,rb ,a∗,ra∗ , ( f ′(×,))∈Λ̂, ( f ′(,))∈Λ˜),
such that
•
(
A, A˜
)=Com1 (c˜rs1;a;ra),
•
(
B , B̂
)=Com1 (ĉrs1;b;rb),
•
(
B , B˜
)=Com1 (c˜rs1;b;rb),
•
(
A∗, Â∗
)=Com1 (ĉrs1;a∗;ra∗),
• (π×, π̂×)=
(
g
∑
∈Λ̂ f
′
(×,)
2 , ĝ
∑
∈Λ̂ f
′
(×,)
2
)
,
• (π, π̂)=
(
g
∑
∈Λ˜ f
′
(,)
2 , g˜
∑
∈Λ˜ f
′
(,)
2
)
,
• a∗i = TΛ
(
−1 (i ) ,
) ·ai , for i ∈Zn, and
• for some i ∈Zn, a(i ) = bi .
For the permutation argument to be useful in more complex arguments, the veriﬁer should
additionally check the validity of commitments: e(A˜,g2) = e(A, g˜2), e(B̂ ,g2) = e(B , ĝ2), and
e(B˜ ,g2)= e(B , g˜2).
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System parameters: Same as in Protocol 2.2, but let
Λ˜ :=Λ∪{2λk −λ j }i ,k∈Zn ∪2̂Λ∪ ({2λk +λi −λ j }i , j ,k∈Zn∧i = j \2 ·Λ).
CRS generation Gencrsperm(1
κ):
Let parambp := (p,G1,G2,GT,e)←PGa(1κ). Let α̂, α˜,x ←Zp . Let g1 ←G1 \ {1}
and g2 ←G2 \ {1}. Let ĝ t ← g α̂t and g˜ t ← g α˜t for t ∈ {1,2}.
Denote gt ,← g xt , ĝ t ,← ĝ x

t , and g˜ t ,← g˜ x

t for t ∈ {1,2} and  ∈ {0}∪ Λ˜.
Let (D,D˜)← (∏n−1i=0 g2,λi , ∏n−1i=0 g˜2,λi ).
The CRS is
crs← (parambp; (g1,, ĝ1,, g˜1,)∈{0}∪Λ, (g2,)∈{0}∪Λ˜, (ĝ2,)∈Λ̂, (g˜2,)∈Λ˜,D,D˜).
Let ĉrs1 ←
(
parambp; (g1,, ĝ1,)∈{0}∪Λ
)
, c˜rs1 ←
(
parambp; (g1,, g˜1,)∈{0}∪Λ
)
.
Common inputs: (A, A˜,B , B̂ , B˜ ,),
where  is a permutation fromZn toZn , (A, A˜)←Com1(c˜rs1;a;ra),
(B , B̂)←Com1(ĉrs1;b;rb), and (B , B˜)←Com1(c˜rs1;b;rb),
such that bj = a( j ) for j ∈Zn .
Argument generated by the prover:
NIZK-PK
{
(a,ra ,b,rb) : 
(
(A, A˜)
)= (B , B̂ , B˜)}
1. Let (T ∗, T̂ ∗,T ∗2 )← (
∏n−1
i=0 g
TΛ(−1(i ),)
1,λi
,
∏n−1
i=0 ĝ
TΛ(−1(i ),)
1,λi
,
∏n−1
i=0 g
TΛ(−1(i ),)
2,λi
).
2. Let ra∗ ←Zp ,
(A∗, Â∗)←Com1(ĉrs1;TΛ(−1(0),) ·a0, . . . , TΛ(−1(n−1),) ·an−1;ra∗).
Create an argument (π×, π̂×) for

(A∗, Â∗)
= (A, Â)◦(T ∗, T̂ ∗,T ∗2 ).
3. Let Λ˜′ := 2̂Λ ∪ ({2λ( j )+λi −λ j : i , j ∈Zn ∧ i = j} \ 2 · Λ) ⊂
{−λn−1+1, . . . ,3λn−1}.
4. For  ∈ Λ˜′, set I1() as in Protocol 2.2,
I2() :=
{
(i , j ) : i , j ∈Zn ∧ j = i ∧ 2λ(i )+λ j =λi +2λ( j )
∧ 2λ( j )+λi −λ j = 
}
,
and
μ,←
∑
(i , j )∈I1()
a∗i −
∑
(i , j )∈I2()
bi .
5. Let (E, E˜)← (∏n−1i=0 g2,2λ(i )−λi , ∏n−1i=0 g˜2,2λ(i )−λi ).
6. Let π←Dr ∗a ·E−rb ·
∏
∈Λ˜′ g
μ,
2, , π˜
← D˜r ∗a · E˜−rb ·
∏
∈Λ˜′ g˜
μ,
2, ,
Send πperm ← (A∗, Â∗,π×, π̂×,π, π˜) ∈G21×G42 to the veriﬁer as the argument.
Veriﬁcation
(
crs; (A, A˜,B , B̂ , B˜ ,),πperm
)
:
Let (E, E˜) and (T ∗, T̂ ∗,T ∗2 ) be computed as above. If (π
×, π̂×) veriﬁes,
e(A∗,D)/e(B ,E) = e(g1,π), e(A∗, ĝ2) = e(Â∗,g2), and e(g1, π˜) = e(g˜1,π),
then the veriﬁer accepts the argument. Otherwise, the veriﬁer rejects it.
Protocol 2.3 – Permutation argument 
(
(A, A˜)
)= (B , B̂ , B˜) from [Lip12a]
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Theorem 2.6 ([Lip12a](Theorem 7, Section 6))
The permutation argument has a common reference string of length n1+o(1) and communica-
tion of 6 group elements (2 elements fromG1 and 4 elements fromG2). The computational
complexity of the prover is Θ(n2) scalar additions inZp and n1+o(1) exponentiations inG2.
The computational complexity of the veriﬁer is dominated by 12 bilinear pairings.
2.5 Threshold Cryptosystems
Threshold cryptosystems are a fundamental notion for the terminal revocation solution pre-
sented in Chapter 7. In the following, the focus is set on the case of threshold RSA signatures
as they provide a good balance between security and efﬁciency considering the protocol
participants in the Extended Access Control (see Chapter 6). Indeed, the computational power
of Machine Readable Travel Documents (such as e-passports) is much more limited compared
to the one of terminals. Furthermore, this threshold signature scheme is based on secret
sharing, which is explained hereinafter.
2.5.1 Secret Sharing
The notion of secret sharingwas introduced by Shamir in [Sha79] and independently by Blakley
in [Bla79]. It aims at dividing the knowledge of a secret among  servers. The motivation
behind it was to protect a secret against the corruption of some servers. To achieve secret
sharing, Shamir used Lagrange interpolation to divide the secret into multiple shares. The
main idea is that any polynomial function f of degree t can be reconstructed from t+1 distinct
points. f (0) is considered to be the secret s to be shared. If given t or less points, the function
cannot be reconstructed. Hence every participant will be given a point of the function as a
secret share. Mathematically speaking, f is deﬁned as follows:
f (x)=
t∑
i=0
ai · xi . (2.1)
As mentioned, the secret is s = f (0)= a0. Every participant i > 0 will be provided the secret
share si = f (i ). Given a set of participantsΨwith |Ψ| = t+1, f can be reconstructed as follows:
f (x)= ∑
j∈Ψ
s j ·λΨx, j , (2.2)
where λΨx, j are the Lagrange coefﬁcients deﬁned by
λΨx, j =
∏
i∈Ψ\ j
(i −x) · (i − j )−1 (2.3)
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and with x ∈Ψ. Moreover, note that the inversion present in the Lagrange coefﬁcients requires
working in a ﬁeld. This restriction can be relaxed although there would be a loss in efﬁciency.
For instance, the computation of f (x) could be replaced with the computation of imax ! · f (x),
where imax is larger or equal than the largest index among participants.
When secret sharing is used, the participant or authority in charge of reconstructing the
secret will obviously learn the secret. This is of course not a desirable property and to be
instantiated in practice, secret sharing needs some modiﬁcations. Ideally, the goal would be
to share (to divide) the secret among  servers, with the constraint that servers could perform
computations based on the secret without reconstructing it. One such application is threshold
cryptography, with the additional constraint that to be able to use the secret, t +1 servers
need to collaborate. Thus, using the secret is achieved without being able to reconstruct it.
Furthermore, no t or less servers could use the secret. The solution presented in Chapter 7
uses threshold signatures rather than threshold decryption. Nevertheless, the latter could still
be used although negatively impacting efﬁciency.
2.5.2 Threshold Signatures
Participants in a threshold signature scheme consist of  signers Si , a trusted dealer T , a
veriﬁer V , and an adversary A . The scheme itself is composed of a set of ﬁve algorithms:
(KG ,Σi ,Σv ,Σc ,Vσ). The trusted dealerT runs KG in order to generate all the parameters and
keys of the threshold signature scheme. ThenT publishes the public parameters and sends
to each Si its respective secret key. Each signer Si is thus able to create a partial signature
by running algorithm Σi . The resulting partial signatures can be veriﬁed with algorithm Σv .
To combine the necessary partial signatures into the general signature σ, a signer Si runs
algorithm Σc . Lastly, the signature σ can be veriﬁed with algorithm Vσ. In the following, a
description of these ﬁve algorithms is provided.
Key generation: KG(1κ, t ,)−→ (pk, {sk1, . . . ,sk}, {vk1, . . . ,vk},vk).
The key generation algorithm, run byT , takes the security parameter κ, the threshold
parameter t , and the number of participants  as input. It outputs the public key pk of
the system,  secret keys ski together with their corresponding veriﬁcation keys vki and
the general veriﬁcation key vk of the system.
Partial signing: Σi (m,pk,vk,ski ,vki )−→ (σi , [πi ]).
The partial signature algorithm, run by Si , takes as input a message m, the general
public key pk, the general veriﬁcation key vk, and the secret share ski with its veriﬁcation
key vki . It outputs a partial signature σi with an optional veriﬁcation proof πi on the
validity of σi . For reasons of simplicity, the notation Σi (m,pk,vk,ski ,vki ) is shortened
to Σi (m) when there is no confusion.
Partial signature veriﬁcation: Σv (m,pk,vk,σi ,πi ,vki )−→ {0,1}.
The partial signature veriﬁcation algorithm, run by any veriﬁer V , takes as input a mes-
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sage m, the general public key pk, the general veriﬁcation key vk, the partial signature
σi , its corresponding veriﬁcation proof πi and veriﬁcation key vki . It checks the validity
of σi and outputs the result. The veriﬁcation of σi with πi is used to achieve robustness.
For simplicity reasons, the notation Σv (m,pk,vk,σi ,πi ,vki ) is shortened to Σv (σi ,πi )
when there is no confusion.
Partial signature combining: Σc (m,pk, {σi }Ψ)−→σ.
The combining share algorithm, run by anySi , takes as input a message m, the public
key pk, and a setΨ of size t +1 of valid partial signatures σi . It outputs the signature
σ of m. For simplicity reasons, the notation Σc (m,pk, {σi }Ψ) is shortened to Σc ({σi }Ψ)
when there is no confusion.
Signature veriﬁcation: Vσ(m,σ,pk)−→ {0,1}.
The signature veriﬁcation algorithm, run by any veriﬁer V , takes as input a message m,
its signature σ, and the public key pk. It checks the validity of σ and outputs the result.
For simplicity reasons, the notation Vσ(m,σ,pk) is shortened to Vσ(m) when there is no
confusion.
Threshold Signature Security Requirements. The security requirements for threshold sig-
natures are robustness, threshold security, existential unforgeability, and optionally proactive
security.
• Robustness states that if all partial signatures used to create a signature σ on message m
are valid then the signature σ is a valid signature of m.
• The threshold security requirement states that any authorized subsets of t +1 or more
signers can produce a valid threshold signature on message m, but no other coalitions.
This imply that no subset of t or less signers can produce a valid threshold signature.
• A threshold signature scheme is said to be existentially unforgeable if a computationally
bounded adversary is unable to perform an adaptive chosen message attack. The goal
of such an attack is to forge a valid partial signature or a valid signature on a chosen
message, while having access to a signature oracle and while taking into account the
responses from this signature oracle. Only in the case of forging a valid signature, the
adversary is additionally allowed to corrupt up to t signers.
• Proactive security states that an update mechanism exists for signers to update their
secret key share, without modifying the general public key of the system (nor the general
veriﬁcation key).
2.5.3 Threshold RSA
As the plain RSA signature scheme [RSA78] suffers several security ﬂaws (see [Vau06], Sec-
tion 10.2.2), threshold RSA is usually based on a variant of the plain RSA signature scheme,
such as the Full Domain Hash (FDH) signature scheme from Bellare and Rogaway [BR93,
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BR96, Cor00] (see Section 2.4.5). Let p and q be two large primes such that n = pq . Let ed
(mod ϕ(n))= 1, whereϕ is the Euler’s Totient function. Henceϕ(n)= (p−1)(q−1). The public
key of this system is (n,e). Let F be the hash function used in the FDH signature scheme.
HenceF hashes from any message spaceM into the full domainZ∗n . To obtain a signature σ
on amessage m, the signer computesσ= (F (m))d (mod n). Hence d is part of the private key
of the signer. To verify the signature, it sufﬁces to check the following: F (m)
?=σe (mod n).
To obtain the threshold version of the FDH variant of the RSA signature scheme, the secret d
needs to be shared among  servers. Assume the presence of a trusted party in charge of the
key generation algorithm. In the case of the Extended Access Control (Chapter 7), this trusted
party will be the Document Veriﬁer (DV). To share d , secret sharing will be used. However this
cannot be done directly as revealing ϕ(n) to the signers would allow them to factorize n and
thus compute d from e. Hence a single signer would be able to sign on behalf of the entire
group. Extensive research has been undertaken regarding threshold RSA signatures and the
solution regarding terminal revocation proposed in Chapter 7 is based on the threshold RSA
signature of Shoup [Sho00]. Depending on the number of servers  and the threshold value t ,
solutions from King [Kin00] and Desmedt-Frankel [DF94] could also be considered.
Shoup [Sho00] suggested the use of safe primes for the RSA modulus. Hence n = pq =
(2p ′ +1)(2q ′ +1) such that p,p ′,q and q ′ are primes. Let n˜ = p ′q ′. The value of n˜ will not be
revealed and should be kept secret from all parties. If proactive security is not needed, then
n˜ can be safely erased after the key generation phase. The public exponent e will be chosen
as a prime with e > . d will be picked such that ed ≡ 1 (mod n˜) and shared using the secret
sharing of Shamir (see Section 2.5.1). Hence the secret share of signer i will be of the form
di = f (i ) (mod n˜), where f is deﬁned by the equation (2.1) of Section 2.5.1. Let QRn be the
set of all quadratic residues modulo n. Recall that QRn is thus the subgroup of squares inZ∗n .
The general veriﬁcation key vkwill be randomly chosen in QRn . The veriﬁcation key of signer
i will be set as vki = vkdi ∈QRn . To compute the Lagrange coefﬁcients, the trick explained at
the end of Section 2.5.1 is used with imax = . Let Δ= (!).
To generate a partial signatureσi on message m, signer i will ﬁrst compute x =F (m) and then
σi = x2Δdi . The validity proofπi ofσi consists of proving the statement logvk (vki )= logx4Δ
(
σ2i
)
.
This can be achieved with a small variant of the NIZK proof of Chaum and Pedersen in [CP92],
for proving discrete logarithm equality in the random oracle model. Note that the requirement
for a variation originates from the fact that computations are performed in a group of unknown
order.
Protocol 2.4 illustrates the discrete logarithm equality argument πi , which is brieﬂy described
hereafter. Recall that the prover knows the discrete logarithm ski = di = logvk (vki ), however
the order of vk is unknown. The goal of the prover (the signer in the threshold RSA) is to
convince veriﬁers that given the two group elements (R,S)= (x4Δ,σ2i ), the following statement
holds: logvk vki = logR S. To do so, the prover picks a sufﬁciently large random a ∈R Z2‖n‖+2L1 ,
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Common inputs: (H ,vk,vki ,R,S,L1),
where L1 is a security parameter,H :QR6n → 1L1 is a hash function,
vk,vki ∈QRn are veriﬁcation keys such that vki = vkski ,
R,S ∈QRn such that R = x4Δ and S =σ2i .
Argument generated by the prover:
NIZK-PK
{
(ski ) : vki = vkski ∧σ2i = (x)4Δski
}
The prover picks a large element a ∈R Z2‖n‖+2L1 . Let A = vka and B = Ra . The
prover computes c =H (vk,R,vki ,S, A,B) and z = a+c · ski .
He sends πi ← (c,z) to the veriﬁer as the argument.
Veriﬁcation (H ,vk,vki ,R,S,πi ):
The veriﬁer checks that c
?=H (vk, R, vki , S, vkzvk−ci , RzS−c ).
Protocol 2.4 – Discrete logarithm equality argument logvk (vki )= logx4Δ
(
σ2i
)
(variant of Chaum and Pedersen [CP92])
where L1 is a secondary security parameter (Shoup suggests L1 = 128)10, and computes
A = vka , B = Ra , c =H (vk,R,vki ,S, A,B), and z = a+ c · ski . Note thatH is a hash function
that maps six group elements to an L1 bit integer. The NIZK proof will thus consist of πi =
(c,z). Indeed, any veriﬁer can be convinced of the veracity of the statement by checking if
c
?=H (vk,R,vki ,S,vkzvk−ci ,RzS−c ). However, this proof would lose soundness if the prover
is free to choose vki . More details can be found in Section 3 of [BPW12]. In the case of the
solution presented in Chapter 7, vki is ﬁxed by a trusted third party and then given to the
prover.
Lastly, combining the t +1 valid partial signatures σ j , with j ∈Ψ and Ψ ⊂ {1, . . . ,}, means
computing the signature σ =
(∏
j∈Ψσ
2ΔλΨ0, j
j
)α
xβ (mod n), where α and β are obtained by
solving α ·4Δ2+β ·e = 1 (mod n˜) with the extended Euclidean algorithm. Notice that α and β
can be precomputed by the trusted authority. Finally, the veriﬁcation of σ is the same as in the
FDH signature scheme.
Therefore, the algorithms composing the threshold RSA signature presented by Shoup [Sho00]
are as follows:
• KG(1κ, t ,)−→ (pk, {sk1, . . . ,sk}, {vk1, . . . ,vk},vk):
pk= (n,e,Δ,F ,α,β), where n,e,F are obtained from the parameters of the FDH signa-
ture scheme, Δ= !, and α,β are obtained by solving α ·4Δ2+β ·e = 1 (mod n˜) with the
extended Euclidean algorithm.
10Note that according to Shoup, the coefﬁcient 2 in front of L1 is set in order to strengthen the zero-knowledge
simulatability.
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ski = di =∑tj=0 aj · i j (mod n˜), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,}, with a0 = d and aj>0 ∈R Zn˜ .
vk ∈R QRn and vki = vkski , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,}.
• Σi (m,pk,vk,ski ,vki )−→ (σi , [πi ]):
σi = (F (m))2Δski .
πi =NIZK-PK
{
(ski ) : vki = vkski ∧σ2i = (F (m))4Δski
}
.
• Σv (m,pk,vk,σi ,πi ,vki )−→ {0,1}.
The partial signature veriﬁcation algorithm checks the NIZK-PK πi .
• Σc (m,pk, {σi }Ψ)−→σ.
σ=
(∏
j∈Ψσ
2ΔλΨ0, j
j
)α
(F (m))β (mod n), where λΨ0, j are computed as in equation (2.3).
• Vσ(m,σ,pk)−→ {0,1}.
The signature veriﬁcation algorithm performs the following check: F (m)
?=σe (mod n)
More details as well as the security proof of the threshold RSA signature scheme of Shoup can
be found in [Sho00].
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Chapter 3
Set Membership Proofs
In this chapter, we ﬁrst present in Section 3.1 the set membership proof primitive. Section 3.2
introduces prior work achieved in this ﬁeld, explains subsequent results, emphasizes the use
of cryptographic accumulators, and presents some related work. Section 3.3 then gives a
solution for the set membership proof based on the Boneh-Boyen signature scheme [BB04].
Section 3.4 shows that other signature schemes could also be used. This is demonstrated using
the signature scheme proposed by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya in [CL02b]. Last but not least,
Section 3.5 presents an alternative solution based on accumulators. The results of Section 3.3
and Section 3.5 are published at Asiacrypt 2008 [CCs08], as a joint work with Jan Camenisch
and abhi shelat1. Even though the theoretical idea behind Section 3.4 was set out in [CCs08],
the actual protocol is detailed exclusively here.
3.1 Set Membership Proof Primitive
The problem we are trying to solve in this chapter is called the set membership proof problem.
It can be easily explained using the following game. Consider the existence of a public set Φ
and two players. The public set could be for instance a set of names or a set of parameters.
The ﬁrst player secretly chooses an element σ from the public set, and digitally commits to it.
Let us name the ﬁrst player the prover. As his name indicates, his goal is to prove a speciﬁc
statement to the second player, who becomes the veriﬁer. The statement that the prover
wants to prove is that the element he has picked (and that he has committed to) is indeed
contained in the public set. In other words, he wants to prove that the element contained in his
commitment, is a member of the public set. However, two main constraints are involved. On
the one hand, the prover wants to keep his value secret, revealing no additional information
besides the set membership proof of his committed element and the fact that he is able to open
his commitment to such a value. However, on the other hand, the veriﬁer wants to be sure that
1Note that abhi shelat requires his name to be written in lower case.
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the prover is unable to cheat. The ﬁrst constraint can be achieved by way of a zero-knowledge
property, while the second constraint needs to be insured with a soundness property.
The main motivation behind set membership proofs as a cryptographic building block, comes
from the challenges brought when cryptographic protocols in an idealized model need to
be adapted to face malicious adversaries. Furthermore, they are also important for other
applications, such as in the context of anonymous credentials. Consider a user who is is-
sued a credential containing a number of attributes such as an address, and assume that
the user needs to prove that she lives in a European capital. In this case, a list of all such
cities is given and the user has to show that she possesses a credential containing one of
those cities as an address (without of course, leaking the city the user lives in). Another ex-
ample is where a user who has a subscription to a journal (for instance the news and the
sports sections). Assume that some general sections are only accessible to subscribers of
speciﬁc lists. Using a set membership proof, the user can efﬁciently show that she is a sub-
scriber to one of the required kinds. Online card games also need set membership proofs,
in order to prove that a given card, played face down, is a valid card without revealing the
value of the card. This need has been mentioned by Barnett and Smart in [BS03]. Addition-
ally, the need for set membership proofs also arises in an electronic election or an e-voting
scheme, as pointed out by Cramer et al. in [CGS97]. Assume that in an electronic election
or an e-voting scheme, a user is required to prove that his ballot contains a valid name or a
valid vote respectively. These proofs are straightforward to solve by a set membership proof.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Proof of Set Membership)
Let C = (Gen,Com,Open) be the generation, the commit and the open algorithm of a string
commitment scheme. For an instance c, a proof of set membership with respect to commit-
ment scheme C and set Φ is a proof of knowledge for the following statement:
PK
{
(σ,ρ) : c ←Com(σ; ρ)∧σ ∈Φ}
Remark: The proof system is deﬁned with respect to any commitment scheme. Thus, in
particular, if Com is perfectly hiding, then the language LR consists of all commitments c
(assuming that R is non-empty). Thus, for soundness, it is important that the protocol is
a proof of knowledge. Furthermore, the statement being proven is the ability to open a
commitment to an element contained in a public set. That is different from the claim that a
commitment contains an element from a given public set, as the latter case gives no warranty
that the prover knows the element in the commitment. Last but not least, it is important to
note that in this chapter, proofs of set membership are, in fact, interactive arguments. As there
is an absence of restriction on the commitment scheme used, a commitment scheme that is
not perfectly binding (seeDeﬁnition 2.32) will yield a proof system that is only computationally
sound, in other words: an argument (see Section 2.3.2). The computationally bounded prover
will know only one way of opening his commitment and cannot deduce other ways. As prior
and present works refer to the problem as a “proof”, this term will be used here.
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In order to solve the interactive set membership proof problem, we present three honest
veriﬁer zero-knowledge solutions. The restriction to honest veriﬁers can be explained on two
grounds. Firstly and as explained in Section 2.4.1, there is a standard technique proposed by
Cramer, Damgård, and MacKenzie in [CDM00] that can be used to transform an honest veriﬁer
zero-knowledge proof system into a general zero-knowledge one. Moreover, this technique is
perfectly adapted to the special Σ protocols presented hereafter to solve the set membership
proof problem. Secondly, the majority of other proof techniques are usually presented as
honest veriﬁer protocols. This is especially the case for range proofs. As one of the range
proofs presented in Chapter 4 is based on the following set membership proofs, having the
protocols in the honest veriﬁer model allows for more accurate comparisons.
The ﬁrst and main solution for set membership proof is based on the Boneh-Boyen signa-
tures [BB04]. It requires that the strong Difﬁe-Hellman assumption holds. The second solution
intends to show that other signature schemes can be used instead of the Boneh-Boyen signa-
tures. We illustrate this with the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme [CL02b]. In this
second solution, the strong RSA assumption is needed instead of the strong Difﬁe-Hellman
assumption. Note that the use of signature schemes for set membership proofs is a complete
novelty introduced in [CCs08]. The third solution aims at replacing signature schemes in our
set membership proof protocol with cryptographic accumulators. We use the cryptographic
accumulator presented by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL02a], which is also based on the
strong RSA assumption.
Non-interactive set membership proof solutions can be obtained from their interactive ver-
sions by using standard techniques, such as for example the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86].
These techniques often require an additional computational hardness assumption or an ex-
tended model in order to prove their security. For instance, the Fiat-Shamir heuristic requires
the random oracle model, which assumes the existence of random oracles. Under this as-
sumption, the Fiat-Shamir heuristic has been proven secure against chosen message attacks,
by Pointcheval and Stern [PS96]. However, although this model enables the obtention of
efﬁcient protocols, it has been shown in [CGH98, CGH04] that some protocols in the random
oracle model become insecure in the plain model. Moreover, Goldwasser and Tauman ex-
plained in [GK03] that some digital signatures obtained after a Fiat-Shamir transformation
are simply insecure. A better alternative to the Fiat-Shamir heuristic would be the Lindell
transform [Lin15] or the CPSV transform [CPSV16], where zero-knowledge is achieved in the
standard model, and only the soundness requires the use of random oracles. In the case
that random oracles need to be completely avoided, a solution based on the Groth-Sahai
method [GS08, GS12a] could be used.
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3.2 Prior and Related Work
The ﬁrst concerns regarding membership proofs appeared when Ohta, Okamoto, and Koyama
started to look into the problem of membership authentication in [OOK90]. In their paper,
the focus of membership targets the authentication of a user to a privilege group, without
revealing the identity of the user. To prove their membership status in a given group, all users
of the group are provided with the same secret. This has been pointed out by Shu, Matsumoto,
and Imai in [SMI91], where they provided a solution based on the discrete logarithm problem
and on the difﬁculty of extracting modular roots. However their solution requires, in terms
of the security parameter, a linear amount of exponentiations for both provers and veriﬁers,
as well as a linear amount of transmitted elements. A similar protocol has been proposed
later by Damgård and Jurik in [DJ01], where set membership proof is achieved by showing
that a ciphertext encodes one valid plaintext from a given set of plaintexts. Their protocol is
based on a generalization of the encryption scheme of Paillier [Pai99]. Hence the encryption
of a plaintext σ ∈ Zns is achieved with C = E(σ,r ) = gσr ns (mod ns+1), where n is an RSA
modulus, s is a natural number, g is a generator of an ns order groupG, and r is a random
element from a groupH isomorphic toZ∗n . To show that C is the encryption of the plaintext
σ ∈Φ, a prover performs a proof of knowledge that one of the elements ui =C ·g−i is an (ns)th
power, where i ∈Φ. However, both prover and veriﬁer need to perform O(|Φ|) exponentiations
and the communication complexity is also O(|Φ|) group elements.
De Mare and Wright provided an alternative solution for set membership proofs in [dMW06],
based on the hardness of the boolean 3-satisﬁability (3SAT) problem. However, the elements
composing the set are not public and the set size is restricted to, at most, up to a hundred
elements.
Regarding subsequent results, Bayer and Groth provided, in [BG13, Bay13], a construction
for set membership and set non-membership proofs without relying on either a trusted third
party, or on signing the set elements. This however comes with a price in terms of both com-
munication and computation. For a setΦ of size |Φ|, their argument requires a communication
complexity of O(log |Φ|) group elements. As for the computational complexity, both provers
and veriﬁers need to compute O(log |Φ|) exponentiations. Regarding non-membership proofs,
Blazy, Chevalier, and Vergnaud recently proposed, in [BCV15], a non-interactive argument
based on the decisional Difﬁe-Hellman assumption.
Another subsequent result is provided by Canard et al. in [CCJT13], where they proposed a
non-interactive set membership proof without any security proof, based on the Fiat-Shamir
heuristic. Their scheme is based on a threshold variant of the ElGamal encryption [ElG84] and
on a new variant of Boneh-Boyen signatures [BB04] that does not require pairing computations.
Regarding the computational complexity of the prover, their set membership proof requires
15 exponentiations. Their communication complexity, despite being composed of a single
message, is larger by a factor of 5. Moreover they require at least 2, and at most 3, veriﬁers.
The computational complexity of veriﬁers is smallest when there are only 2 veriﬁers, although
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it would still require 21 exponentiations. If the veriﬁers collude however, they will be able to
decrypt the ciphertext containing a signature on the secret element of the prover, and hence
to deduce his secret element from the uniqueness of the signature. To address these issues,
Arfaoui et al. [ALT+15b, ALT+15a] worked on a similar version, also based on the random
oracle model, without the use of encryption. Their protocol can be seen as a special case of the
general signature based set membership proof mentioned in Section 5.1 of [CCs08], which is
explained in Protocol 3.3. Their solution is to simply use the variant of Boneh-Boyen signatures
presented in [CCJT13] in conjunction with Protocol 3.3. Compared to the Boneh-Boyen
signature based set membership proof presented in Section 3.3, they achieve exactly the same
communication complexity but gain in terms of prover and veriﬁer computational complexity.
Where the veriﬁer is issuing the signatures, he needs to compute 4 additional exponentiations
instead of 2 pairings, while the prover needs to perform 5 additional exponentiations instead
of one pairing. Moreover, if the veriﬁer is not the one issuing the signatures, the computational
complexity gain for the prover remains the same. In this case, the veriﬁer needs to do an
additional exponentiation for one less pairing.
Benaloh and de Mare introduced, in [BdM93], the notion of cryptographic accumulators,
based on the strong RSA assumption. Their use is to merge a set of elements into a single short
accumulator, as well as producing a witness for each element proving that it has indeed been
integrated into the accumulator. In [BdM93], Benaloh and de Mare proposed a membership
testing where the secret choice is revealed. The exact same issue affects [BP97] by Baric´ and
Pﬁtzmann. This issue was ﬁrst solved by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya in [CL02a], with the
introduction of dynamic accumulators, also under the strong RSA assumption. Dynamic
accumulators not only allow the addition of elements into the accumulator, but also the
deletion of elements. However, restrictions apply on the elements that can be accumulated.
For instance, only prime numbers can be accumulated and the largest value has to be strictly
smaller than the square of the smallest value.
Further work has been accomplished in order to improve accumulators ([San99, GTH02, TX03,
Ngu05, AWSM07, LLX07, WWP07, PTT08, DT08, GTH09, Lip12b, FLZ14]) such as integrating
composite numbers [TX03], providing non-membership protocols [LLX07, DT08, Lip12b,
FLZ14], improving efﬁciency [GTH02, GTH09, PTT08], or using other computational hardness
assumptions such as the q-strong Difﬁe-Hellman assumption [Ngu05]. However, all of these
schemes require the secret element to be revealed in order to achieve the set membership
proof.
Guo et al. proposed in [GMSV13] a related method called membership encryption. They hide
the set description and attributes in a privacy preserving token P (G). Their encryption method
is performed on a public element x and the token P (G). Decryption is then possible only if the
user is holding the membership assertion x ∈G. Guo et al. claimed that their method could
be used to achieve the set membership proof of a secret element in a public set, however their
method would leak the value of the secret element.
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Buhrman et al. in [BMRV00], Radhakrishnan et al. in [RSV02], Ostrovsky et al. in [ORS04], Kate
et al. [KZG10] and Garg et al. in [GR15] focus on a different aspect of set membership proofs.
In their papers, they consider different representations of sets in order to efﬁciently show the
membership of a public element x into these sets. Hence they aim at answering questions
of the form “is the public element x contained in the private setΨ”. Similarly, Micali, Kilian,
and Rabin [MRK03] assess the problem in which a polynomial-time prover wants to commit
to a ﬁnite secret setΨ of strings so that, later on, he can, for any string x, reveal with a proof
whether x ∈Ψ or x ∈Ψ without leaking any knowledge beyond the membership assertions.
In particular, the proofs do not reveal the elements nor the size ofΨ. Their solution is non-
interactive and based on the computational hardness assumption of the discrete logarithm
problem.
A particular aspect of set membership proofs appears when the set is a range of consecutive
integer elements. This case is handled by range proofs rather than set membership proofs, as
special techniques can be applied in order to increase efﬁciency. This matter will be explained
in chapters 4 and 5.
Figure 3.1 provides some complexity comparisons between the protocols presented in this
chapter and schemes from the literature with similar security goals. The asymptotical commu-
nication complexities are provided in terms of group elements. Assumptions based on the
DLog problem require groups of size 256 bits. These groups will be denotedGd . Assumptions
based on the factorization problem require groups of size 2048 bits. These groups will be
denotedG f . The groupsGT required for pairings are of size 3072 bits. Computational com-
plexities are provided in terms of exponentiations (exp.) and pairings. Note that setup costs
are here left aside, although they will be given later for the protocols presented in this thesis.
Schemes Communication
Computational
Prover Veriﬁer
[SMI91] O(|Φ|) O(|Φ|) exp. O(|Φ|) exp.
[DJ01] O(|Φ|) O(|Φ|) exp. O(|Φ|) exp.
[BG13, Bay13] O(log |Φ|) O(log |Φ|) exp. O(log |Φ|) exp.
[CCJT13] 8 |Gd |+9
∣∣G f ∣∣ 15 exp. 21 exp.
[ALT+15a] 6 |Gd |+ |GT| 8 exp. 7 exp.
Protocol 3.1
6 |Gd |+ |GT| 3 exp., 1 pairing 3 exp., 2 pairings([BB04] signature based)
Protocol 3.2
19 |Gd |+6
∣∣G f ∣∣ 14 exp. 13 exp.([CL02b] signature based)
Protocol 3.4
19
∣∣G f ∣∣ 18 exp. 15 exp.([CL02a] accumulator based)
Figure 3.1 – Complexity comparisons for set Φ
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3.3 Boneh-Boyen Signature Based Set Membership Proof
Here we present a set membership proof protocol that is inspired by the oblivious transfer
protocol presented by Camenisch, Neven, and shelat [CNs07]. The basic idea is that the veriﬁer
ﬁrst sends the prover a signature on every element in the set Φ. The prover therefore receives
a signature on the particular element σ to which C is a commitment. The prover then “blinds”
this received signature and performs a proof of knowledge that she possesses a signature on
the committed element. Notice that the communication complexity of this proof depends on
the cardinality of Φ, in particular because the ﬁrst message of the veriﬁer contains a signature
on every element in Φ. The rest of the protocol, however, requires only a constant number of
group elements to be sent. The novelty of this approach is that the ﬁrst veriﬁer message can
be re-used in other proofs of membership; indeed, this property is used to achieve the results
for range proofs in Chapter 4.
Computational assumptions. The protocol in this section requires Pedersen commitments,
symmetric2 bilinear groups, associated computational hardness assumptions, as well as the
q-Strong Difﬁe Hellman assumption (q-SDH, see Section 2.2.2), with |Φ| = q . Note that the q-
SDH assumption implies the DLog assumption. Let PG be a symmetric bilinear pairing group
generator that on input 1κ outputs descriptions of multiplicative cyclic groupsG1 andGT of
prime order p where
∥∥p∥∥= k = (2κ+ log2 q). LetG∗1 =G1 \ {1} and let g ∈G∗1 . The generated
groups are such that there exists an admissible symmetric bilinear map e :G1 ×G1 →GT,
meaning that
• for all a,b ∈Zp it holds that e(g a ,gb)= e(g ,g )ab ;
• e(g ,g ) = 1;
• and the bilinear map is efﬁciently computable.
Boneh-Boyen signatures. The set membership proof presented in this section relies on the
elegant Boneh-Boyen short signature scheme [BB04] which is explained in Section 2.4.5 and
brieﬂy recalled here. The signer’s secret key is x ∈R Z∗p and the corresponding public key
is y = g x . The signature on a message m is s = g 1/(x+m). Veriﬁcation is done by checking
that e(s, y · gm)= e(g ,g ). Let us also recall here the following unforgeability property of the
Boneh-Boyen short signature [BB04], paraphrased below:
Lemma 3.1 ([BB04](Lemma 1, Section 3.1))
Suppose the q-Strong Difﬁe Hellman assumption holds in (G1,G1). Then the basic Boneh-
Boyen signature scheme is q-secure against an existential forgery under a weak chosen mes-
sage attack.
2Note that asymmetric bilinear groups could and should be used in practice as explained in Section 2.1.3. The
use of symmetric bilinear groups here is solely to help readers understand the protocol.
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Informally, this lemma states that under some speciﬁc assumptions, Boneh-Boyen signatures
are unforgeable. This property will be needed to prove the soundness of the set membership
proof described in this section. The reader is brieﬂy reminded that the q-Strong Difﬁe Hellman
assumption holds in (G1,G1), if an adversary has a negligible advantage in outputting a pair(
m, g 1/(x+m)
)
, when given as input
(
g , g x ,g x
2
, · · · , g xq
)
, where g is a generator ofG1. For a
more detailed and formal deﬁnition, see Section 2.2.2. A weak chosen message attack on a
signature scheme consists of retrieving signatures on chosen messages, that were queried by
the adversary before seeing the signature scheme public key. Furthermore, the Boneh-Boyen
q-security property of a signature scheme informally consists of the unforgeability property
when the attacker is allowed to query a signing oracle for strictly less than q messages of
his choice. Further details regarding the weak chosen message attack and q-security can
be found in Section 2.4.5. Last but not least, recall that Cheon provided a warning on the
hardness of the q-Strong Difﬁe Hellman assumption in [Che06]. His results state that the
computational complexity of recovering the secret element x is O
(√
p/q
) =O (2(k−logq)/2)
group operations, where p is the k-bit prime order ofG1. Hence, as explained in Section 2.2.2,
particular attention needs to be given to the choice of p and the value of q , unless the value q
is small enough compared to p. In practice, the binary length of p is often greater than 256
bits, for a value of q smaller than 15 bits. This leads to a computational complexity of an attack
strictly higher than 2120 group operations. Hence in order to obtain a 128 bit security (meaning
that the computational complexity is higher than 2128 group operations), the restriction on
the security parameter k is k 
 256+ log2 q .
Protocol explanation. The Boneh-Boyen signature based set membership proof is depicted
in Protocol 3.1. The common input includes the following elements: a description of G1
andGT, as provided by the pairing group generator PG for the Boneh-Boyen signature; two
generators g and h of G1 for the Pedersen commitment; the public set Φ ⊂ Z|G1|; and a
Pedersen commitment C to one element in Φ. As |G1| = p, this implies that Φ ⊂ Zp . The
prover input additionally contains elements σ and r such that C = gσhr and σ ∈Φ.
The ﬁrst message exchanged consists of the Boneh-Boyen public key y of the veriﬁer together
with signatures Ai on every element contained in Φ. Here, x ∈Z∗p is the Boneh-Boyen secret
key of the veriﬁer. Note that instead of the veriﬁer signing the elements in Φ, a trusted third
party can be employed. Moreover, picking x ∈Z∗p should be done such that −x is not present
in Φ, as it is impossible to produce a signature on −x. Indeed, an honest veriﬁer would be
required to compute A−x = g 1x−x . As for the malicious veriﬁer, he would need to provide a
signature A−x such that e(g ,g )= e(A−x , y · g x) for y = g−x . In all cases, the correctness of the
public key y and signatures Ai should be checked by the prover (and by the veriﬁer if a trusted
third party generated them). It is important to note here that regarding the security proof,
this ﬁrst message can be considered as a setup cost, and therefore the rest of the protocol will
appear as a Σ-protocol.
The second message, which is sent by the prover to the veriﬁer, is a blinding VP on the
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signature of σ, achieved by an exponentiation with a random secret v . At each step, every
element is checked for correctness, such as verifying that an element is in the correct group.
However many of these checks are only necessary when compiling from the honest veriﬁer
zero-knowledge model to the full zero-knowledge proofs. As previously mentioned, only
the honest veriﬁer case is presented here. The standard checks are provided for the sake of
completeness.
Common Input: g ,h, a commitment C , and a set Φ.
Prover Input: σ,r such that C = gσhr and σ ∈Φ.
P y,{Ai }ﬀ V • Veriﬁer picks x ∈R Z∗p such that −x ∈Φ and
sends y ← g x and Ai ← g 1x+i , ∀i ∈Φ.
• Prover checks that y ∈G∗1 , Ai ∈G∗1 and
that e(g ,g )
?= e(Ai , y · g i ), ∀i ∈Φ.
P VP  V • Prover picks v ∈R Z∗p and sends VP ← Avσ.
• Veriﬁer checks that VP ∈G∗1 .
Prover and Veriﬁer run PK{(σ,r,v) :C = gσhr ∧ VP = g vx+σ }
P a,D V • Prover picks s, t ,m ∈R Z∗p and
sends a ← e (V −sP g t ,g ) and D ← g shm .
• Veriﬁer checks that a ∈GT and D ∈G∗1 .
P cﬀ V • Veriﬁer sends a random challenge c ∈R Z∗p .
• Prover checks that c ∈Z∗p .
P zσ,zv ,zr V • Prover sends zσ← s−σc, zv ← t − vc, and zr ←m− r c.
• Veriﬁer checks that zσ,zv ,zr ∈Z∗p , that D ?=Cchzr g zσ and
that a
?= e (VP , y)c ·e (V −zσP g zv ,g )
Protocol 3.1 – Set membership proof protocol for set Φ,
based on Boneh-Boyen signatures
Once the veriﬁer has received the blinded signature, the prover and veriﬁer engage in a proof
of knowledge that the blinded signature corresponds to the secret σ contained in the initial
commitment. The prover selects three random parameters s, t , and m inZ∗p that will be used
to blind his secret elements σ, v , and r respectively.
The initial message of the proof of knowledge is then a commitment D on the secret ran-
domness s used by the prover, and a group element a ∈GT which is a bilinear pairing on the
blinded signature VP using the same secret randomness s committed in D . At the end of the
protocol, a will allow the veriﬁer to check that VP contains a valid blinded signature. Note, in
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addition, that D ∈G∗1 . If D = 1 then the prover would be able to retrieve the discrete logarithm
of h in base g by outputting logg h =−s/m (mod p).
After this step, the veriﬁer challenges the veriﬁer with the challenge c . The prover replies to the
veriﬁer with the elements zσ, zv , and zr . These will allow the veriﬁer to complete the proof of
knowledge by verifying that the following two equations hold:
D
?= Cchzr g zσ (3.1)
a
?= e (VP , y)c ·e (V −zσP g zv ,g ) . (3.2)
Recall again that q = |Φ| is supposedly a small number (bellow 15 bits length) compared to p
(above 256 bits length). The attack from Cheon [Che06] on the q-Strong Difﬁe-Hellman as-
sumption states that the computational complexity of recovering the secret key x is ofO
(√
p/q
)
group operations, instead of O
(
p
)
group operations. Hence the computational complexity
reduction of O
(
q
)
is, in our case, polynomially bounded. Nevertheless, in order for the
computational complexity of recovering the secret key x to be higher than 2κ group operations
(which is often called a κ-bit security), the security parameter k should be k 
 2κ+ log2 |Φ|.
Theorem 3.2
If the |Φ|-Strong Difﬁe-Hellman assumption associated with a pairing generator PG holds,
then Protocol 3.1 is a zero-knowledge argument of set membership for the set Φ.
Proof
To show that Protocol 3.1 is a zero-knowledge argument of set membership, three security
properties need to be satisﬁed: the completeness of the protocol, the special soundness property,
and the special honest veriﬁer zero-knowledge property.
The completeness of the protocol follows by inspection. In particular, the two last equalities
hold as follows. Recall that a = e (V −sP g t ,g ). Hence,
e
(
VP , y
)c ·e (V −zσP g zv ,g ) = e(VP , y)c · e(VP ,g )−zσ · e(g ,g )zv
= e(VP ,g x)c · e(VP ,g )−s+σc · e(g ,g )t−vc
= e(VP ,g )xc · e(VP ,g )−s · e(VP ,g )σc · e(g ,g )t · e(g ,g )−vc
= e(VP ,g )xc+σc · e(g ,g )−vc · e(VP ,g )−s · e(g ,g )t
= e(g vx+σ ,g )(x+σ)c · e(g ,g )−vc · e(VP ,g )−s · e(g ,g )t
= e(g v ,g )c · e(g ,g )−vc · e(VP ,g )−s · e(g ,g )t
= e(g ,g )vc · e(g ,g )−vc · e(VP ,g )−s · e(g ,g )t
= e(VP ,g )−s · e(g ,g )t = e
(
V −sP g
t ,g
) = a.
Similarly, as D = g shm , the following holds:
Cchzr g zσ = (gσhr )c · hm−r c · g s−σc = gσchrc · hm−r c · g s−σc
= gσc+s−σc · hrc+m−r c = g shm
= D.
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The special soundness follows from the extraction property of the proof of knowledge and the
unforgeability of the Boneh-Boyen signature. This extraction property and how its extractor
works will be explained ﬁrst. Finally, a demonstration will be provided, explaining that if a
malicious prover P∗ is able to convince a veriﬁer, then the extractor using this prover P∗ can
either be used to break the unforgeability property of the Boneh-Boyen signature (Lemma 3.1),
or to create σ ∈Φ and r such that C = gσhr .
The extraction property of the proof of knowledge implies that for any prover P∗ that convinces
V with probabilityS , there exists an extractor which interacts with P∗ and outputs a witness
(σ,r,v)within an expected number of steps bounded by q(κ)S −μ(κ) , where μ is the knowledge
error, q is a positive non zero polynomial, and κ is the security parameter. Moreover, following
standard techniques ([BG92, Gol01]), the extractor obtains two related accepting transcripts
tr and tr ′, for different challenges c = c ′ but with the same initial elements {y, {Ai },VP ,a,D}:
tr = {y, {Ai },VP ,a,D,c,zσ,zv ,zr } ,
tr ′ = {y, {Ai },VP ,a,D,c ′,z ′σ,z ′v ,z ′r } .
Then, the witness can be obtained by computing:
σ= zσ− z
′
σ
c ′ −c ; r =
zr − z ′r
c ′ −c ; v =
zv − z ′v
c ′ −c ;
and its correctness can be conﬁrmed with the following checks:
C
?= gσhr ; VP ?= Avσ.
The extractor succeeds since (c ′ −c) is invertible inZp .
If a malicious prover P∗ is able to convince veriﬁers, then P∗ can be (almost) directly used to
mount a weak chosen-message attack against the Boneh-Boyen signature scheme.Indeed, the
attacker will ﬁrst learn all of the signatures of the elements in Φ. Then, as P∗ has succeeded
in convincing V , the extractor will output the witness (σ,r,v) by interacting with P∗, for
VP = g vx+σ and C = gσhr . Hence, if v = 0 (as shown below) then V (1/v)P is a valid signature of
σ. Due to the unforgeability property of the Boneh-Boyen signature scheme, the extractor
outputs σ ∈Φ and r such that C = gσhr .
The following proof by contradiction, shows that v is a non zero element and hence invertible
inZ∗p . Recall that a valid transcript necessarily satisﬁes the veriﬁcation equation (3.2). Hence,
the related transcripts tr and tr ′, used by the extractor, satisfy the equalities:
a = e (VP , y)c ·e (V −zσP g zv ,g ) , and
a = e (VP , y)c ′ · e (V −z ′σP g z ′v ,g ) . (3.3)
The proof by contradiction shows that if c = c ′ and v = 0, then the extracted σwill fail to pass
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the veriﬁcation equation for the correctness of its signature:
e(g ,g )
?= e(Aσ, y · gσ).
As the extractor is assumed to have obtained two related transcripts tr and tr ′, for different
challenges c = c ′, the following holds:
v = 0 =⇒ zv − z
′
v
c ′ −c = 0
=⇒ zv = z ′v (3.4)
=⇒ e (VP , y)c ·e (V −zσP g zv ,g )= e (VP , y)c ′ · e (V −z ′σP g zv ,g ) (3.5)
=⇒ e(VP ,g x)c · e(VP ,g )−zσ = e(VP ,g x)c
′ · e(VP ,g )−z
′
σ (3.6)
=⇒ e(VP ,g )xc−zσ = e(VP ,g )xc
′−z ′σ
=⇒ xc− zσ = xc ′ − z ′σ (mod p) (3.7)
=⇒ x(c−c ′)= zσ− z ′σ (mod p) (3.8)
=⇒ σ= zσ− z
′
σ
c ′ −c =−x (mod p) (3.9)
Due to equation (3.4), z ′v is replaced by zv in equation (3.3) to obtain equation (3.5). As
e(g ,g ) = 0 by deﬁnition (GT is a multiplicative group), equation (3.5) can be divided by
e(g ,g )zv to obtain equation (3.6). Since VP = 1 we have e(VP ,g ) = 1, which implies equa-
tion (3.7). Furthermore, as c = c ′, equation (3.8) can be divided by (c ′ − c). As a result, equa-
tion (3.9) will fail the check e(g ,g )
?= e(Aσ, y · gσ), for any signature Aσ ∈G∗1 .
1. Sim retrieves y, {Ai } from V ∗ (or from a trusted third party).
2. Sim chooses σ ∈R Φ, v ∈R Z∗p and computes VP ← Avσ.
3. Sim runs the simulator of PK{(σ,r,v) :C = gσhr ∧ VP = g vx+σ }.
(a) On challenge c ∈Z∗p , Sim chooses zσ,zv ,zr ∈R Z∗p .
(b) Finally, Sim computes a ← e(VP ,g )−zσ−σce(g ,g )zv+vc and D ←Cchzr g zσ .
4. Sim returns the transcript {y, {Ai },VP ,a,D,c,zσ,zv ,zr }.
Figure 3.2 – Simulator for the set membership proof protocol
Finally, to prove special honest veriﬁer zero-knowledge, we construct a simulator Sim for any
veriﬁer V ∗, as depicted in Figure 3.2. The goal of the simulator Sim is to simulate all possible
interactions with any honest prover P . Sim will ﬁrst follow the initialization and the blinding
instructions honestly, using a random σ ∈R Φ and a random v ∈R Z∗p to compute VP . Then
Sim runs the simulator of the Σ-protocol PK
{
(σ,r,v) :C = gσhr ∧ VP = g vx+σ
}
. Hence, on the
challenge c ∈Z∗p , the simulator ﬁrst picks zσ, zv , zr inZ∗p randomly, and then computes a, D
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as follows:
a = e(VP ,g )−zσ−σce(g ,g )zv+vc ,
D = Cchzr g zσ .
The output of the simulator is a transcript {y, {Ai },VP ,a,D,c,zσ,zv ,zr }, which has an identical
probability distribution to a normal transcript between regular provers and veriﬁers. We can
easily see that y , {Ai } and c are identical in both transcripts, as they are provided by the veriﬁer.
VP has the same probability distribution as it is computed with a valid σ ∈Φ and a random
v ∈R Z∗p . As s, t ,m are randomly picked in Z∗p , they impose the same randomness towards
zσ,zv ,zr . Hence zσ,zv ,zr also have the same probability distribution. It is straightforward to
see that D has the same probability distribution as it is computed from the same elements
with the same distributions. Last but not least, as s = zσ+σc and t = zv + vc, a has the same
probability distribution for the same reasons as for D . SinceG1 is a prime-order group, then
the blinding is perfect in the ﬁrst two steps of the simulator; thus the zero-knowledge property
follows from the zero-knowledge property of the Σ-protocol in the third step.
Communication and Computational Complexity. As the ﬁrst message of Protocol 3.1 can
be regarded as a setup procedure, it will not be included in the complexity analysis. Never-
theless, its cost is mentioned here for comparison purposes. The ﬁrst message consists of |Φ|
signatures and the public key y , which sum up to |Φ|+1 group elements for the communi-
cation, |Φ|+1 exponentiations for the veriﬁer (or the trusted third party), and |Φ|+1 bilinear
pairings for the prover in the non-honest veriﬁer model.
Overall, the communication complexity of Protocol 3.1 consists of 2 group elements inG1, 1
group element inGT and 4 elements inZ∗p . Regarding computational complexity, the honest
veriﬁer setting is assumed. Hence, the prover computational cost is dominated by 3 exponen-
tiations and 1 pairing. The veriﬁer computational cost is dominated by 3 exponentiations and
2 pairings.
3.4 Alternative Signature Based Set Membership Proof
The set membership proof protocol presented in Section 3.3 makes the veriﬁer produce signa-
tures on the set elements, send them to the prover, and then requires the prover to show that
he knows a signature (from the veriﬁer) and the element he holds. In other words, this last step
requires the prover to be able to prove the knowledge of a signature on a value that he has com-
mitted to, using the Pedersen commitment scheme. Concretely, the weak signature scheme by
Boneh and Boyen is employed. The following is a discussion on alternative signature schemes
which allow the whole protocol to be based on different assumptions. Apart for the weak
Boneh-Boyen signature scheme, there are other signature schemes that could be employed.
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In terms of assumptions, one notable alternative would be the one by Camenisch and Lysyan-
skaya [CL02b] that is based on the strong RSA assumption. It is not hard to adapt the protocol
given in Section 3.3 to that signature scheme, in particular as Camenisch and Lysyanskaya gave
protocols to prove knowledge of a committed value in their paper [CL02b]. It should further
be mentioned that Pointcheval and Sanders recently developed an improvement of [CL02b]
in [PS15], where signatures consists of two group elements instead of three, with the help of
speciﬁc computational assumptions (notably the LRSW assumption [LRSW99]). However, the
solution presented in Section 3.3 remains the most efﬁcient one. The alternatives discussed in
this section are of similar efﬁciency.
Computational assumptions. The protocol in this section requires the notion of quadratic
residues modulo n, special RSA modulus, the strong RSA assumption, and the Fujisaki-
Okamoto commitment scheme ([FO98, DF02], see Section 2.4.2). An RSA modulus n = pq is
called special if p and q are both safe primes. Hence n = (2p ′ +1)(2q ′ +1), where p ′ and q ′ are
both Sophie-Germain primes. The strong RSA assumption is explained in Section 2.2.2. As a
brief reminder, this assumption states that for a random a ∈Z∗n , it is hard to compute e 
 3
and the eth root of a, where n is an RSA modulus. Recall in addition that for the commitment,
instead of performing computations in a group of prime order as for a Pedersen commitment,
the Fujisaki-Okamoto commitment uses the set QRn of quadratic residues modulo a special
RSA modulus n.
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures. The set membership proof in this section relies on the
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme in [CL02b] which is explained hereafter. The
signer’s secret key is a safe prime p˜ such that n˜ = p˜ q˜ is a special RSA modulus of binary length
2k, where k is the general security parameter. The corresponding public key is (n˜,a,b,c),
where a,b,c ∈R QRn˜ \ {1}3. The signature on a message m of binary length m , is a tuple
(s,e,v) such that ve ≡ ambsc (mod n˜), where e is a random prime number of binary length
e 
 m +2, s is a random number of binary length s > 2k +m , and where v is obtained
with v = (ambsc)e−1 (mod n˜). To verify a signature (s,e,v) on a message m against a public
key (n˜,a,b,c), a veriﬁer runs the predicate Verify(n˜,a,b,c)(m, s,e,v) which consists of checking
that ve ≡ ambsc mod n˜. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya suggested the following values for the
security parameters: k = 512, m = 160, e = 162, s = (2k+m+160)= 1344. Let us also recall
the security property of the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme [CL02b], paraphrased
below:
Theorem 3.3 ([CL02b](Theorem 1))
The Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme is secure under the strong RSA assumption.
More precisely, if a forger breaks the signature scheme in time p(k) with probability (k), then
the strong RSA assumption can be broken in time O(p(k)) with probabilityΩ((k)/p(k)).
3Note that the requirement of removing the element 1 from QRn˜ is missing in the original version [CL02b].
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Protocol explanation. The Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature based set membership proof
is depicted in Protocol 3.2. The common input includes the following elements: the pub-
lic parameters of a Fujisaki-Okamoto commitment (a safe RSA modulus n = pq and two
generators g ,h ∈QRn); the public set Φ of elements with binary length smaller than m ; a
Fujisaki-Okamoto commitment C to one element in Φ and security parameters e ,s . The
security parameters e ,s are used to deﬁne the length of the signature elements ei , si re-
spectively. The prover input additionally contains an element σ ∈Φ and r ∈Z∗|G| such that
C = gσhr .
Common Input: g ,h, a commitment C , a set Φ,
and security parameters m , s , e .
Prover Input: σ,r such that C = gσhr and σ ∈Φ.
P (n˜,a,b,c), {(si ,ei ,vi )}ﬀ V • Veriﬁer picks two safe primes p˜, q˜ , sets n˜ ← p˜ q˜ ,
picks a,b,c ∈R QRn˜ \ {1},
picks random numbers si of length s , ∀i ∈Φ,
picks random primes ei ∈R
(
2e−1, 2e
)
, ∀i ∈Φ,
computes vi ←
(
aibsi c
)1/ei , ∀i ∈Φ,
sends (n˜,a,b,c) and (si ,ei ,vi ), ∀i ∈Φ.
• Prover checks for every i ∈Φ that ei ∈R
(
2e−1, 2e
)
and
that veii ≡ aibsi c.
Prover and Veriﬁer run
PK{(σ,r, sσ,eσ,vσ) :C = gσhr ∧ Verify(n˜,a,b,c)(σ, sσ,eσ,vσ)= 1}
Protocol 3.2 – Set membership proof protocol for set Φ,
based on Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures
The ﬁrst message exchanged consists of the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature public key
(n˜,a,b,c) of the veriﬁer, together with a signature (si ,ei ,vi ) on every element of i ∈Φ. The
secret key of the veriﬁer is the safe prime p˜ which allows him to factorize n˜ = p˜ q˜ into two
safe primes. Obviously, (p˜,n) should be coprime as well as (q˜ ,n), otherwise the owner of the
factorization n = pq would be allowed to produce signatures on behalf of the veriﬁer, and
hence to break the unforgeability property of the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme.
As in the case of Section 3.3 with the Boneh-Boyen signature scheme, standard checks should
be performed such as verifying the correctness of signatures (si ,ei ,vi ) on every element i ∈Φ.
Once the signatures are delivered to the prover and their correctness has been veriﬁed, the
prover and the veriﬁer engage in an honest veriﬁer zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of
a signature, such that the signature corresponds to the element hidden in the commitment
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C of the prover. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya provided two protocols achieving this proof of
knowledge of a signature in [CL02b], both based on the strong RSA assumption. Their ﬁrst
protocol is intended to be comprehensive rather than optimized, while the second one is
focused on optimization. For the sake of completeness, the optimized protocol is detailed in
Appendix A. Let us recall their security property, which is paraphrased from [CL02b]:
Lemma 3.4 ([CL02b] (Lemma 8 and lemma 15))
Assume thatC = gσhr is a Fujisaki-Okamoto commitment on the elementσ ∈Φwith random-
ness r ∈Z∗|G|, as deﬁned in protocol 3.2. Let (s,e,v) be a Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature
on the element σ as deﬁned in [CL02b]. Let VerifyPK be the veriﬁcation algorithm of the
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme, where PK is the public key. The two Camenisch-
Lysyanskaya protocols in [CL02b] for proof of knowledge of a signature are zero-knowledge
proofs of knowledge of the values (σ,r, s,e,v) such that VerifyPK (σ, s,e,v)= 1.
Theorem 3.5
If the strong RSA assumption holds, then Protocol 3.2 is a zero-knowledge argument of set
membership for the set Φ.
Proof
Recall that the underlying proof of knowledge
PK{(σ,r, sσ,eσ,vσ) :C = gσhr ∧ Verify(n˜,a,b,c)(σ, sσ,eσ,vσ)= 1}
is detailed in Appendix A.
The completeness of the protocol follows from the completeness of the underlying proof of
knowledge.
The special soundness property follows from the unforgeability of the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya
signature scheme (Theorem3.3) and from the extraction property of theCamenisch-Lysyanskaya
proof of knowledge of a signature (Lemma 3.4). The goal of the extractor is to produce a valid
signature on an openingσ ofC , by invoking the underlying extractor of the proof of knowledge
of a signature. Moreover, the extractor is actually identical to the one of the underlying proof
of knowledge. Indeed, if the extractor of the proof of knowledge of a signature succeeds and
outputs a witness (σ,r, sσ,eσ,vσ), either it can be directly used to break the unforgeability of
the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme as (sσ,eσ,vσ) would be a valid signature of σ,
or the witness contains σ ∈Φ and an opening (σ,r ) of C . However, if this extractor fails, then a
reduction can be made to break the strong RSA assumption.
In order to prove special honest veriﬁer zero-knowledge, the simulator follows the initialization
steps honestly, then invokes the simulator of the underlying honest veriﬁer zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge of a signature.
Communication and Computational Complexity. As in the case of Protocol 3.1, the ﬁrst
message of Protocol 3.2 can be regarded as a setup procedure, and thus will not be included
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in the complexity analysis. Nevertheless, we mention its cost for comparison purposes. The
ﬁrst message consists of |Φ| signatures and the public key (n˜,a,b,c). For the communication,
this amounts to 4+|Φ| elements inZn˜ , |Φ| elements of length e and |Φ| elements of length s .
The veriﬁer (or the trusted third party) will be required to perform 3 |Φ| exponentiations. The
prover in the non-honest veriﬁer model, will also be required to perform the same amount of
exponentiations.
Overall, the complexity of Protocol 3.2 is identical to the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya proof of
knowledge of a signature. The communication complexity sums up to 6 group elements and 9
elements in the size of the group order. Regarding computational complexity for the honest
veriﬁer setting, the prover computational cost is dominated by 14 exponentiations. The veriﬁer
computational cost is dominated by 13 exponentiations.
Common Input: a commitment C , a set Φ,
the commitment scheme parameters Paramcom,
and the signature scheme parameters Paramsign.
Prover Input: σ,r such that C =Commit(σ,r ) and σ ∈Φ.
P Pub, {Ai }ﬀ V • Veriﬁer picks his secret key Sk,
generates the corresponding public key Pub,
computes the signature Ai = SignSk (i ), ∀i ∈Φ,
sends Pub and {Ai }, ∀i ∈Φ.
• Prover checks for every i ∈Φ that
VerifyPub (i , Ai )= 1.
Prover and Veriﬁer run
PK{(σ,r, A) :C =Commit(σ,r ) ∧ VerifyPub(σ, A)= 1}
Protocol 3.3 – Set membership proof protocol for set Φ,
based on a general signature scheme
Using Alternative Signature Schemes. The general idea of using a set membership proof
based on a signature scheme consists of two steps. At ﬁrst, the prover is given signatures on
every element of the public set Φ. This allows the prover to select the signature corresponding
to his secret element σ ∈Φ. The signatures can be provided by either the veriﬁer or a trusted
third party. In the second step, the prover runs a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of a
signature with the veriﬁer, to ensure that the prover knows a valid signature on his secret
element that he has previously committed to. The assumptions needed are inherited from the
ones used in the commitment scheme, in the signature scheme, and in the proof of knowledge
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needed. A general description is provided in Protocol 3.3, where Paramsign, Sign, and Verify
refer respectively to the parameters, the signature algorithm, and the veriﬁcation algorithm of
the signature scheme. Pub and Sk are, respectively, the public key and the secret key of the
signer. As for the commitment scheme used, Paramcom refers to the public parameters of the
commitment, and the commit algorithm Commit(m,r ) returns a commitment to the message
m under randomness r . Note that depending on the commitment and signature scheme used,
the proof of knowledge will force some restrictions on the message space provided by the
public set Φ.
3.5 Accumulator Based Set Membership Proof
The reasons that signature schemes were employed in the previous two sections, is that the
prover needed to show that he committed to a value for which he knows an authenticator
without revealing that value or the authenticator. Now it turns out that exactly the same goal
can be achieved with cryptographic accumulators with similar complexities.
Cryptographic accumulators are brieﬂy recalled here, as they are explained in more detail in
Section 2.4.6. A cryptographic accumulator is an algorithm that allows a user to compress
a list of elements into a single accumulator value. For each element, there exists a witness
attesting to the fact that the element is indeed contained in the accumulator value. For
some cryptographic accumulators, there exist efﬁcient proof systems that allow a prover
holding an accumulated element and its corresponding witness to prove to a veriﬁer in zero
knowledge that he is privy to an element that is contained in the accumulator. Camenisch and
Lysyanskaya have given details of such an accumulator in [CL02a], with the introduction of
dynamic accumulators (see Section 2.4.6). They also provided a protocol that a committed
value is contained in the accumulator based on the strong RSA assumption. However, their
proof of knowledge needs to be modiﬁed in order to be used in a set membership proof
protocol, as only primes in a restrictive integer range are allowed to be accumulated.
The idea of building an efﬁcient set membership proof with dynamic accumulator is very sim-
ilar to the signature based one. The veriﬁer adds each element of the set into the accumulator
and sends the accumulator value to the prover together with the corresponding witness for
each element. The prover then proves to the veriﬁer that the value he has committed to is
contained in the accumulator produced by the veriﬁer, by using the appropriate witness.
Computational assumptions. As in Section 3.4, the accumulator based set membership
proof requires Pedersen commitments, the notions of quadratic residues, and special RSA
modulus, as well as the accumulator associated computational hardness assumptions. In this
case, the dynamic accumulators of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya are based on the strong RSA
assumption.
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Camenisch-Lysyanskayaaccumulators. Thedynamic accumulators of Camenisch and Lysyan-
skaya [CL02a] are brieﬂy recalled here, as they are explained in more detail in Section 2.4.6.
Assuming a special RSA modulus n˜ = (2p˜+1)(2q˜+1) of length k, the message space of the ele-
ments to be accumulate is the set of prime numbers e, such that e ∈ {p˜, q˜} and 2< A 	 e < A2.
These requirements come from the structure of the accumulator and the way in which ele-
ments are accumulated. Indeed, to add an element e into the accumulator v ∈QR∗n˜ , the user
computes v ′ = ve (mod n˜). The witness of an element e contained in an accumulator v ∈QR∗n˜
is the element we = v1/e (mod n˜). To check that an element e is indeed contained in the
accumulator v , the following veriﬁcation is performed: v
?= (we )e (mod n˜). Last but not least,
we recall the security theorem of the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya dynamic accumulators [CL02a],
paraphrased below:
Theorem 3.6 ([CL02a](Theorem 2))
Under the strong RSA assumption, the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya accumulator scheme is a
secure dynamic accumulator.
Common Input: g ,h, a commitment C , a set Φ.
Prover Input: σ,r such that C = gσhr and σ ∈Φ.
P n˜, v, g˜ , h˜, Θﬀ V • Veriﬁer picks a safe prime product n˜ = (2p˜+1)(2q˜+1),
picks u, g˜ , h˜ ∈R QRn˜ ,
picks ai ∈ {0,1}k¯ such that ei = i ·2k +ai are prime, ∀i ∈Φ,
computes v ← u2
∏
ei (mod n˜) ;wi ← v1/ei (mod n˜), ∀i ∈Φ,
sends n˜, v , g˜ , h˜, and Θ← {(ei ,wi ) : i ∈Φ}.
• Prover checks the correctness of n˜, v, g˜ , h˜, Θ.
• Prover and Veriﬁer run PK{(α) : g˜ = h˜α (mod n˜)}.
P W, R, Ce  V • Prover picks r1,r2,re ∈Zn˜/4,
sends W ←wσh˜r1 (mod n˜), R ← g˜ r1 h˜r2 (mod n˜),
and Ce ← g˜ eσ h˜re (mod n˜).
• Veriﬁer checks that W, R, Ce ∈QRn˜ .
Prover and Veriﬁer run
PK{(σ,r,eσ,aσ,re ,r1,r2) : C = gσhr ∧ Ce = g˜ eσ h˜re (mod n˜) ∧
Ce = (g˜ 2k )σg˜ aσ h˜re (mod n˜) ∧ Reσ = g˜ r1eσ h˜r2eσ (mod n˜) ∧
v =W eσ h˜−r1eσ (mod n˜) ∧ aσ ∈ [−2k−1,2k−1]}
Protocol 3.4 – Set membership proof protocol for set Φ,
based on Camenisch-Lysyanskaya accumulators
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Protocol explanation. One complication that needs to be dealt with here, is that the accu-
mulator only allows the accumulation of prime numbers, whereas the set Φ is composed of
arbitrary bits strings. A mapping thus need to be encoded. This can be done as follows: let
Φ be our set, where the elements i ∈ Φ are assumed to be integers; let ei = i2k + ai , where
ai < 2k¯ < 2k is selected so that ei is prime. The security parameter k¯ deﬁnes the length of
elements ai . Moreover, it is required that A2−1< q/2, where q is the order of the Pedersen
commitment group. This requirement is inherited from the requirements of the proof of
knowledge that ei is accumulated in v (see Appendix B and [CL02a]). With this encoding, the
veriﬁer can produce a proof of knowledge that eσ corresponds to his committed element σ,
and that eσ is accumulated in v . Hence the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya accumulator based set
membership proof depicted in Protocol 3.4 is obtained.
The common input includes the following elements: the descriptionG of a Pedersen commit-
ment group; two generators g and h ofG for the Pedersen commitment; the public set Φ ; and
a Pedersen commitment C to one element in Φ. The prover input additionally contains the
elements σ ∈Φ and r ∈Z∗|G| such that C = gσhr .
The ﬁrst step consists of a message sent by the veriﬁer to the prover, followed by a small proof
of knowledge. This ﬁrst message consists of the accumulator v , public parameters (n˜, g˜ , h˜)
for the accumulator, and a set Θ regrouping the witnesses wi for the accumulated element ei
corresponding to the elements i ∈Φ. Furthermore, the veriﬁer possesses the primes p˜ and q˜
that decompose n˜ = (2p˜+1)(2q˜+1), as well as the element u used to generate the accumulator
v . As was the case for the non-honest veriﬁer model, standard checks should be performed
such as verifying the correctness of the elements n˜, v, g˜ , h˜, Θ. The proof of knowledge that
follows aims at convincing the prover that g˜ ∈ 〈h˜〉. The straightforward way to achieve this, is
that the prover runs the proof of knowledge PK{(α) : g˜ = h˜α (mod n˜)} with the veriﬁer using
binary challenges. Another, more efﬁcient, way is described by Bangerter et al. [BCM05], based
on the work of Cramer [Cra97].
The second step, is the core of the set membership proof. A reply is provided from the prover
to the veriﬁer, that consists of a blinding W on the witness wσ, and additionally of two
commitments R, Ce . The commitment R is a commitment on the randomness used for the
blinding W . The commitment Ce is a commitment on the prime eσ corresponding to the
committed element σ. In both this step and the previous one, every element is checked for
correctness, such as verifying that an element is in the correct group. However, these checks
are only necessary when compiling from the honest veriﬁer zero-knowledge model to the full
zero-knowledge proofs. Here again, only the honest veriﬁer case is of concern. The standard
checks are provided for the sake of completeness.
The last stage of this second step, is a proof of knowledge that eσ corresponds to the σ in
the initial commitment of the prover, and that eσ is also contained in the accumulator. The
resulting proof of knowledge is given in Appendix B, where the accumulator proof given
by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL02a] is adapted to this setting. This adaptation mainly
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concerns the fact that the correspondence between eσ and the committed σ needs to be
additionally proven to hold. For this to work, the prover needs to show that eσ = σ2k + aσ
holds, for some aσ known to the prover. Here it is, of course, important that this aσ be at most
of length k¯ < k bits. This can be enforced efﬁciently, provided that k¯ is a couple of bits smaller
than k, where in practice the difference should be about 300 bits for this to work. More precise
accuracy could be achieved with the range proofs presented in Chapter 4 and in Chapter 5.
However, for this speciﬁc purpose, they would be less efﬁcient.
Theorem 3.7
If the strong RSA assumption holds, then Protocol 3.4 is a zero-knowledge argument of set
membership for the set Φ.
Proof
The completeness of the protocol follows from the completeness of the underlying proofs of
knowledge.
The special soundness property follows from the security property of theCamenisch-Lysyanskaya
accumulator scheme (Theorem 3.6) and from the extraction property of the proof of knowl-
edge of a committed accumulated element described in Appendix B. This extraction property
is directly derived from the extraction property of the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya proof of knowl-
edge that a committed value is accumulated ([CL02a], Theorem 3). The extractor goal is to
produce a valid pair (eσ,wσ) on σ, such that wσ is a witness that eσ has been accumulated in
v , and eσ =σ2k +aσ, where aσ ∈ [−2k−1,2k−1]. This is achieved by invoking the underlying
extractor for the proof of knowledge of a committed accumulated element, as this extractor
directly provides the necessary elements. If σ ∈ Φ, this can be directly used to break the
security property of the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya accumulator scheme as wσ would be a valid
witness for a prime eσ that has not been accumulated. However, if the extractor fails, then a
reduction can be made to break the strong RSA assumption.
To prove special honest veriﬁer zero-knowledge, the simulator follows the ﬁrst step honestly.
It then randomly selects σ ∈R Φ, honestly computes and sends W,R,Ce to the veriﬁer V ∗, and
invokes the simulator of the underlying honest veriﬁer zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of
a committed accumulated element.
Communication and Computational Complexity. As the ﬁrst message of Protocol 3.4 can
be regarded as a setup procedure, it will not be included in the complexity analysis. Neverthe-
less, its cost is mentioned for the purpose of comparison. The ﬁrst message consists of the set
Θ, the accumulator v and public parameters (n˜, g˜ , h˜). For the communication, these elements
can be approximated with an upper bound of 4+2 |Φ| elements inZn˜ . The veriﬁer will be re-
quired to perform 1+|Φ| exponentiations for the witnesses and the accumulator computation.
The prover in the non-honest veriﬁer model will be required to perform |Φ| exponentiations
for checking the correctness of the witnesses. Note also, that for many applications, the param-
eters n˜, v , g˜ , h˜, and Θ only needs to be computed and published once (possibly by a trusted
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third party). In this case the communication and computational complexity of Protocol 3.4
becomes independent of the number of elements in the setΦ.
With regard to the communication complexity, the exchanged elements have, at most, a
length of k bits, where k is the security parameter deﬁning the length of n˜. Thus, instead of
mentioning the precise size of each element, it will simply be implied that group elements
have at most up to k bits of length. The communication complexity therefore includes 3
group elements for the proof of knowledge PK{(α) : g˜ = h˜α (mod n˜)}, the three commitments
W,R,Ce , and lastly, 13 group elements for the remaining proof of knowledge of a committed
accumulated element. Overall, the communication complexity sums up to 19 group elements.
Regarding computational complexity, the honest veriﬁer setting is assumed. The prover
computational cost is dominated by 18 exponentiations. The veriﬁer computational cost is
dominated by 15 exponentiations.
Remark: Recall that for the primes ei that could be accumulated, the range restriction is
[A, B ] with 2 < A and B < A2. This restriction is mainly due to the fact that operations are
achieved in QRn˜ . The author of this thesis conjectures that by working in the group of τ power
residues modulo n˜, the upper bound B can be set to B < Aτ, however the lower bound would
be changed to τ < A. Note that these groups are slightly different to Schnorr groups as the
modular computations are performed with a special RSA modulus instead of a prime number.
This conjecture should also be applicable in the case of [CL02a].
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Interactive Range Proofs
This chapter starts by presenting, in Section 4.1, the range proof primitive in its basic inter-
active version. Section 4.2 then continues with prior and recent work on interactive range
proofs, as well as some related work. In Section 4.3, a family of range proofs based on the set
membership proof primitive are presented. This will be achieved by using the Boneh-Boyen
signature based set membership proof from Section 3.3. Section 4.4 introduces and explains
the sumset representation of integer intervals. Based on the notion of sumsets, a more efﬁ-
cient range proof is presented in Section 4.5. The main results of Section 4.3 are published
at Asiacrypt 2008 [CCs08], as a joint work with Jan Camenisch and abhi shelat1. The main
theory and results of Section 4.4 and Section 4.5 are published in the proceedings of ACISP
2010 [CLs10], as a joint work with Helger Lipmaa and abhi shelat. Lastly, note that Protocol 4.4
in Section 4.3 is unpublished as it is a direct result of [CCs08].
4.1 Interactive Range Proofs Primitive
The problem tackled in this chapter is closely related to the set membership proof problem
explained in the previous chapter. Indeed the range proof problem can be seen as a special
case of the set membership proof problem, when the set Φ consists of all integers that are
within a given range [A, B ]. HenceΦ= {x ∈N : A 	 x 	B}, where A,B ∈N. For more clarity, we
recall the game of the set membership proof problem and describe the range proof problem
by way of a similar game between a prover and a veriﬁer. In the range proof game, the prover
wants to convince the veriﬁer of the veracity of a speciﬁc statement. This statement is that
his secret element σ that he picked (and ﬁxed in a commitment available to any veriﬁer) is
included in the public range [A, B ], where A,B ∈N. This game comes with the same concerns
as for the set membership proof problem. The prover wants to reveal no information besides
the fact that his secret element belongs to the public range [A, B ], and that he is able to open
1Note that abhi shelat requires his name to be cited in lower case.
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his commitment to such an element. As for the veriﬁer, he wants to be sure that the prover is
unable to cheat. Hence zero-knowledge and soundness properties are respectively needed to
address these concerns. In this chapter, the focus is on the general interactive version of range
proofs. Non-interactive range proofs will be the topic of the next chapter.
The need for range proofs started with the need to adapt cryptographic protocols constructed
in idealized models, into protocols secure against any (malicious) adversary. Range proofs
became even more necessary with the rise of electronic communications. As several online
services became more and more complex, the need for complex cryptographic building boxes
followed. Services such as anonymous credentials, e-cash, e-auctions, electronic elections,
and e-voting are all examples of services that require range proof primitives. Hence range
proofs are now considered a basic cryptographic building block. In the case of anonymous
credentials, a typical example is age restriction services. Assume that a user needs to prove
that her age is greater than 18 years to access some adult content, or between 13 and 18 in
the case of teen-community websites; these can be ensured with range proofs performed on
their hidden age contained in a passport credentials or electronic identities (or e-ID). These
cases can be generalized to any timestamp credential that the owner wishes to keep secret. In
the case of e-cash and e-auctions, range proofs become useful in providing range information
on the size of portfolios or on the bid range. This can be illustrated with a user accessing a
private investment platform or a ﬁscal arrangement platform (also called lump sum taxation
in Switzerland). In these cases, a user needs to prove that the size of his portfolio is within
some range in order to access these platforms. However, they also wish to keep their exact
fortune a secret from these platforms. In the case of e-auctions, not only are users requested
to prove that their portfolio is large enough to participate in the auctions, but for some speciﬁc
auctions with sealed bids, such as blind auctions or Vickrey auction, bidders might need
to prove that their bids are higher than a minimum threshold. Last but not least, electronic
elections or e-voting with, respectively, a very large number of candidates or choices, can
beneﬁt from range proofs to attest the validity of ballots, as explained by Damgård and Jurik
in [DJ01]. However, where the voting choices are small, such as in [CGS97] where there is only
a choice between yes and no, the set membership proof primitive should be used instead of
range proofs.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Range Proof)
Let C = (Gen,Com,Open) be the generation, the commit, and the open algorithm of a string
commitment scheme. A range proof with respect to the commitment schemeC is a special case
of the set membership proof in which the set Φ is a sequence of consecutive integers Φ= [A,B ]
for A,B ∈N. Hence, for an instance c, a range proof with respect to commitment scheme C
and integer range [A,B ] is a proof of knowledge for the following statement:
PK
{
(σ,ρ) : c ←Com(σ; ρ)∧σ ∈ [A,B ]} , where A,B ∈N.
Remark: As in the case of setmembership proofs, the proof system for range proofs is deﬁned
for any commitment scheme. Moreover, the statement being proven is the ability of the prover
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to open his commitment to an element contained in the public range [A,B ]. Furthermore, it is
important to note that interactive range proofs are, in fact, interactive arguments, for the exact
same reasons as for set membership proofs. Since the cryptographic literature (past, present,
and related) refers to the problem as a “range proof”, that term is used in this thesis. Some
additional explanations are provided in the remark in Section 3.1.
A naïve solution would be to use a set membership proof to solve the range proof problem.
More efﬁcient solutions can be obtained by exploiting the structure of Φ, as it is a consecutive
integer range in the case of range proofs. Nevertheless, if the range is very small (under
7 elements), then it would be more efﬁcient to directly employ the set membership proof
protocol presented in Section 3.3.
Two honest veriﬁer zero-knowledge solutions will be presented in this chapter, based on
three moves protocols called Σ-protocols (see Section 2.4.1). The focus on honest veriﬁers is
justiﬁed by the availability of the Cramer et al. transformation [CDM00] that converts honest
veriﬁer zero-knowledge proof systems so as to be secure against any veriﬁer. Moreover, this
transformation is well adapted for Σ-protocols. In these protocols, the prover sends an initial
message containing some elements determining the randomness used to blind his secrets.
The veriﬁer then provides the prover with an unpredictable, random challenge, allowing the
prover to reply with a ﬁnal message in order to complete the proof system. Furthermore, the
restriction of honest veriﬁers protocols facilitates comparisons with other range proofs, as the
majority restrict themselves to this model.
The primary solution for range proofs used in this thesis is explained in Section 4.3. This
solution is tightly linked to the set membership proof primitive, as it divides the integer range
at hand into a u-base decomposition in order to obtain integer intervals that are small enough
to be handled by a set membership proof protocol. The computational hardness assumptions
required are identical to the ones needed for the set membership proof primitive. This solution
offers two important improvements for range proofs. Initially applied using signature based
set membership proofs, the technique of this solution was the ﬁrst one to introduce the u-base
decomposition of ranges and combine it with a proof of knowledge of a signature. The second
improvement to range proofs is the asymptotical bound for the communication complexity,
with respect to the honest veriﬁer zero-knowledge security. Indeed, the communication
complexity achieved by this solution is O
(
k
logk−loglogk
)
group elements, with the security
parameter k = log(B − A).
The second solution provides a constant factor 2 improvement on the communication com-
plexity, compared to the primary solution. To achieve this improvement, the primary solution
is modiﬁed so that it uses a sumset representation of the range instead of a speciﬁc u-base de-
composition. Sumset representations of integer ranges will be explained in Section 4.4 before
presenting the second solution in Section 4.5. Sumsets are classiﬁed in additive combinatorics
as a multi-base decomposition. Furthermore, the computational hardness assumptions for
this second solution are left unchanged from the primary solution.
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4.2 Prior and Related Work
Known range proofs can be classiﬁed into four categories, according to their underlying
techniques:
1. Σ-response2 range testing ([BCDvdG87, CFT98a, CFT98b, FO98]);
2. positivity testing ([Bou00, Lip03, Gro05, Sce09]);
3. range decomposition
([BG97, Mao98, DJ01, Sch01, LAN02, CCs08, CLs10, MN10, Gro11, CCJT13]); and
4. proof of signature knowledge2 ([TS06, CCs08, CLs10]).
Historically speaking, the ﬁrst solution to range proofs was created in 1987 by Brickell, Chaum,
Damgård, and van deGraaf in [BCDvdG87]. Their solutionwas based on the discrete logarithm
assumption and was achieved using a range check on the response message from aΣ-protocol.
Therefore this technique is designated as a Σ-response range testing. Unfortunately, too many
drawbacks follow from this technique. In their protocol, a prover holding a secret element
σ ∈ [0,B ] can only prove that σ ∈ [−B ,2B ] after repeating the proof in parallel k times, where k
deﬁnes the soundness security of the protocol (the success probability of a malicious prover
is upper bounded by 21−k). This inaccuracy in the range being proven is speciﬁc to this
technique, and is measured with a factor called expansion rate δ. In the case of [BCDvdG87],
the expansion rate is δ = 3. The Σ-responses are often computed as m = σ · c + r , where r
is a random element that has been committed to at the beginning of the protocol and c is
a random challenge provided by the prover. Checking solely the range of m cannot provide
an accurate range proof with an expansion rate of δ= 1, and at the same time ensuring the
zero-knowledge property of the proof.
Following the lead of Brickell et al. [BCDvdG87], two other solutions were produced based
on theΣ-response range testing. Using the same computational hardness assumption (namely
the discrete logarithmassumption), Chan, Frankel, andTsiounis overcame in [CFT98a, CFT98b]
the need to repeat the proof k times. However, they ended up with a larger expansion rate of
δ= 22k+3 and a probabilistic completeness of (1−2−k−1) for a soundness security of 2−k . This
means that the completeness of their protocol will fail with probability 2−k−1 and a malicious
prover will succeed with a probability of at most 2−k . Moreover, for a secret elementσ ∈ [0,2H ],
the range statement being proven is σ ∈ [−2H+2k+2, 2H+2k+2].
Although very similar to [CFT98a, CFT98b], Fujisaki and Okamoto used the strong RSA as-
sumption in [FO98] (see Section 2.2.2). They achieved perfect completeness in computations
performed with an RSA modulus N of size k, instead of computations modulo a prime p
as in [BCDvdG87, CFT98a, CFT98b]. For a secret element σ ∈ [A,B ], the expansion rate that
they obtained is δ= 2O(k)+1. Hence, for an RSA modulus N of 1024 bits, the expansion rate
2The use of this designation is speciﬁc to this thesis and is not mentioned elsewhere.
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becomes δ
 21025. Furthermore, their scheme is statistically witness indistinguishable (see
Section 2.3.5) and not honest veriﬁer zero-knowledge.
In order to limit the drawbacks of the Σ-response range testing, Boudot proposed, in [Bou00],
to solve arbitrary range proofsσ ∈ [A,B ] with two positivity tests B−σ
 0 andσ−A 
 0. In his
solutions, the Fujisaki-Okamoto commitment scheme (see Section 2.4.2) is used to commit to
σ. Each positivity test m 
 0 is solved by ﬁnding the largest square x2 	m. Thus, the positivity
test is obtained by showing that m = x2+ x 
 0, where the commitment to x2 is proven to
contain a square using a group of unknown order, and x ∈
[
0, 2

B − A] is proven with the
Chan et al. method [CFT98b]. As the latter method induces inaccuracy in the range proof,
Boudot solves this issue by artiﬁcially increasing the secret with a positive constant 2T , where
T = 2(2k+3)+ (B − A). The positivity test becomes m2T = x˜2+ x˜ 
 0, where x˜2 is the largest
square x˜2 	m2T and x˜ ∈ [0, 2
√
2T (B − A)]. Using Chan et al. method on x˜ will now convince
the veriﬁer that:
|x˜| 	
(
2
√
2T (B − A)
)
·22k+2
	
(
21+T /2

B − A
)
·22k+2
	 2T /2+2k+3

B − A
	 2T /222k+3(B − A)1/2
< 2T /22(2k+3)(2(B−A))1/2, as B − A > 0
< 2T /22(2k+3)2(B−A)/2
< 2T /22(2k+3)+(B−A)/2
< 2T /22T /2
< 2T .
Note that here, |x˜| is the absolute value of x˜. The veriﬁer is thus convinced that m is of the
form m2T = xˆ2+ xˆ, with xˆ ∈ ]−2T , 2T [. This implies that m is of the form m = xˆ22−T + xˆ2−T .
As m has to be an integer, (xˆ2−T ) ∈ ]−1, 1[, and xˆ2 
 0, these imply that m 
 0. Note also
that the computational hardness assumption required in [Bou00] is the same as for [CFT98b],
namely the strong RSA assumption. Furthermore, the interactive version of the Boudot range
proof is a 7 round protocol, where 28 elements are transmitted for roughly 32’000 bits. Note
that the number of elements transmitted is independent of the range size. This protocol
therefore becomes advantageous for large ranges. Moreover, the veriﬁer needs to compute 24
exponentiations, while the prover needs to compute 29 exponentiations.
In the category of positivity testing, Lipmaa recalled, in [Lip03], a Lagrange theorem from 1770,
that stated that any positive integer m can be represented as the sum of four integer squares,
m =∑4i=1 (x2i ). In order to compute these squares, Lipmaa provided an improved algorithm
by combining the initial one proposed by Rabin and Shallit in [RS86] with an algebraic trick
produced by Cornacchia in 1908 (and described in Section 1.5.2 of [Coh10]) to represent a
prime p of the form p = 1 (mod 4) as the sum of two squares. Hence, to solve the positivity
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testing on an integer m, Lipmaa proves in [Lip03] that m is the sum of four integer squares. His
protocol requires the strong RSA assumption, and a positivity test is achieved by transmitting
16 elements for roughly 18’000 bits. Hence both [Bou00] and [Lip03] are comparable in terms
of communication complexity, if two positivity tests from [Lip03] are used to achieve the
range proof σ ∈ [A,B ]. Furthermore, the protocol presented in [Lip03] is a Σ-protocol, and
as such requires only 3 rounds of communication. Moreover, the veriﬁer needs to perform
18 exponentiations for one positivity test performed on an integer m. As for the prover, his
computation complexity is dominated by 18 exponentiations and a polylogarithmic time
complexity O
(
(logm)2
)
to ﬁnd the four squares x2i , such that m =
∑4
i=1
(
x2i
)
. Last but not
least, the protocol by Lipmaa in [Lip03] has perfect completeness, which is a missing property
in [Bou00].
Similarly to the Lagrange theorem, Legendre produced, in 1798, a theorem stating that any
positive integer m = 4a(8b+7), for positive integers a and b, can be represented as the sum of
three squares. Using this latter theorem instead of the Lagrange theorem, Groth proposed,
in [Gro05], to use the exact same techniques as in [Lip03] with three squares instead of four.
To compute the three squares, Groth uses an algorithm by Rabin and Shallit [RS86] with the
Cornacchia enhancement, as it was used in the case of computing the four squares for [Lip03].
Hence, Groth reduces the problem of proving m 
 0, to the problem of proving 4m+1
 0, as
4m+1 can always be represented as the sum of three squares, due to the Legendre theorem.
This saves the prover and the veriﬁer from having to compute 4 exponentiations. Furthermore,
the communication complexity is reduced to 14’720 bits, as 13 elements need to be transmit-
ted independently of the range size, instead of 16 in the case of [Lip03].
Scemama suggested, in [Sce09], to solve general range proofs of the form σ ∈ [A,B ] by solv-
ing the positivity test (B −σ)(σ− A) 
 0. In order to do so, he uses the positivity test of
Boudot [Bou00], to prove that (σ− A)(σ−B)=−(x2+x)	 0. By doing so, Scemama obtains a
9 round protocol with probabilistic completeness. The communication complexity consists of
24 elements transmitted for roughly 28’500 bits. The computation complexity of the veriﬁer is
reduced to 21 exponentiations and that of the prover is reduced to 27 exponentiations.
A third approach to range proofs is to perform a range decomposition. The idea is to decom-
pose the secret element σ into some base, and then prove that the decomposition of σ is
composed by elements of that base. The most trivial decomposition is the binary decompo-
sition ([BG97, Mao98, DJ01, Sch01, LAN02, Sch05, MN10, Gro11, CCJT13]). More advanced
techniques involve the use of u-ary decomposition ([CCs08]) and general multi-base decom-
position ([CLs10]).
The binary decomposition range proof was introduced in 1997 by Bellare and Goldwasser
in [BG97]. In order to prove that σ ∈ [0, 2k −1], which means that σ is a k-bits string, they
decompose σ in its binary form σ =∑k−1i=0 σi2i . Each σi is committed, then proven to be a
binary element using a 1-out-of-2 elements proof of knowledge provided by Cramer, who
privately disclosed it to Bellare and Goldwasser. The 1-out-of-2 elements proof of knowledge
is obtained by applying the results of [CDS94] to the Schnorr protocol [Sch91]. This proof
technique is referred to as an “OR-proof” in the current literature. It is then sufﬁcient to prove
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the correspondence between the σi commitments and the commitment to σ. The veriﬁer
is then convinced that the secret σ lies in [0,2k −1] since there were only k commitments.
Moreover, the security of [BG97] relies on the discrete logarithmic assumption to provide
perfect witness indistinguishability (see Section 2.3.5), a weaker security property than perfect
zero-knowledge. The computational complexity for both the prover and the veriﬁer is O(k)
exponentiations, while O(k) group elements are transmitted. Note that the protocol presented
in [Mao98] by Mao, is very similar to [BG97]. The sole improvement provided by Mao targets
the correspondence between the commitment to σ and its binary decomposition commit-
ments. Mao showed that this correspondence requires one exponentiation fewer when the
randomnesses of the binary decomposition commitments sum up to the randomness of the
commitment to σ.
Instead of the discrete logarithmic assumption, in [DJ01] Damgård and Jurik proposed the
same structure as in [BG97, Mao98] while using the decisional composite residuosity assump-
tion (DCR assumption) from Paillier [Pai99]. Informally, this assumption captures the difﬁculty
of deciding if a random element x ∈R Z∗n2 is a n’th power inZ∗n2 , where n is an RSA modulus.
Here, x being a n’th power in Z∗
n2
, implies that it can be written as x = yn (mod n2), for a
y ∈Z∗
n2
. For more details on the DCR assumption, see Section 2.2.2. The protocol proposed
in [DJ01] uses computations modulo ns+1, for any s 
 1. Unfortunately, the asymptotical
communication and computational complexities of this latter protocol are unchanged when
compared to the previous range proofs using the binary decomposition method.
Schoenmakers in [Sch01, Sch05] studied and discussed how to solve a more general case
σ ∈ [0,B ] where 2k−1 <B 	 2k , from the binary decomposition of [BG97, Mao98]. His method
consists of achieving the range proof σ ∈ [0,B ] with either a conjunction or a disjunction of
two binary decomposition range proofs:
σ ∈ [0,B ] ⇐⇒ σ ∈ [0,2k ] ∧ σ ∈ [B −2k ,B ]
σ ∈ [0,B ] ⇐⇒ σ ∈ [0,2k−1] ∨ σ ∈ [B −2k−1,B ].
He also introduced several recursive relations which can be used to reduce the number of
basic proofs of knowledge required when committing to the individual bits of the secret. More
precisely, he writes the upper bound B of the positive range [0,B ] as either the product or the
sum of two numbers. By performing this scheme recursively, he decreased the amount of work
needed. However, the overall communication complexity still consists of O(k) transmitted ele-
ments for a computational load of O(k) exponentiations. Nevertheless, Schoenmakers noticed
that for k 	 27, the binary decomposition range proof is more efﬁcient with regards to the
communication complexity, when compared to the positivity test from Groth method [Gro05].
Note also that the techniques of Schoenmakers for reducing certain ranges to other more
convenient ranges can be used with any range proof technique.
Lipmaa, Asokan, and Niemi explained, in [LAN02], an interesting method for the range proof
σ ∈ [0,B ], based on a binary sumset representation. As the sumset representation will be
explained in more details in Section 4.4, only the binary case is stated here. The secret element
is decomposed as σ=∑logBi=0 σi B i , where σi ∈ {0,1} and Bj = ⌊B+2i2i+1 ⌋. This can be seen as a
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generalization of the method introduced in [DJ01], which works only where B = 2k −1. Hence
the same asymptotical communication and computational load are achieved for the same
computational hardness assumptions.
An alternative protocol based on the discrete logarithmic assumption has been proposed
by Moran and Naor in [MN10], where they substitute the k proofs of knowledge that the ele-
ments σi are binary, with a proof that the set (σi , 1−σi ) :σ=∑k−1i=0 σi2i is a shufﬂe of the set
{C0, C1}k , where C0 and C1 are respectively commitments to 0 and 1. Although the idea seems
more elegant, the burden of the shufﬂe argument increases the computational complexity to
O(k2) exponentiations and requires O(k2) group elements to be transmitted.
Groth subsequently proposed another solution based on the binary decomposition method
in [Gro11]. By using a rather complicated method based on commitments of commitments,
he claims to achieve a range proof with communication complexity of O(k1/3) group elements.
His protocol relies on the common reference string model (see Section 2.2.4) and requires 7
rounds of communication. Furthermore, the computational hardness assumption needed
is the reverse double pairing assumption in asymmetric bilinear groups (for more details
see Section 2.2.2). As for the security proof, soundness is achieved by the use of a witness-
extended emulation (see Section 2.3.3). When studying this protocol, special care should be
taken, as some small inaccuracies are present. For instance, the range proof uses a batch proof
argument in which the elements cuj and cv j should be sent in step 5 instead of step 3. Last
but not least, the computational complexity is higher than claimed. A prover will need to
compute O(k2/3) exponentiations and O(k2/3) pairings, while a veriﬁer will need to compute
O(k1/3) exponentiations and O(k1/3) pairings. These inaccuracies were notiﬁed to the author,
who provided us with a private corrected version. A public corrected version should soon be
published.
More recently, Canard et al. presented, in [CCJT13], a general range proof σ ∈ [A,B ] inspired
by the binary sumset representation of Lipmaa et al. [LAN02] with the Fischlin lemma on
binary representations, as described in [Fis01]. Informally, the Fischlin lemma states that for
any type of binary representation, when comparing representations of two different elements,
the higher order bits are identical. Furthermore, the ﬁrst occurrence of a difference reveals
a 0 bit for the smaller element and a 1 bit for the larger element. Moreover, the range proof
protocol is provided without any security proofs. It should be further noted that although
their protocol claims to use a multi-base decomposition, it is in fact a simple binary sumset
representation. Their protocol could therefore be enhanced by using the general sumset
representation. Moreover, they claim that their range proof protocol is only interesting for
ranges that are smaller than 25 = 32, which would lead to a communication load of at least 30
group elements (requiring the DDH assumption). For this kind of restriction, set membership
proof protocols are more efﬁcient, as shown in Figure 3.1.
The u-ary decomposition for range proofs was introduced by Camenisch, Chaabouni, and
shelat in [CCs08] and will be discussed in Section 4.3. Furthermore, this method was enhanced
by Chaabouni, Lipmaa, and shelat, in [CLs10], by applying general sumset representations of
ranges, and is regarded as a multi-base decomposition. This will be detailed in Section 4.5.
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Regarding signature based range proofs, Teranishi and Sako proposed, in [TS06], to simply
apply their signature based set membership proof primitive for the range proof. Camenisch et
al. in [CCs08], followed by Chaabouni et al. in [CLs10] provide a much more efﬁcient solution,
by combining the base decomposition method with proofs of signature knowledge.
It should be noted that in comparison with the notion of range proofs that we deﬁned earlier,
the protocols presented by Nergiz et al. in [NNPC10] and Wu et al. in [WHLD14], are slightly
different as the statement σ ∈ [α,β] being proven should also hide the range [α,β] in which
the membership is proven.
Last but not least, a comparison between relevant protocols, based on a concrete example, is
provided in Figure 4.6 at the end of this chapter.
4.3 Set Membership Based Range Proofs
In this section, the general range proof problem σ ∈ [A,B ] is reduced to solving the range
proof problem σ ∈ [0,u). Furthermore, this latter problem is solved by decomposing the
range in the u-ary base, for some optimally chosen u. Thus, each element σ of the range
[0,u) can be identiﬁed with  elements σ j ∈ [0,u−1] such that σ =∑−1j=0σ j u j . Hence, in
order to show that a commitment holds a secret element σ ∈ [0,u), it sufﬁces to show that its
decomposition in the u-ary base leads to  commitments of elements in the range [0,u−1].
Therefore, the key technique is to use a set membership proof protocol in order to prove that
each committed digitσ j is indeed a digit in base u. Note that in the case of u = 2, this becomes
a simple binary decomposition. Writing the secret in base-u (instead of base 2) is indeed an
obvious step. However, using prior methods, doing so does not reduce the communication
complexity, nor the computational complexity. Using priormethods, proving that a committed
digit is a u-ary digit requires (u−1) OR-proofs, forcing complexities to be linear in the security
parameter. By using the set membership proof primitives introduced in the previous chapter,
the complexities can be reduced both asymptotically as well as in practice for many frequently
occurring ranges. This will be explained using the particular example of the Boneh-Boyen
signature based set membership proof from Section 3.3.
The key insight is the design of a scheme that can reuse the elements from the u-ary base
proof, in all  proof instances. Speciﬁcally, the veriﬁer can send one list of u signatures
representing the u-ary digits, and the prover can use this same list to prove that all  digits are
indeed u-ary digits. Thus, the total communication complexity of our approach is O(u+).
With appropriately selected values for u and , we show that this approach yields a proof
of size O
(
k
logk−loglogk
)
group elements, where k is the security parameter. Compared to
previous literature results, this leads to better asymptotical and practical complexities for both
communication and computation loads.
Note, however, that if the range is small or the same range is used for many protocols, then it is
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more efﬁcient to employ the set membership proof protocol directly. This choice is implicitly
contained in the choice of u and . Indeed, for = 1, the range proof presented in this section
is identical to the set membership proof on which it is initially based.
Computational assumptions. The protocol in this section depends solely on the choice of
the set membership proof primitive and on the commitment scheme used. These choices will
dictate the necessary computational hardness assumptions. For the Boneh-Boyen signature
based set membership proof in conjunction with Pedersen commitments, the range proof
requires bilinear groups (see Section 2.1.3), associated computational hardness assumptions
as well as the q-Strong Difﬁe Hellman assumption (see Section 2.2.2). The computational
hardness assumptions relating to bilinear groups, as well as bilinear groups altogether, can
be relaxed if the protocol employs the techniques from Canard et al. in [CCJT13] in order to
compute Boneh-Boyen signatures without pairings. This matter will be discussed at the end
of this section, as the focus will be on the original version presented in [CCs08].
Let PG be a pairing3 group generator that on input 1κ outputs descriptions of multiplicative
groupsG1 andGT of prime order p where
∥∥p∥∥= κ. LetG∗1 =G1 \ {1} and let g ∈G∗1 . Let e be
the corresponding admissible bilinear map e :G1×G1 →GT. Recall that for all a,b ∈Zp it
holds that e(g a ,gb)= e(g ,g )ab , that e(g ,g ) = 1, and that e is efﬁciently computable.
Protocol explanation. The ﬁrst range proof presented here in Protocol 4.1 is based on the
set membership proof from Section 3.3. The common input includes the following elements: a
description ofG1 andGT, as provided by the pairing group generator PG for the Boneh-Boyen
signature; two generators g and h of G1 for the Pedersen commitment; the parameters u
and  deﬁning the public range [0,u) such that u < |G1|; and a Pedersen commitment C to
one element in [0,u). As |G1| = p, this implies thatZu ⊂Zp . The prover input additionally
contains elements σ and r such that C = gσhr and σ ∈ [0,u).
Notice that the ﬁrst message exchanged is identical to the ﬁrst message of the Boneh-Boyen
signature based set membership proof protocol (see Protocol 3.1 in the previous chapter),
where Φ = Zu . Hence this ﬁrst message consists of the Boneh-Boyen public key y of the
veriﬁer together with signatures Ai on every element contained in Zu . Here, x ∈Z∗p is the
Boneh-Boyen secret key of the veriﬁer. As an alternative, a trusted third party can be employed
to produce the signatures on every element ofZu . Moreover, picking x ∈Z∗p should be done
such that −x is not present inZu . It would not be possible for the honest veriﬁer to produce
a signature on the element −x, as he would need to perform an inversion of 0 modulo p.
As for the malicious veriﬁer, it would not be possible to provide a signature Ai such that
e(g ,g )= e(Ai , y ·g i ) for y = g−i . In all cases, the correctness of the public key y and signatures
Ai should be checked by the prover (and by the veriﬁer if a trusted third party generated them).
3Note that here, the use of symmetric bilinear groups is to ease explanations. In practice, asymmetric bilinear
groups could and should be used as explained in Section 2.1.3.
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For the second message, the prover decomposes his secret σ in base u to obtain the u-ary
digits {σ j }, such that σ=∑−1j=0 (σ j u j ). For each u-ary digit σ j , the prover selects a random
secret v j and composes a blinding Vj on the signature Aσ j of σ j . This blinding is achieved by
the exponentiation
(
Aσ j
)v j . The second message is then the collection of the blindings: {Vj },
for j ∈Z. Recall that the protocol presented here is performed in the honest veriﬁer model.
The standard checks, such as verifying that an element is in the correct group, are mainly
provided for the sake of completeness. However, they become necessary when compiling
from the honest veriﬁer zero-knowledge model to the full zero-knowledge proofs.
Common Input: g ,h,u,, and a commitment C .
Prover Input: σ,r such that C = gσhr and σ ∈ [0,u).
P y,{Ai }ﬀ V • Veriﬁer picks x ∈R Z∗p such that −x ∈Zu and
sends y ← g x and Ai ← g 1x+i , ∀i ∈Zu .
• Prover checks that y ∈G∗1 , Ai ∈G∗1 and
that e(g ,g )
?= e(Ai , y · g i ), ∀i ∈Zu .
P {Vj }  V • Prover picks v j ∈R Z∗p and sends Vj ← A
vj
σ j ,
for every j ∈Z, such that σ=
∑−1
j=0
(
σ j u j
)
.
• Veriﬁer checks that Vj ∈G∗1 , ∀ j ∈Z.
Prover and Veriﬁer run
PK
{(
{σ j },r, {v j }
)
: C = hr g
∑−1
j=0(σ j u j ) ∧ Vj = g v jx+σ j , ∀ j ∈Z}
P {aj },D  V • Prover picks s j , t j ,m ∈R Z∗p for every j ∈Z and
sends aj ← e
(
V
−s j
j g
t j ,g
)
and D ← hmg
∑−1
j=0(s j u j ).
• Veriﬁer checks that aj ∈GT, ∀ j ∈Z, and D ∈G∗1 .
P cﬀ V • Veriﬁer sends a random challenge c ∈R Z∗p .
• Prover checks that c ∈Z∗p .
P
{zσ j },{zv j },zr V • Prover sends zr ← (m− r c),
and zσ j ← (s j −σ j c), zv j ← (t j − v j c) for every j ∈Z.
• Veriﬁer checks that zσ j ,zv j ,zr ∈Z∗p for every j ∈Z,
that D
?=Cchzr g
∑−1
j=0
(
zσ j u
j
)
and
that aj
?= e (Vj , y)c ·e (V −zσ jj g zv j ,g ) for every j ∈Z.
Protocol 4.1 – Interactive range proof protocol for range [0,u)
After the blindings of the u-ary digit signatures have been transmitted, the prover and veriﬁer
engage in a proof of knowledge that the blinded signatures Vj correspond to the secret u-ary
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digits σ j , and that these digits are the u-ary decomposition of the secret σ contained in the
initial commitment. To do so, the prover selects the random parameters s j , t j , and m inZ∗p
that will be used to blind his secret elements σ j , v j , and r respectively. The initial message of
the proof of knowledge is then a commitment D on the secret random elements s j used by the
prover, and the group elements aj ∈GT which are bilinear pairings on the blinded signature
Vj using the corresponding secret randomness s j contained in the commitment D . At the end,
aj will allow the veriﬁer to check that Vj contains a valid blinded signature. Note as well that
D ∈G∗1 . If D = 1, the prover would be able to retrieve the discrete logarithm of h in base g by
outputting:
logg h =
−∑−1j=0 (s j u j )
m
(mod p).
Following this step, the veriﬁer challenges the prover with a single challenge c . After receiving
this challenge, the prover replies with the elements zσ j , zv j , and zr . These will allow the
veriﬁer to complete the proof of knowledge by verifying that the following equations hold:
D
?= Cchzr g
∑−1
j=0
(
zσ j u
j
)
aj
?= e (Vj , y)c ·e (V −zσ jj g zv j ,g ) , ∀ j ∈Z.
Theorem 4.1
If the u-Strong Difﬁe-Hellman assumption associated with a pairing generator PG holds,
then Protocol 4.1 is a zero-knowledge range argument for the range [0,u).
Proof
Recall that (G1,GT)←PG(1k ), p = |G1| and that u < p < 2k . Similarly to the case of the Boneh-
Boyen signature based set membership proof primitive, u is much smaller than p. The attack
fromCheon [Che06] on the u-StrongDifﬁe-Hellman assumption states that the computational
complexity of recovering the secret key x is of O
(√
p/u
)
group operations, instead of O
(
p
)
group operations. Hence the computational complexity reduction of O
(
u
)
is, in our case,
polynomially bounded. Furthermore, in order for the computational complexity of recovering
the secret key to be higher than 2κ group operations (κ-bit security), the difference between
u and p should be higher than 2κ bits. This implies that for a κ-bit security, the security
parameter k should be k 
 2κ+ log2u.
To show that Protocol 4.1 is a zero-knowledge range argument, three security properties need
to be met: the completeness of the protocol, the special soundness property, and the special
honest veriﬁer zero-knowledge property.
The completeness of the protocol follows by inspection. In particular, the last equalities hold
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as follows. Recall that D = hmg
∑−1
j=0(s j u j ). Hence,
Cchzr g
∑−1
j=0
(
zσ j u
j
)
= Cc ·hm−r c · g
∑−1
j=0((s j−σ j c)u j )
= Cc ·hmh−r c · g
∑−1
j=0(s j u j )g−
∑−1
j=0(σ j cu j )
= Cc ·
(
hr g
∑−1
j=0(σ j u j )
)−c
·hmg
∑−1
j=0(s j u j )
= hmg
∑−1
j=0(s j u j )
= D.
Similarly, as aj = e
(
V
−s j
j g
t j ,g
)
, the following holds:
e
(
Vj , y
)c ·e (V −zσ jj g zv j ,g ) = e(Vj , y)c ·e(Vj ,g )−zσ j ·e(g ,g )zv j
= e(Vj ,g x)c · e(Vj ,g )−s j+σ j c · e(g ,g )t j−v j c
= e(Vj ,g )xc · e(Vj ,g )−s j · e(Vj ,g )σ j c · e(g ,g )t j · e(g ,g )−v j c
= e(Vj ,g )xc+σ j c · e(g ,g )−v j c · e(Vj ,g )−s j · e(g ,g )t j
= e(g
v j
x+σ j ,g )(x+σ j )c · e(g ,g )−v j c · e(Vj ,g )−s j · e(g ,g )t j
= e(g v j ,g )c · e(g ,g )−v j c · e(Vj ,g )−s j · e(g ,g )t j
= e(g ,g )v j c · e(g ,g )−v j c · e(Vj ,g )−s j · e(g ,g )t j
= e(Vj ,g )−s j · e(g ,g )t j
= e
(
V
−s j
j g
t j ,g
)
= a.
The special soundness follows from the extraction property of the proof of knowledge and the
unforgeability of the Boneh-Boyen signature scheme (Lemma 3.1). The extraction property
is almost identical to the one related to the Boneh-Boyen signature based set membership
proof protocol (for more details see the proof of Theorem 3.2). The difference appears in the
witness that is output by the extractor. In the set membership proof protocol, the extractor
outputs a witness (σ,r,v), whereas in this range argument, the witness will be (σ,r, {v j }). The
computations performed by the extractor will be explained ﬁrst. A demonstration will also be
provided, showing that if a malicious prover P∗ is able to convince a veriﬁer, then the extractor
interacting with this prover P∗ can either be used to break the unforgeability property of the
Boneh-Boyen signature, or to create σ ∈ [0,u) and r such that C = gσhr .
At ﬁrst, the extractor obtains two related transcripts tr and tr ′, for different challenges c = c ′
but with the same initial elements
{
y, {Ai }, {Vj }, {aj },D
}
:
tr = {y, {Ai }, {Vj }, {aj },D,c, {zσ j }, {zv j },zr }
tr ′ =
{
y, {Ai }, {Vj }, {aj },D,c
′, {z ′σ j }, {z
′
v j },z
′
r
}
.
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Then, the witness (σ,r, {v j }) can be obtained by computing:
σ=
∑−1
j=0
(
zσ j − z ′σ j
)
u j
c ′ −c ; r =
zr − z ′r
c ′ −c ; v j =
zv j − z ′v j
c ′ −c .
Notice that for the same reasons as in the proof of Theorem 3.2, v j = 0, for every j ∈ Z.
Moreover, the extractor succeeds since (c ′ −c) is invertible inZp .
In the case that a malicious prover P∗ convinces a veriﬁer V , then P∗ can be (almost) directly
used to mount a weak chosen-message attack against the Boneh-Boyen signature scheme
exactly as in the case of the Boneh-Boyen signature based set membership proof protocol. In
the beginning, the attacker learns all of the signatures of the elements inZu . As P∗ succeeds
in convincing V , the extractor will output the witness (σ,r, {v j }), with Vj = g
v j
x+σ j andC = gσhr ,
where σ =∑−1j=0 (σ j u j ). Hence, as v j = 0 then V (1/v j )j is a valid signature of σ j . Due to the
unforgeability property of the Boneh-Boyen signature scheme, the extractor outputsσ ∈ [0,u)
and r such that C = gσhr .
1. Sim retrieves y, {Ai } from V ∗ (or from a trusted third party).
2. Sim chooses σ ∈R [0,u), v j ∈R Z∗p for every j ∈Z, and
computes Vj ← Avjσ j where σ=
∑−1
j=0
(
σ j u j
)
.
3. Sim runs the simulator of
PK
{(
{σ j },r, {v j }
)
: C = hr g
∑−1
j=0(σ j u j ) ∧ Vj = g v jx+σ j , ∀ j ∈Z} :
(a) On challenge c ∈Z∗p , Sim chooses {zσ j }, {zv j },zr ∈R Z∗p .
(b) Finally, Sim computes D ←Cchzr g
∑−1
j=0
(
zσ j u
j
)
and
aj ← e(Vj ,g )−zσ j −σ j c e(g ,g )zv j +v j c for every j ∈Z.
4. Sim returns the transcript
{
y, {Ai }, {Vj }, {aj },D,c, {zσ j }, {zv j },zr
}
.
Figure 4.1 – Simulator for the interactive range argument protocol
The special honest veriﬁer zero-knowledge property follows from the perfect blinding of the
signatures in the ﬁrst phase, and the corresponding special honest veriﬁer zero-knowledge
property of the underlying proof of knowledge. Moreover, the interactions between any veriﬁer
V ∗ and any honest prover P can be efﬁciently simulated with the help of the simulator Sim,
depicted in Figure 3.2. The simulator Sim will ﬁrst follow the initialization and the blinding
instructions honestly, using a random σ ∈R [0,u) and random v j ∈R Z∗p to compute every Vj .
Then Sim runs the simulator of the Σ-protocol for the underlying proof of knowledge:
PK
{(
{σ j },r, {v j }
)
: C = hr g
∑−1
j=0(σ j u j )
∧
Vj = g
v j
x+σ j , ∀ j ∈Z
}
.
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On the challenge c ∈ Z∗p and for every j ∈ Z, the simulator ﬁrst randomly picks
zσ j , zv j , zr inZ
∗
p , then computes aj and D as follows:
a = e(Vj ,g )−zσ j −σ j c e(g ,g )zv j +v j c ,
D = Cchzr g
∑−1
j=0
(
zσ j u
j
)
.
The output of the simulator is a transcript
{
y, {Ai }, {Vj }, {aj },D,c, {zσ j }, {zv j },zr
}
, which has an
identical probability distribution to a normal transcript between regular provers and veriﬁers.
We can easily see that y , {Ai }, and c are identical in both transcripts, as they are provided by
the veriﬁer. The elements Vj have the same probability distribution as they are computed
from a valid σ ∈ [0,u) and random v j ∈R Z∗p . As s j , t j , and m are randomly picked in Z∗p ,
they respectively impose the same randomness towards zσ j ,zv j , and zr . Hence zσ j ,zv j ,zr
have the same probability distribution as well. It is straightforward to see that D has the same
probability distribution as it is computed from the same elements with the same distributions.
Last but not least, as s j = zσ j +σ j c and t j = zv j +v j c , aj has the same probability distribution
for the same reasons as for D . Last but not least, sinceG1 is a prime-order group, the blinding
is perfect in the ﬁrst two steps of the simulator; thus the zero-knowledge property follows from
the zero-knowledge property of the Σ-protocol in the third step.
CommunicationandComputationalComplexity. As the ﬁrstmessage of Protocol 4.1 should
be regarded as being part of the setup procedure, it will not be included in the complexity
analysis. Nevertheless, its cost is mentioned for the general purposes of comparison and
analysis. This message consists of u signatures and the Boneh-Boyen public key y . These
sum up to (u+1) group elements ofG1 for the communication, (u+1) exponentiations inG1
for the veriﬁer (or the trusted third party), and (u+1) bilinear pairings for the prover in the
non-honest veriﬁer model.
Protocol 4.1 can be analyzed in two phases. the ﬁrst phase consists of the prover sending 
blinded signatures Vj , which sum up to  group elements inG1. The second phase consists of
the underlying proof of knowledge, with 3 messages exchanged. The prover sends  group
elements in GT and one group element in G1, to which the veriﬁer replies with a single
challenge element inZ∗p . The last message, sent by the prover, consists of (2+1) elements
from the groupZp . Overall, if ‖G1‖, ‖GT‖, and
∥∥Zp∥∥ correspond, respectively, to the binary
size of the group elements in G1, GT, and Zp , then the overall communication load Com
according to parameters u and  becomes:
Com(u,)=  · (‖G1‖+‖GT‖+2 ·∥∥Zp∥∥)+ (‖G1‖+2 ·∥∥Zp∥∥) .
Note that the choice of u and  are correlated with the size of the range. Hence a range
proof for the range [0,B) imposes the restriction u 
 B , where u and  are chosen to be as
small as possible. This restriction implies that B 
 u 
 2. For the purpose of comparison,
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assume that the size of the range is (k −1) bits, in order to comply with the restrictions of
the protocol: B 	 u < |G1| < 2k . The choice u = 2 and = (k−1) corresponds to the settings
of the binary decomposition protocol, which leads to a total communication complexity of
O(k) group elements. As for the other limit, the choice u = B and  = 1 corresponds to the
signature based setmembership proof. Although this would lead to a constant communication
complexity, with 7 group elements being transmitted, the cost of the setup phase would
become exponential in k with the need to compute and transmit O(2k ) signatures.
A more suitable choice of u is afforded by Protocol 4.1, as it allows more ﬂexibility in the values
of u. This can be demonstrated with the following choice for u:
u = logB
loglogB
= k−1
log(k−1) (4.1)
=⇒ u =O
(
k
logk
)
.
The restriction u 
 B implies that 
 logBlogu = k−1logu . Furthermore, when taking into account
equation (4.1), this restriction becomes:

 k−1
logu
=⇒ 
 k−1
log(k−1)− loglog(k−1)
=⇒ =O
(
k
logk− loglogk
)
.
This results in a total communication complexity of:
Com(u,)=O
(
k
logk− loglogk
)
,
which is asymptotically smaller than O(k).
Furthermore, not only is Protocol 4.1 asymptotically better, it also performs well for realistic
concrete parameters. In that regard, the concrete optimization needs to take into account the
setup cost. This leads to a general communication load of:
GenCom(u,)= c1u+c2+c3, (4.2)
where c1, c2, and c3 are constants such that:
c1 = ‖G1‖ ,
c2 = ‖G1‖+‖GT‖+2 ·
∥∥Zp∥∥ , and
c3 = 2 · ‖G1‖+2 ·
∥∥Zp∥∥ .
By including in equation (4.2) the approximation ≈ logBlogu , the general communication load
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becomes:
GenCom(u,)= c1u+ c2 logB
logu
+c3. (4.3)
A minimum can thus be found with respect to u, by setting the derivative of equation (4.3) to
0, and by attempting to solve the resulting equation:
d
du
GenCom(u,)= c1− c2 logB
u
(
logu
)2 = 0,
which simpliﬁes to:
u
(
logu
)2 = c2
c1
logB. (4.4)
Unfortunately, equation (4.4) cannot be solved analytically. However, given c1, c2 and B , the
numerical method of Kelly Black presented in [Bla97] can be used to ﬁnd u.
Last but not least, regarding computational complexity, the honest veriﬁer setting is assumed.
Hence, the prover computational cost is dominated by (3+2) exponentiations and  pairings.
The veriﬁer computational cost is dominated by (2+4) exponentiations and 2 pairings.
Handling Arbitrary Ranges. Protocol 4.1 works for the range [0,u). In order to handle an
arbitrary range [A,B ], an improvement to the folklore reduction described by Schoenmakers
in [Sch01] and [Sch05] can be used. First, it is straightforward to see that [A,B ]= [A,B +1). To
achieve minimum communication complexity, the criteria for u in equation (4.4) becomes
u
(
logu
)2 = c2
c1
log(B +1− A). (4.5)
Suppose, initially, that B + 1 = A+u. Then [A,B ] = [A, A+u). Therefore, proving that
σ ∈ [A,B ] is equivalent to proving that σ− A ∈ [0,u).
Now suppose that u−1 <B+1− A <u and that 0< A <B . The following inequalities relation
is thus obtained:
B +1−u < A <B <B +1< A+u.
Hence, [A,B ]= [A,B +1)= [A, A+u)∩ [B +1−u, B +1). Notice the absence of inequality
between B and u. This means that u <B may occur and therefore it might not be possible
to decompose σ as σ =∑−1j=0 (u jσ j ). Furthermore, it is important to note that even if A <
σ< u, this does not imply that for all j ∈Zu , α j <σ j , where α j and σ j are, respectively, the
decomposition of A and σ.
To show that σ ∈ [A,B ], it sufﬁces to show that (σ− A) and (σ+u−B −1) are both in [0,u).
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Common Input: g ,h,u,, A,B , and a commitment C .
Prover Input: σ,r such that C = gσhr and σ ∈ [A,B ].
P y,{Ai }ﬀ V • Veriﬁer picks x ∈R Z∗p such that −x ∈Zu and
sends y ← g x and Ai ← g 1x+i , ∀i ∈Zu .
• Prover checks that y ∈G∗1 , Ai ∈G∗1 and
that e(g ,g )
?= e(Ai , y · g i ), ∀i ∈Zu .
P {Vj },
{
V˜ j
}
 V • Prover picks v j , v˜ j ∈R Z∗p ,
sends Vj ← AvjΥ j and V˜ j ← A
v˜ j
Ψj
for every j ∈Z,
such that (σ− A)=∑−1j=0 (Υ j u j ) ,
and
(
σ+u−B −1)=∑−1j=0 (Ψj u j ).
• Veriﬁer checks that Vj ,V˜ j ∈G∗1 , ∀ j ∈Z.
Prover and Veriﬁer run
PK
⎧⎨⎩
(
{Υ j }, {Ψj },r, {v j }, {v˜ j }
)
: Cg−A = hr g
∑−1
j=0(Υ j u j ) ∧ Cgu−B−1 = hr g∑−1j=0(Ψj u j )∧
Vj = g
v j
x+Υ j ∧ V˜ j = g v˜ jx+Ψj , ∀ j ∈Z
⎫⎬⎭
P {aj },{a˜ j },D V • Prover picks s j , t j , t˜ j ,m ∈R Z∗p for every j ∈Z and
sends D ← hmg
∑−1
j=0(s j u j ),
aj ← e
(
V
−s j
j g
t j ,g
)
, and a˜ j ← e
(
V˜ j
−s j g t˜ j ,g
)
.
• Veriﬁer checks that aj , a˜ j ∈GT, ∀ j ∈Z, and D ∈G∗1 .
P cﬀ V • Veriﬁer sends a random challenge c ∈R Z∗p .
• Prover checks that c ∈Z∗p .
P
{
zΥ j
}
,
{
zΨj
}
,zr{
zv j
}
,
{
zv˜ j
} V • Prover sends zr ← (m− r c),
zΥ j ← (s j −Υ j c), zΨj ← (s j −Ψj c),
zv j ← (t j − v j c) and zv˜ j ← (t˜ j − v˜ j c) for every j ∈Z.
• Veriﬁer checks for every j ∈Z that zΥ j ,zΨj ,zv j ,zv˜ j ,zr ∈Z∗p ,
that D
?=Ccg−Achzr g
∑−1
j=0
(
zΥ j u
j
)
,
that D
?=Ccg
(
u−B−1)chzr g∑−1j=0
(
zΨj u
j
)
,
that aj
?= e (Vj , y)c ·e (V −zΥ jj g zv j ,g ) and
that a˜ j
?= e (V˜ j , y)c ·e (V˜ j−zΨj g zv˜ j ,g ).
Protocol 4.2 – Interactive range proof protocol for range [A,B ],
with AND composition
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Note that (σ− A) can always be decomposed in base u with  digits as 0	 (σ− A)<B+1−A <
u. Similarly,
(
σ+u−B −1) can also always be decomposed with  digits as:
0<u− (B +1− A) ,
0<u+ A−B −1	
(
σ+u−B −1
)
,
0<u−1+σ−B 	 u−1< u.
Furthermore, the u signatures and the veriﬁcation key need to be sent only once for both sub-
sets. The resulting proof can be achieved with an AND composition as shown in Protocol 4.2.
The major modiﬁcation compared to the use of two distinct basic range proofs, is the use of
a same challenge c, with identical elements D and zr . As both A and B are public, the same
commitmentC can be used for both subsets. Furthermore, the veriﬁcation checks on D by the
veriﬁer need to be adapted as well. The ﬁrst check of the veriﬁer, D
?=Ccg−Achzr g
∑−1
j=0
(
zΥ j u
j
)
,
ensures that (σ− A)=∑−1j=0 (Υ j u j ). Similarly, the second checkD ?=Ccg (u−B−1)chzr g∑−1j=0(zΨj u j )
ensures that
(
σ+u−B −1)=∑−1j=0 (Ψj u j ). The third check:
aj
?= e (Vj , y)c ·e (V −zΥ jj g zv j ,g ) ,
ensures that 0	Υ j < u. This implies that 0	σ− A < u which is equivalent to showing that
σ ∈ [A, A+u). The fourth and last check:
a˜ j
?= e (V˜ j , y)c ·e (V˜ j−zΨj g zv˜ j ,g ) ,
ensures that 0	Ψj <u. This implies that 0	σ+u−B−1<u which is equivalent to showing
that σ ∈ [B +1−u, B +1). The latter concludes the range proof with an AND composition.
With the additional sending of 4 extra elements, the communication complexity becomes:
ComAND (u,)= 2 ·
(‖G1‖+‖GT‖+2 ·∥∥Zp∥∥)+ (‖G1‖+2 ·∥∥Zp∥∥) .
As for the computational cost of the prover, it will be dominated by (6+2) exponentiations
and 2 pairings. The computational cost of the veriﬁer will be dominated by (4+7) exponen-
tiations and 4 pairings.
Corollary 4.2
If the u-Strong Difﬁe-Hellman assumption associated with a pairing generator PG
(
1k
)
holds,
where k is the security parameter, then Protocol 4.2 is a zero-knowledge range argument for
the range [A,B ], with communication complexity of O
(
k
logk−loglogk
)
group elements.
Proof
To show that Protocol 4.2 is a zero-knowledge range argument, three security properties need
to be met: the completeness of the protocol, the special soundness property, and the special
honest veriﬁer zero-knowledge property.
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1. SimAND retrieves y, {Ai } from V ∗ (or from a trusted third party).
2. SimAND chooses σ ∈R [A,B ], v j , v˜ j ∈R Z∗p for every j ∈Z,
computes Vj ← AvjΥ j where (σ− A)=
∑−1
j=0
(
Υ j u j
)
, and
V˜ j ← Av˜ jΨj where
(
σ+u−B −1)=∑−1j=0 (Ψj u j ).
3. SimAND runs the simulator of
PK
⎧⎨⎩
(
{Υ j }, {Ψj },r, {v j }, {v˜ j }
)
: Cg−A = hr g
∑−1
j=0(Υ j u j ) ∧ Cgu−B−1 = hr g∑−1j=0(Ψj u j )∧
Vj = g
v j
x+Υ j ∧ V˜ j = g v˜ jx+Ψj , ∀ j ∈Z
⎫⎬⎭ :
(a) On challenge c ∈Z∗p , SimAND chooses {s j }, {zv j }, {zv˜ j },zr ∈R Z∗p , and
computes for every j ∈Z:
zΥ j ← (s j −Υ j c), and
zΨj ← (s j −Ψj c).
(b) Finally, SimAND computes D ←Ccg−Achzr g
∑−1
j=0
(
zΥ j u
j
)
, and for every j ∈Z
aj ← e(Vj , y)c ·e(Vj ,g )−zΥ j ·e(g ,g )zv j , and
a˜ j ← e(V˜ j , y)c ·e(V˜ j ,g )−zΨj ·e(g ,g )zv˜ j .
4. SimAND returns the transcript:{
y, {Ai }, {Vj }, {V˜ j }, {aj }, {a˜ j },D,c, {zΥ j }, {zΨj }, {zv j }, {zv˜ j },zr
}
.
Figure 4.2 – Simulator for the interactive range argument protocol,
with AND composition
The completeness follows from the completeness property of Protocol 4.1 proven in Theo-
rem 4.1 and from the decomposition in base u of (σ− A) and (σ+u−B −1). As 0	 (σ− A)<
u and 0< (σ+u−B −1)< u, their decomposition consists of  digits:
(σ− A)=
−1∑
j=0
(
Υ j u
j
)
, such that 0	Υ j < u, and
(
σ+u−B −1
)
=
−1∑
j=0
(
Ψj u
j
)
, such that 0	Ψj < u.
Recall that for B +1= u, the AND decomposition is not needed as the range argument for
σ ∈ [A,B ] is equivalent to the range argument for (σ− A) ∈ [0,u).
The special soundness property follows from the special soundness of Protocol 4.1. The main
difference in this case, is that the witness output by the extractor is
(
σ,r, {v j }, {v˜ j }
)
and is
computed as follows:
σ= A+
∑−1
j=0
(
zΥ j − z ′Υ j
)
u j
c ′ −c ; r =
zr − z ′r
c ′ −c ; v j =
zv j − z ′v j
c ′ −c ; v˜ j =
zv˜ j − z ′v˜ j
c ′ −c .
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Identically to the case of Theorem 4.1, a malicious prover P∗ that convinces a veriﬁer can be
(almost) directly used to perform a weak chosen-message attack against the Boneh-Boyen
signature scheme. Valid signatures can be obtained with V (
1/v j )
j and with V˜ j
(1/v˜ j ) for Υ j and
Ψj respectively. Recall that for every j ∈Z, v j = 0 and v˜ j = 0 for the same reasons as in the
proof of Theorem 4.1 and of Theorem 3.2.
The special honest veriﬁer zero-knowledge property is inherited from the same property of
Protocol 4.1. The simulator SimAND of the interactions between any veriﬁer V ∗ and any
honest prover P is described in Figure 4.2. Although SimAND is slightly different from the
simulator Sim (Figure 4.1), their conclusions are identical. The probability distribution of the
transcript output by SimAND is identical to the one of a normal interaction between regular
provers and veriﬁers. Note that the requirement D
?=Ccg
(
u−B−1)chzr g∑−1j=0
(
zΨj u
j
)
is also met.
Further optimization can be achieved if the additional restriction B +1− A < 2u−1 is met.
Indeed, in this case the AND composition based on the range [0,u) can be replaced with an
OR composition (also known as OR-proof) based on the range [0,u−1). The decomposition
becomes:
[A,B ]= [A,B +1)= [A, A+u−1)∪ [B +1−u−1,B +1).
The OR composition for proving that σ ∈ [A,B ] is directly obtained by applying the “proof of
OR” presented by Cramer et al. in [CDS94] (Corollary 12 and 13) with Protocol 4.1 for the range
[0,u−1). The drawback of this proof technique is that it imposes the weaker security property
of witness hiding (see Section 2.3.5), instead of the zero-knowledge security property.
Corollary 4.3 ([CDS94](Corollary 12))
Let protocolΘ be a three round public coin, honest veriﬁer zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
for relation R, which satisﬁes the special soundness property. Then for any n,d there is a
protocol with the same round complexity as Θ in which the prover shows that he knows d out
of n witnesses without revealing which d witnesses are known.
Note that public coin means that the veriﬁer sends solely a uniformly random challenge in the
Σ-protocol.
Corollary 4.4 ([CDS94](Corollary 13))
Consider the protocol guaranteed by Corollary 4.3, let n = 2 and d = 1, i.e. the prover proves
that he knows at least 1-out-of-2 solutions. For any generator G generating pairs in R, this
protocol is witness hiding over G2.
The resulting protocol consists of running two range proofs in parallel: an honest and a
simulated one. The following explanations are provided for the case that σ ∈ [A, A+u−1).
The alternative case is easily obtained by swapping the subsets for the honest and simulated
sub-range proofs. The subset [A, A+u−1) will be called the true subset, as it contains σ.
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1. Sims honestly retrieves y, {Ai } from V (or from a trusted third party).
2. Sims chooses σ ∈R [B +1−u−1,B +1), v j ∈R Z∗p for every j ∈Z−1, and
computes V˜ j ← AvjΨj where
(
σ+u−1−B −1)=∑−2j=0 (Ψj u j ).
3. Sims runs the simulator of
PK
{(
{Ψj },r, {v j }
)
: Cgu
−1−B−1 = hr g
∑−2
j=0(Ψj u j ) ∧ V˜ j = g v jx+Ψj , ∀ j ∈Z−1} :
(a) Sims chooses cs , {zΨj }, {z˜v j }, z˜r ∈R Z∗p .
(b) Finally, Sims computes D˜ ←Ccs g
(
u−1−B−1)cs hz˜r g∑−2j=0
(
zΨj u
j
)
and
a˜ j ← e(V˜ j ,g )−zΨj −Ψj cs e(g ,g )z˜v j +v j cs for every j ∈Z−1.
4. Sims returns the transcript
{
y, {Ai }, {V˜ j }, {a˜ j },D˜ ,cs , {zΨj }, {z˜v j }, z˜r
}
.
Figure 4.3 – Simulator for the simulated range argument protocol σ ∈ [B +1−u−1,B +1)
The subset [B +1−u−1,B +1) does not necessarily contain σ and hence will be called the
simulated subset. The simulated range proof corresponds to the simulated subset. In order
to perform the simulated range proof, the prover will use the simulator Sims described in
Figure 4.3. Note that y and {Ai } are honestly retrieved from the veriﬁer, but the challenge cs
is chosen by the prover. The elements {zΨj }, {z˜v j }, z˜r from the simulator Sims will be sent to
the veriﬁer only after the prover has retrieved the challenge c from the veriﬁer. Additionally,
the prover also sends cB ← cs . The honest range proof for the true subset is performed as
described in Protocol 4.1 with minor modiﬁcations. The target range is [0,u−1) instead
of [0,u), and in order to prove that σ ∈ [A, A+u−1), the digits σ j are replaced with the
digits Υ j such that (σ− A)=∑−2j=0 (Υ j u j ). Hence the check of the veriﬁer on D is modiﬁed as
D
?=CcA g−AcAhzr g
∑−2
j=0
(
zΥ j u
j
)
, where cA ← (c−cs). The prover is also required to send cA to the
veriﬁer, who will additionally check that c
?= cA + cB . To complete the OR composition, the
veriﬁer also needs to check that:
D˜
?=CcB g
(
u−1−B−1)cB hz˜r g∑−2j=0
(
zΨj u
j
)
, and
a˜ j
?= e (V˜ j , y)cB ·e (V˜ j−zΨj g z˜v j ,g ) .
The range proof with OR composition requires less elements to be sent compared to the AND
composition, even thought the two challenges cA and cB need to be sent:
ComOR (u,)= 2 ·Com(u,−1)−
∥∥Zp∥∥+2 ·∥∥Zp∥∥
= 2 · [(−1) · (‖G1‖+‖GT‖+2 ·∥∥Zp∥∥)+ (‖G1‖+2 ·∥∥Zp∥∥)]+∥∥Zp∥∥
= 2 · (‖G1‖+‖GT‖+2 ·∥∥Zp∥∥)+ (∥∥Zp∥∥−2 · ‖GT‖) .
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The gain for the communication load is of
(‖G1‖+2 · ‖GT‖+∥∥Zp∥∥) bits, when compared to the
AND composition. The prover computational cost will be dominated by 6 exponentiations
and 2(−1) pairings. Finally, the veriﬁer computational cost will be dominated by (4+6)
exponentiations and 4(−1) pairings.
Corollary 4.5
If the u-Strong Difﬁe-Hellman assumption associated with a pairing generator PG
(
1k
)
holds,
where k is the security parameter, then the OR composition described above is a witness hiding
range argument for the range [A,B ], with communication complexity of O
(
k
logk−loglogk
)
group elements.
Proof
Theorem 4.1, Corollary 4.3, and Corollary 4.4 imply that the OR composition is a witness hiding
range argument. LetΘ be the Protocol 4.1. ThenΘ is a public coin protocol as the veriﬁer sends
only a random challenge. Furthermore, it satisﬁes honest veriﬁer zero-knowledge and special
soundness (Theorem 4.1). Hence Θmeets the requirements from Corollary 4.3. Therefore,
from Corollary 4.4, the OR composition is a witness hiding range argument.
Last but not least, proving that σ ∈ [A,B ] where A < 0 can be reduced to one of the previous
cases by showing that σ− A ∈ [0,B − A].
Common Input: u,, and a commitment C ;
the commitment scheme parameters Paramcom;
and the set membership proof parameters Paramsmem.
Prover Input: σ,r such that C =Commit(σ,r ) and σ ∈ [0,u).
Prover and Veriﬁer run
PK
{(
{σ j },r
)
: C = hr g
∑−1
j=0(σ j u j ) ∧ σ j ∈Zu , ∀ j ∈Z}
Protocol 4.3 – Interactive range proof protocol for range [0,u),
from a general set membership proof
Using Alternative Set Membership Proof. Protocol 4.1 can be adapted to use any appropri-
ate alternative set membership proof. Moreover, when combined with a generic set member-
ship proof, a generalization of the u-ary decomposition for range proofs is obtained. This is
described in Protocol 4.3. The prover needs to show that his secret element can be decom-
posed in  digits, and that each of these digits is inZu using the generic set membership proof.
The range proof σ ∈ [0,u) is thus obtained from the following proof of knowledge:
PK
{(
{σ j },r
)
: C = hr g
∑−1
j=0(σ j u j )
∧
σ j ∈Zu , ∀ j ∈Z
}
.
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In order to achieve overall minimal communication complexity, the communication load of
the set membership proof will dictate the values of parameters u and .
An alternative set membership proof example is to use a variant of the set membership proof
of Arfaoui et al. from [ALT+15a], which is essentially a Boneh-Boyen based set membership
proof without pairings. This variant, although exclusively introduced in this thesis, can be
easily deduced from [ALT+15a]. The resulting range proof is described in Protocol 4.4, where
the boxed elements correspond to the elements that differ from Protocol 4.1. Regarding the
underlying set membership proof, the main difference with the original version of Arfaoui et
al. is the way signatures are veriﬁed. Protocol 4.4 uses pairings for checking the validity of
the signatures, thus bilinear groups and associated computational hardness assumptions are
still needed. This requirement can be relaxed, but will induce a high efﬁciency cost. Indeed,
in the original protocol of Arfaoui et al., the veriﬁcation of the signatures Ai is performed
with the proof of knowledge described in Figure 4.4, repeated for every signature Ai . The
1. The prover (V in the range proof) randomly picks si ∈R Zp .
2. Prover V sends ai ← Asii and bi ← g si to the veriﬁer P .
3. Veriﬁer P sends a challenge ci ∈R Zp .
4. Prover V sends the reply ri ← si +ci · x to the veriﬁer P .
5. Veriﬁer P checks that Arii
?= ai
(
g A−ii
)ci and that g ri ?= bi yci .
Figure 4.4 – Proof of knowledge PK
{
(x) : y = g x ∧ Axi = g · A−ii }
variant of their method improves both the computational complexity and the communication
load. Both the prover and the veriﬁer no longer need to compute bilinear pairings in the
range proof. Hence the overall computational complexity of the prover is reduced to (3+2)
exponentiations, and that of the veriﬁer is reduced to (2+3) exponentiations. Regarding the
communication complexity, the elements aj ∈GT are all replaced with the elements E j ∈G1.
Thus the communication load becomes:
Com(u,)= 2 · (‖G1‖+∥∥Zp∥∥)+ (‖G1‖+2 ·∥∥Zp∥∥) .
Note, however, that this communication complexity holds for the basic range proof σ ∈ [0,u).
In order to handle arbitrary ranges, the same technique described before should be used,
namely the AND composition (see Protocol 4.2). Thus the communication load for arbitrary
ranges [A,B ] becomes:
ComAND (u,)= 4 ·
(‖G1‖+∥∥Zp∥∥)+ (‖G1‖+2 ·∥∥Zp∥∥) .
Regarding the computational cost of the AND composition, the computational cost of the
prover will be dominated by (6+2) exponentiations, and that of the veriﬁer will be dominated
by (4+6) exponentiations.
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Common Input: g ,h,u,, and a commitment C .
Prover Input: σ,r such that C = gσhr and σ ∈ [0,u).
P y,{Ai }ﬀ V • Veriﬁer picks x ∈R Z∗p such that −x ∈Zu and
sends y ← g x and Ai ← g 1x+i , ∀i ∈Zu .
• Prover checks that y ∈G∗1 , Ai ∈G∗1 and
that e(g ,g )
?= e(Ai , y · g i ), ∀i ∈Zu .
P {Vj }  V • Prover picks v j ∈R Z∗p and sends Vj ← A
vj
σ j ,
for every j ∈Z, such that σ=
∑−1
j=0
(
σ j u j
)
.
• Veriﬁer checks that Vj ∈G∗1 , ∀ j ∈Z.
Prover and Veriﬁer run
PK
{(
{σ j },r, {v j }
)
: C = hr g
∑−1
j=0(σ j u j ) ∧ Vj = g v jx+σ j , ∀ j ∈Z}
P
{
E j
}
,D
 V • Prover picks s j , t j ,m ∈R Z∗p for every j ∈Z and
sends E j ←V −s jj g t j and D ← hmg
∑−1
j=0(s j u j ).
• Veriﬁer checks that E j ,D ∈G∗1 , ∀ j ∈Z.
P cﬀ V • Veriﬁer sends a random challenge c ∈R Z∗p .
• Prover checks that c ∈Z∗p .
P
{zσ j },{zv j },zr V • Prover sends zr ← (m− r c),
and zσ j ← (s j −σ j c), zv j ← (t j − v j c) for every j ∈Z.
• Veriﬁer checks that zσ j ,zv j ,zr ∈Z∗p for every j ∈Z,
that D
?=Cchzr g
∑−1
j=0
(
zσ j u
j
)
and
that E j
?=V cx−zσ jj g
zv j for every j ∈Z.
Protocol 4.4 – Interactive range proof protocol,
based on Arfaoui et al. set membership proof
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Theorem 4.6
If the u-Strong Difﬁe-Hellman assumption associated with a pairing generator PG holds,
then Protocol 4.4 is a zero-knowledge range argument for the range [0,u).
Proof
The proof to show that Protocol 4.4 is a zero-knowledge range argument, is identical to the
proof of Theorem 4.1 with minor modiﬁcations. Completeness is achieved, as the following
holds:
V
cx−zσ j
j g
zv j =V cx−s j+cσ jj g t j−cv j
=V c(x+σ j )j V
−s j
j g
−cv j g t j
= g
v j
(x+σ j ) ·c(x+σ j )g−cv j V −s jj g
t j
=V −s jj g t j
= E j .
Special soundness is achieved in the same way as in Theorem 4.1. The simulator for the special
honest veriﬁer zero-knowledge is achieved as described in Figure 4.1, with amodiﬁcation in step
3b: the computations of aj are replaced with the computations of E j ←V
−zσ j −σ j c
j g
zv j +v j c .
4.4 Sumset Representation of Integer Intervals
Using the u-ary decomposition, handling arbitrary ranges [A,B ] almost doubles the communi-
cation load as well as the computational complexity when compared to the basic [0,u) range
proof. This is essentially due to the use of two basic range proofs in order achieve the ﬂexibility
of arbitrary ranges. A better solution is therefore achieved when the range decomposition
allows some ﬂexibility in the base decomposition, as is the case with multi-base decomposi-
tion. Such decomposition can be obtained with a sumset representation of integer intervals.
Informally, although this decomposition uses u-ary digits, the base corresponding to the digits
is more ﬂexible. For σ ∈ [0,H ], the following explains how to derive the sumset representation
σ=ω′ +∑−1i=0 σiGi , where Gi are public parameters, σi ∈Zu , ω′ ∈ [0,H ′], 0	 H ′ < u−1, and
2	 u  H . Here, H ′ = (H − (u−1) ·⌊ Hu−1⌋) as all sub-intervals [0, (u−1)] are already included
by the elements σi . Moreover, the aim is to ﬁnd minimal  for any ﬁxed value of H and
u. Handling arbitrary ranges [A,B ] will be achieved by proving that σ− A ∈ [0,H ], where
H =B − A.
An intuitive explanation of the sumset representation will be provided ﬁrst. Suppose that H
and u are ﬁxed, and let H0 = H . Then clearly σ ∈ [0,H0] and σ =ω1+σ0G0, where σ0 ∈Zu ,
ω1 ∈ [0,H1]= [0,H0− (u−1)G0], and G0 is deﬁned as G0 := (1+H0)/u. This can be derived
from the goal to divide [0,H0] into u smaller (possibly overlapping) intervals of equal size
H1 such that H1 is minimal. The sub-intervals should start at periodic positions jG0, for
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some G0 and for 0 	 j 	 (u−1). Ideally, the start of each new sub-intervals should be just
after the end of each previous sub-intervals. This would imply that G0 = 1+H1. To guarantee
overlapping and ensure that there are no isolated elements between sub-intervals, the start
of each sub-intervals should be before or equal to the ideal case. Therefore, G0 	 1+H1.
Furthermore, in order to reach the upper limit H0, the following condition must also holds:
H0 = (u−1)G0+H1. Thus, the optimal case when H1 =G0−1, implies that H0 = uG0−1 or
G0 = (1+H0)/u. Since G0 has to be an integer, it has to be set as G0 = (1+H0)/u. Finally, as
stated above, H1 =H0− (u−1)G0.
These formulas reduce the case [0,H0] to a smaller case [0,H1] that can be solved similarly.
Recursively, σ=ω′ +∑ j σ jG j , with ω′ ∈ [0,H ′], σ j ∈Zu , and where
Gj =
⌊
1+Hj
u
⌋
, and (4.6)
Hj+1 =Hj − (u−1)Gj (4.7)
=Hj −
⌊
1+Hj
u
⌋
· (u−1).
This process is carried out for as long as Hj 
 u−1. It stops when the interval [0,Hj+1] is small
enough so that it cannot be covered by u different non-empty intervals, that is, if Hj+1 < u−1.
At that point and as the recursive process is completed, the number  of steps in this recursive
process can be deﬁned as (u,H) := j +1. Furthermore, H ′ can be set as H ′ =H =Hj+1.
For example, with H = 57 (thus σ ∈ [0,57]) and u = 4 (σi ∈ [0,3]), it can be veriﬁed that
σ = 14σ0 +4σ1 +σ2. As (4−1) | 57, this implies that H ′ = 0. By way of providing a further
example with H = 160 and u = 4:
σ= 40σ0+ω1, with ω1 ∈ [0,40]
= 40σ0+10σ1+ω2, with ω2 ∈ [0,10]
= 40σ0+10σ1+2σ2+ω3, with ω3 ∈ [0,4]
= 40σ0+10σ1+2σ2+σ3+ω′, with ω′ ∈ [0,1].
The recursive process is now complete since 1<u−1= 3.
Lemma 4.7
Let Hj and G j be deﬁned respectively as in equations (4.7) and (4.6), then the sequence Hj
is a ﬁnite monotone (strictly) decreasing sequence, the sequence G j is a ﬁnite monotonic
decreasing sequence (G j+1 	 Gj ), and 0 	 H 	 u −2, where H is the last element of the
sequence Hj .
Proof
Showing that the sequence Hj is monotone decreasing, can be proved by induction. In order
to do so, two steps need to be demonstrated: H1 <H0 and Hj+1 <Hj .
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First, consider the case of H1:
H1 =H0− (u−1)G0
=H0− (u−1) ·
⌊
1+H0
u
⌋
<H0− (u−1)
(
1+H0
u
−1
)
<H0− (u−1)
(
1+H0−u
u
)
<H0−
(
u−1
u
)
(H0− (u−1))
<H0.
The last inequality is achieved as H0 > (u−1) and u 
 2. Thus, for all j <  and as Hj 
 (u−1),
the following holds:
Hj+1 =Hj − (u−1)Gj
=Hj − (u−1) ·
⌊
1+Hj
u
⌋
<Hj − (u−1)
(
1+Hj
u
−1
)
<Hj − (u−1)
(
1+Hj −u
u
)
<Hj −
(
u−1
u
)(
Hj − (u−1)
)
<Hj .
As Hj+1 <Hj , then the sequence Hj is monotone decreasing. This sequence is also ﬁnite as it
stops when H < u−1.
Thus, regarding the sequence Gj , the following holds:
Gj+1 =
⌊
1+Hj+1
u
⌋
	
⌊
1+Hj
u
⌋
=Gj .
Thus, the sequence Gj is a monotonic decreasing sequence. It is also ﬁnite as it has one
element less than the sequence Hj .
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Recall that the sequence Hj stops when H <u−1, therefore H 	 u−2. Furthermore, H is
necessarily positive:
H ′ =H =H−1− (u−1) ·
⌊
1+H−1
u
⌋

H−1− (u−1)
(
1+H−1
u
)

 (uH−1− (u−1)(1+H−1)) ·u−1

 (uH−1− (u−1)− (u−1)H−1) ·u−1

 (H−1− (u−1)) ·u−1

 0.
This concludes the proof.
The following lemma gives an upper bound for the number of steps in the decomposition pro-
cess. This result is slightly better than the one presented in [CLs10], as shown in Corollary 4.9.
Lemma 4.8
In the case of a range [0,H ], and its decomposition with Hj and G j are deﬁned respectively as
in equations (4.7) and (4.6), then the decomposition process is guaranteed to stop in  steps,
where = (u,H)	 1+ logu (H − (u−2))− logu 2.
Proof
Recall that the decomposition process stops when H < u−1. This implies that H−1 
 u−1

2u0+ (u−2). Furthermore, it can be shown by induction that Hj 
 2u− j−1+ (u−2). In that
case, the ﬁrst step consists of supposing that Hj+1 
 2u− j−2+ (u−2). Therefore, the following
implications unfold:
Hj =Hj+1+ (u−1)Gj
=Hj+1+ (u−1) ·
⌊
1+Hj
u
⌋

 2u− j−2+ (u−2)+ (u−1)
(
1+Hj − (u−1)
u
)
=⇒ uHj 
 2u− j−1+u(u−2)+ (u−1)Hj − (u−1)(u−2)

 2u− j−1+ (u−2)+ (u−1)Hj
=⇒ Hj 
 2u− j−1+ (u−2).
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As H =H0, it implies that H 
 2u−1+ (u−2). Therefore:
H 
 2u−1+ (u−2)
=⇒ u−1 	 H − (u−2)
2
=⇒ u 	 u
2
(H − (u−2))
=⇒ 	 logu
(u
2
(H − (u−2))
)
=⇒ 	 1+ logu (H − (u−2))− logu 2.
Corollary 4.9
In the case of a range [0,H ], its decomposition process is guaranteed to stop in 	 ⌈logu (H)⌉
steps. Moreover, the case H 	 uL implies that 	 L.
Proof
The proof follows from Lemma 4.8. First, note that the following relations hold:
	 1+ logu (H − (u−2))− logu 2= 1+ logu (H +2−u)− logu 2
< 1+ logu (H +2−u)	 1+ logu (H) .
Thus < 1+ logu (H) implies that 	
⌈
logu (H)
⌉
. Therefore H 	uL implies that 	 L.
Lemma 4.7 and 4.8 lead to the following theorem:
Theorem 4.10
Let u 
 2, H 
 u. Let G j ,Hj be deﬁned respectively as in equations (4.6) and (4.7). Let H ′
be deﬁned as before (H ′ < u − 1). Denote  = (u,H) as deﬁned previously. The sumset
representation of σ ∈ [0,H ] is therefore σ=ω′ +∑−1j=0σ jG j , where σ j ∈Zu, ω′ ∈ [0,H ′], and
	 1+ logu (H − (u−2))− logu 2. Furthermore, if (u−1) | H then H ′ = 0.
Proof
Recall that H ′ =H. The decomposition is provided with equations (4.6) and (4.7). Lemma 4.7
proves that the decomposition is complete. Lemma 4.8 provides the proof for the upper bound
on . As H ′ =H − (u−1) ·⌊ Hu−1⌋, it implies that if (u−1) | H then H ′ = 0.
Semi-Closed Form for Gj and Hj . While the presented recursive formulas for Gj and Hj+1
are efﬁcient, it is desirable to have a closed form for both of them. The following construction
achieves semi-closed forms, which are formulas that only depend on u, j , and H .
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Assume the basic u-ary decomposition H = ∑L−1j=0 hju j with hj ∈ Zu . For any j 	 L, write
ĥ j :=
⌊
H/u j
⌋
, that is, H = u j ĥ j +∑ j−1i=0 uihi . This implies the following:
H =u j ĥ j +
j−1∑
i=0
uihi (4.8)
=⇒ u j ĥ j +
j−1∑
i=0
uihi =u j+16hj+1+ j∑
i=0
uihi
=⇒ u j ĥ j = u j+16hj+1+u jh j
=⇒ ĥ j = u6hj+1+hj . (4.9)
Deﬁne the notation x := r , such that 0	 r < u−1 and r ≡ x (mod (u−1)). It is important
for the theorem bellow, to keep in mind the following properties resulting from this notation:
(u−1) | a ⇐⇒ a= 0
(u−1) | a ⇐⇒ a+b= ba= 0⇐⇒ a+b= ba= a ⇐⇒ 0	 a < (u−1)a+b= a+ b
0	 a+ b< (u−1)⇐⇒ a+b= a+ b .
Theorem 4.11
Let G j ,Hj be deﬁned respectively as in equations (4.6) and (4.7), let ĥ j =
⌊
H/u j
⌋
and H =∑L−1
j=0 hju
j , then:
Hj = ĥ j +
∑ j−1
i=0 hi

for 0< j 	 , and
G j =6hj+1+⌊1+hj+∑ j−1i=0 hiu ⌋, for 0< j < .
Proof
The proof is achieved by induction. This is accomplished by showing the veracity of the
induction basis ( j = 1) and then proving the induction step for j 
 1.
First, H0 = ĥ0 can be derived from the deﬁnition of ĥ j =
⌊
H
uj
⌋
. As ĥ j =u6hj+1+hj , G0 can be
reformulated as
G0 =
⌊
1+H0
u
⌋
=
⌊
1+ ĥ0
u
⌋
=
⌊
1+uĥ1+h0
u
⌋
= ĥ1+
⌊
1+h0
u
⌋
.
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Thus, H1 can be derived as follows:
H1 =H0− (u−1)G0 = ĥ0− (u−1)G0 =
=
(
uĥ1+h0
)
− (u−1)
(
ĥ1+
⌊
1+h0
u
⌋)
= ĥ1+h0− (u−1)
⌊
1+h0
u
⌋
= ĥ1+ h0
For the last equality, if h0 < (u−1) then h0− (u−1)
⌊
1+h0
u
⌋
= h0 = h0 and if h0 = (u−1) then
h0− (u−1)
⌊
1+h0
u
⌋
= (u−1)− (u−1)= 0= h0. Now, G1 can be derived as follows:
G1 =
⌊
1+H1
u
⌋
=
⌊
1+ ĥ1+ h0
u
⌋
=
⌊
1+uĥ2+h1+ h0
u
⌋
= ĥ2+
⌊
1+h1+ h0
u
⌋
.
This concludes the induction basis. The induction step hypothesis assumes that
Hj = ĥ j +

j−1∑
i=0
hi
	
=u6hj+1+hj +

j−1∑
i=0
hi
	
, and
Gj =6hj+1+
9999:1+hj +
∑ j−1
i=0 hi

u
;;;;< .
Then
Hj+1 =Hj − (u−1)Gj
=
(
u6hj+1+hj +

j−1∑
i=0
hi
	)
− (u−1) ·
9999:1+hj +
∑ j−1
i=0 hi

u
;;;;< .
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Thus to prove that Hj+1 =6hj+1+∑ ji=0hi, the following needs to be shown:

j∑
i=0
hi
	
= hj +

j−1∑
i=0
hi
	
− (u−1) ·
9999:1+hj +
∑ j−1
i=0 hi

u
;;;;< (4.10)
for j < , and hj ,hi ∈Zu . Note that 0 <
(
1+hj +
∑ j−1
i=0 hi
)
< 2u−1. In order to show the
veracity of equation (4.10), consider the following three cases.
Case 1:
∑ j−1
i=0 hi

= 0. Then the left hand side of equation (4.10) is

j∑
i=0
hi
	
=

hj +
j−1∑
i=0
hi
	
=

hj +

j−1∑
i=0
hi
		
= hj  .
The right hand side of equation (4.10) is hj − (u − 1)
⌊
1+hj
u
⌋
. If hj < (u − 1) then hj − (u −
1)
⌊
1+hj
u
⌋
= hj = hj  and if hj = (u−1) then hj − (u−1)⌊1+hju ⌋= (u−1)− (u−1)= 0= hj .
Thus equation (4.10) holds for
∑ j−1
i=0 hi

= 0.
Case 2:
∑ j−1
i=0 hi

= 0 and
(
1+hj +
∑ j−1
i=0 hi
)
< u. Then
(
hj +
∑ j−1
i=0 hi
)
< (u−1) and the
left hand side of equation (4.10) is
j∑
i=0
hi
	
=

hj +
j−1∑
i=0
hi
	
= hj +

j−1∑
i=0
hi
	
.
As the right hand side of equation (4.10) is also equal to hj +
∑ j−1
i=0 hi

, equation (4.10) holds
in this case.
Case 3:
∑ j−1
i=0 hi

= 0 and
(
1+hj +
∑ j−1
i=0 hi
)

 u. Then 0 	
(
hj − (u−1)+
∑ j−1
i=0 hi
)
<
(u−1) and the left hand side of equation (4.10) is
j∑
i=0
hi
	
=

hj − (u−1)+
j−1∑
i=0
hi
	
= hj − (u−1)+

j−1∑
i=0
hi
	
.
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As u 	
(
1+hj +
∑ j−1
i=0 hi
)
< 2u−1, then
⌊
1+hj+∑ j−1i=0 hi
u
⌋
= 1. Thus the right hand side of
equation (4.10) is hj+
∑ j−1
i=0 hi

−(u−1), which is equal to the left hand side of equation (4.10).
These three cases cover all possibilities for equation (4.10). Therefore, this equation holds.
Thus Hj+1 =6hj+1+∑ ji=0hi, which completes the proof for Hj = ĥ j +∑ j−1i=0 hi. For the
sequence Gj , it follows that:
Gj =
⌊
1+Hj+1
u
⌋
=
9999:1+6hj+1+
∑ j
i=0hi

u
;;;;<
=
9999:1+u6hj+2+hj+1+
∑ j
i=0hi

u
;;;;<
=6hj+2+
9999:1+hj+1+
∑ j
i=0hi

u
;;;;< .
This concludes the proof for the sequence Gj .
The semi-closed form for Gj in the binary case u = 2 was claimed in [LAN02] without a proof.
Fortunately, their claim follows straightforwardly from Theorem 4.11. Furthermore, note that
in [LAN02], the upper limit of the summation in the decomposition of σ ∈ [0,H ] is wrongly set
to
⌊
log2 H
⌋
instead of
(⌊
log2 H
⌋−1).
Corollary 4.12 (Binary case, [LAN02])
If u = 2 then G j =6hj+1+⌊1+hju ⌋= ⌊H+2 j2 j+1 ⌋.
Proof
Theorem4.11 shows thatGj =6hj+1+⌊1+hj+∑ j−1i=0 hiu ⌋. However, u = 2 implies that∑ j−1i=0 hi=
0. Thus Gj =6hj+1+⌊1+hju ⌋. By deﬁnition, the following holds: 6hj+1 = ⌊ Huj+1 ⌋= ⌊ H2 j+1 ⌋. Thus
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Gj =
⌊
H
2 j+1
⌋
+
⌊
1+hj
u
⌋
. As ĥ j =u6hj+1+hj , the following hold:
hj = ĥ j −u6hj+1
=
⌊
H
uj
⌋
−u
⌊
H
uj+1
⌋
=
⌊
H
2 j
⌋
−2
⌊
H
2 j+1
⌋
;
=⇒Gj =
⌊
H
2 j+1
⌋
+
999:1+
⌊
H
2 j
⌋
2
;;;<−⌊ H
2 j+1
⌋
=
⌊
1
2
⌊
H +2 j
2 j
⌋⌋
=
⌊
H +2 j
2 j+1
⌋
.
4.5 Sumset Based Range Proofs
The results of Theorem 4.10 allow for a more efﬁcient range proof to be built, based on sumset
decomposition. The efﬁciency gain appears when handling arbitrary ranges, as it would
require the use of a single range proof instead of the AND composition with two range proofs.
The general range proof problemσ ∈ [A,B ] is reduced to solving the range proof (σ−A) ∈ [0,H ],
with H = B − A. Thus, the rest of this section focuses on the range proof problem σ ∈ [0,H ].
Theorem 4.10 shows that σ ∈ [0,H ] can be decomposed as σ = ω′ +∑(u,H)−1j=0 σ jG j , with
σ j ∈Zu and ω′ ∈ [0,H ′]. Recall that Gj are public elements. Also recall that Theorem 4.10
states that if (u−1) | H then H ′ = 0 and there is no element ω′. In the latter, proving that all of
the elements σ j are inZu can be achieved efﬁciently with the same set membership proof,
exactly as in Protocol 4.1 or 4.4. However, the existence of ω′ ∈ [0,H ′] imposes the need to
choose between two solutions:
1. either an additional set membership proof for ω′ needs to be added to the protocol,
2. or the range [0,H ] needs to be artiﬁcially increased,
to obtain a proof of the form σ(u−1) ∈ [0,H(u−1)].
The modiﬁcation achieved in the second option takes advantage of the property brought
by (u − 1) | H(u − 1), which is the suppression of the element ω′ as H ′ = 0. Furthermore,
when using either Protocol 4.1 or 4.4, multiplying the range by (u−1) implies that will be
increased by 1, as H 	 uL implies that H(u−1)< uL+1, and thus 	 L+1. Increasing  by 1
implies an additional communication of 4 elements
(
V, (a, or E),zσ ,zv
)
. This additional
communication load is identical to the cost of an additional set membership proof regarding
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the basic communication load. However, in the case of the ﬁrst solution for ω′, where an
additional setmembership proof is needed, the setup cost will increase. This increase amounts
to H ′ additional elements that correspond to the signatures of the elements inZH ′ , and to the
public key of the signature scheme. Therefore, the second solution, with the artiﬁcial increase
of the range [0,H ], is the most efﬁcient solution.
An alternative solution suggested in [CLs10], is to use the OR-proof instead of the additional
set membership proof, to prove thatω′ is one of the elements in [0,H ′]. However, as OR-proofs
have linear complexity, they are less efﬁcient for individual elements when compared to set
membership proofs. Furthermore, their security is restricted to witness indistinguishability
(see Section 2.3.5), therefore OR-proofs should be discarded as a solution for this speciﬁc task.
Note that the range proof enhancement techniques of [CLs10], that are explained in this
section, apply to any range proof based on range decomposition. Moreover, the range proof
presented in [CLs10] is built upon Protocol 4.1. The solution presented here is built upon
Protocol 4.4, as it is slightly more efﬁcient. The aim is to prove that for a commitment C , Cu−1
commits to a value in [0,(u−1)H ] by using Protocol 4.4. As (u−1) | H(u−1), Theorem 4.10
states that H ′ = 0 and thus σ(u−1)=∑(u,H(u−1))−1j=0 σ jG j .
Computational assumptions. The computational hardness assumptions required for the
range proof in this section are identical to those for Protocol 4.4, namely the u-Strong Difﬁe-
Hellman assumption as well as bilinear groups (see Section 2.1.3) and their associated compu-
tational hardness assumptions. Note that here again, Pedersen commitments are chosen as
the commitment scheme used.
Protocol explanation. The sumset based range proof is presented in Protocol 4.5. As it
is based on Protocol 4.4, the necessary modiﬁcations to change the u-ary decomposition
to a sumset decomposition are highlighted by boxing the elements that differ. Recall that
the elements Gj are computed either recursively as in equation (4.6), with H0 =H(u−1), or
with the semi-closed form as described in Theorem 4.11, where ĥ j =
⌊
H(u−1)
u j
⌋
and H(u−
1) =∑L−1j=0 hju j . The sumset decomposition will deﬁne the value  	 L+1 for H 	 uL . The
decomposition of σ(u−1) will require to prove the set membership of  elements σ j ∈Zu , as
σ(u−1)=∑−1j=0σ jG j .
For the underlying proof of knowledge, recall that raising the commitment to the power
(u−1) is equivalent to multiplying the secret σ by (u−1). As the elements σ j are all in Zu ,
Protocol 4.4 remains the same regarding the set membership proofs σ j ∈Zu . However, their
composition towards C (u−1) has to be changed. Thus the computation of D needs to be
modiﬁed as D = hm(u−1)g
∑−1
j=0(s jG j ) and the veriﬁcation check on D becomes:
D
?=Cc(u−1)hzr (u−1)g
∑−1
j=0
(
zσ j G j
)
.
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Common Input: g ,h,u,← (u,H(u−1)) ,{
Gj
}
j∈Z , and a commitment C .
Prover Input: σ,r such that C = gσhr and σ ∈ [0,H ].
P y,{Ai }ﬀ V • Veriﬁer picks x ∈R Z∗p such that −x ∈Zu and
sends y ← g x and Ai ← g 1x+i , ∀i ∈Zu .
• Prover checks that y ∈G∗1 , Ai ∈G∗1 and
that e(g ,g )
?= e(Ai , y · g i ), ∀i ∈Zu .
P {Vj }  V • Prover picks v j ∈R Z∗p and sends Vj ← A
vj
σ j ,
for every j ∈Z, such that σ(u−1)=
−1∑
j=0
(
σ jG j
)
.
• Veriﬁer checks that Vj ∈G∗1 , ∀ j ∈Z.
Prover and Veriﬁer run
PK
{(
{σ j },r, {v j }
)
: C (u−1) = hr (u−1)g
∑−1
j=0(σ jG j ) ∧ Vj = g v jx+σ j , ∀ j ∈Z}
P {E j },D  V • Prover picks s j , t j ,m ∈R Z∗p for every j ∈Z and
sends E j ←V −s jj g t j and D ← hm(u−1)g
∑−1
j=0(s jG j ) .
• Veriﬁer checks that E j ,D ∈G∗1 , ∀ j ∈Z.
P cﬀ V • Veriﬁer sends a random challenge c ∈R Z∗p .
• Prover checks that c ∈Z∗p .
P
{zσ j },{zv j },zr V • Prover sends zr ← (m− r c),
and zσ j ← (s j −σ j c), zv j ← (t j − v j c) for every j ∈Z.
• Veriﬁer checks that zσ j ,zv j ,zr ∈Z∗p for every j ∈Z,
that D
?=Cc(u−1)hzr (u−1)g
∑−1
j=0
(
zσ j G j
)
and
that E j
?=V cx−zσ jj g
zv j for every j ∈Z.
Protocol 4.5 – Interactive range proof protocol for range [0,H ]
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Theorem 4.13
If the u-Strong Difﬁe-Hellman assumption associated with a pairing generator PG holds,
then Protocol 4.5 is a zero-knowledge range argument for the range [0,H ].
Proof
The proof to show that Protocol 4.5 is a zero-knowledge range argument, is identical to the
proof of Theorem 4.6 with minor modiﬁcations. Completeness is achieved as Theorem 4.10
ensures that σ(u−1)=∑−1j=0σ jG j . Special soundness is achieved similarly as in Theorem 4.6,
with the difference that σ is extracted with the following formula:
σ=
∑−1
j=0
(
zσ j − z ′σ j
)
Gj
c ′ −c .
The simulator for the special honest veriﬁer zero-knowledge is achieved as described in Fig-
1. Sim retrieves y, {Ai } from V ∗ (or from a trusted third party).
2. Sim chooses σ ∈R [0,H ], v j ∈R Z∗p for every j ∈Z, and
computes Vj ← Avjσ j where σ(u−1)=
∑−1
j=0σ jG j .
3. Sim runs the simulator of
PK
{(
{σ j },r, {v j }
)
: C (u−1) = hr (u−1)g
∑−1
j=0(σ jG j ) ∧ Vj = g v jx+σ j , ∀ j ∈Z} :
(a) On challenge c ∈Z∗p , Sim chooses {zσ j }, {zv j },zr ∈R Z∗p .
(b) Finally, Sim computes D ←Cc(u−1)hzr (u−1)g
∑−1
j=0
(
zσ j G j
)
and
E j ←V
−zσ j −σ j c
j g
zv j +v j c for every j ∈Z.
4. Sim returns the transcript
{
y, {Ai }, {Vj }, {E j },D,c, {zσ j }, {zv j },zr
}
.
Figure 4.5 – Simulator for the interactive range argument protocol,
based on the sumset decomposition
ure 4.5. Note that it is essentially the same simulator as for Theorem 4.6, with the appropriate
modiﬁcations for the sumset decomposition.
Communication and Computational Complexity. The communication load and computa-
tional complexity formulas are identical to the ones of Protocol 4.4. Moreover, the computation
of u is achieved in the same way as in Protocol 4.4. However, the parameter  is computed
as  = (u,H(u−1)) 	 L+1 for H 	 uL . This implies that  is increased by one when com-
pared to Protocol 4.4. Furthermore, the complexities in this case apply for arbitrary ranges,
which makes them roughly twice as efﬁcient. Thus, for the range [A,B ] with H = B − A, the
communication load is
Com(u,)= 2 · (‖G1‖+∥∥Zp∥∥)+ (‖G1‖+2 ·∥∥Zp∥∥) .
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The computational complexity of the prover amounts to (3+2) exponentiations, and the one
of the veriﬁer consists of (2+3) exponentiations.
Concrete Example and Comparisons The performance of the different methods depends
on the application at hand as well as the assumptions one is willing to make. Assume, at
ﬁrst, that all possible assumptions are acceptable. For intervals containing 7 elements or
less, employing the set membership proof presented in Section 3.3 directly would be more
efﬁcient. Beyond 7, elements and for ranges smaller than 122 bits, the sumset based range
proof presented in Protocol 4.5 outperforms all other existing range proofs. For ranges that
are larger than 122 bits, the square decomposition method by Lipmaa in [Lip03] and by Groth
in [Gro05] are favorable as they are mostly independent of the size of the interval. However, the
prover will need to run the Rabin-Shallit algorithm (or an equivalent algorithm) to represent
numbers as the sum of four squares (three in the case of [Gro05]) and this kind of algorithm
has a quadratic complexity in the bit-length of the number to be decomposed. This means
that for a n bit-length number, the complexity will be O(n2).
Note that the different existing protocols have different security goals. In order to provide
meaningful comparisons, one has to set a unique security objective and perform the com-
plexity computations accordingly. The security goal is set to 128 bit security for this thesis,
meaning that a cheating prover will succeed with a soundness probability of at most 2−128.
For the protocols presented in this chapter, this security goal implies that the security pa-
rameter k has to be k 
 256+ log2u. Recall that the security parameter deﬁnes the size of
the groupG1 (‖G1‖ = k). In the following, it is considered that ‖G1‖ = 256 to ease compar-
isons with other protocols. Nevertheless, when used in practice, the size of G1 should be
‖G1‖ = 256+ log2u. Previous range proofs were often deﬁned with a 80 bit security goal,
therefore their complexities become signiﬁcantly higher with the 128 bit security objective.
As the protocols in this chapter require bilinear pairings, it is important to recall that the sizes
ofG1 andGT will depend on the security objectives. Galbraith, Paterson, and Smart provide
a detailed explanation in [GPS08] on which size to use forG1 andGT according to different
security settings and requirements. Two different recommendations are speciﬁed here. For
a 128 bit security, NIST [NIST12] recommends to use ‖G1‖ = 256 bits and ‖GT‖ = 3072 bits.
However, Lenstra [Len06] recommends the use of ‖G1‖ = 256 bits and ‖GT‖ = 4440 bits.
Before explaining the details of the comparisons, a concrete example is provided. Assume
that a bank wants to provide special offers from a third party to its young clients. However
the exact age of clients should not be divulged to the third party. This offer targets those who
are born between 1990 and 1998 (not included). The conversion of the birth date into the
Unix Epoch system, results in a target range of [631152000,883612800]. Figure 4.6 provides a
comparison amongst the relevant protocols, ordered by communication complexity. FigureC.1
in Appendix C provides a comparison regarding computational complexity, with the same
order as in Figure 4.6.
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Scheme Communication Complexity
CCs_AND_Lenstra
63264 bits
(Protocol 4.2 with [Len06] recommendations)
CCs_AND_NIST
54528 bits
(Protocol 4.2 with [NIST12] recommendations)
Lipmaa [Lip03]
36352 bits
(Sum of 4 squares)
Boudot [Bou00]
32294 bits
(Square + CFT [CFT98b])
Groth [Gro05]
29440 bits
(Sum of 3 squares)
Scemama [Sce09]
28668 bits
(Square + CFT [CFT98b])
CCs_AND_Arfaoui
19200 bits
(AND composition with Protocol 4.4)
Groth [Gro11]
12032 bits
(binary decomposition of commitments of commitments)
Sumset based range proof
11008 bits
(Protocol 4.5)
Figure 4.6 – Communication load comparison for range proof [631152000,883612800]
The ﬁrst schemes discussed, are the ones of Lipmaa [Lip03] and Groth [Gro05]. Both of them
are based on the sum of squares, and were initially deﬁned for 80 bit security. Moreover, they
are focused on positivity testing, which means that two range proofs are required in order to
handle arbitrary ranges. The communication load equation is solely provided here, with the
values of the parameters. The details of those parameters can be found in [Lip03]:
Com[Lip03] = 2 ·
(
6‖G‖+14k+5B +10‖F (k)‖+ 5
2
‖M‖
)
,
Com[Gro05] = 2 · (5‖G‖+11k+4B +8‖F (k)‖+2‖M‖) ,
where ‖M‖ =B = ‖G‖ = 1024, k = 128, and ‖F (k)‖ = 256.
The schemes of Boudot [Bou00] and Scemama [Sce09] are both based on the conjunction of a
square proof with the Chan et al. method [CFT98b]. Here again, these schemes were designed
with 80 bit security. The communication load equation is solely provided here, with the values
of the parameters. The details of those parameters can be found in [Bou00]:
Com[Bou00] = 14+7s+58t +18‖n‖+5‖b‖+7‖b−a‖ ,
Com[Sce09] = 12+6s+50t +16‖n‖+5‖b‖+6‖b−a‖ ,
where s = 40, t = 128, ‖n‖ = 1024, and ‖b‖ = ‖b−a‖ = 512. Note that the upper bound of the
range has to be lower than 512 bits for both of these schemes.
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The second scheme of Groth [Gro11] achieves a weaker security than existing range proofs.
Moreover, it requires a non-intuitive description with a binary decomposition of commitments
of commitments. Due to the difﬁculty of understanding the protocol itself, several mistakes
are present in the original paper. A preliminary corrected version has been privately disclosed
to the author of this thesis. Although the security proof is still difﬁcult to analyse, a corrected
version should be publicly released soon. The communication load achieved by the protocol
in the corrected version of [Gro11], amounts to 17+10(log2 (B − A))1/3 group elements.
The CCs_AND_Lenstra and the CCs_AND_NIST schemes correspond to Protocol 4.2 with the
recommendations for group size from Lenstra [Len06] and from NIST [NIST12] respectively.
Recall that the communication load of Protocol 4.2 is:
ComProtocol 4.2(u,)= 2 ·
(‖G1‖+‖GT‖+2 ·∥∥Zp∥∥)+ (‖G1‖+2 ·∥∥Zp∥∥) .
The values of
∥∥Zp∥∥, ‖G1‖, and ‖GT‖ depend on the recommendations used. Computing u
is achieved by solving equation (4.5) (Section 4.3), which will determine  as u > (B − A).
Note that equation (4.5) depends on the values of
∥∥Zp∥∥, ‖G1‖, and ‖GT‖, thus different
recommendations will lead to different values for u and . The following communication load
equations are therefore obtained:
ComCCs_AND_Lenstra(26,6)= 2 ·6 · (256+4440+2 ·256)+ (256+2 ·256)
= 63264 bits,
ComCCs_AND_NIST(22,7)= 2 ·7 · (256+3072+2 ·256)+ (256+2 ·256)
= 54528 bits.
Considering the communication load of previous range proofs with similar security require-
ments, CCs_AND_Lenstra becomes more efﬁcient when 	 2. CCs_AND_NIST becomes more
efﬁcient when  	 3. If the computation of u is restricted with equation (4.5), this leads to
ranges that are smaller in size than 169 in the case of CCs_AND_Lenstra, and ranges that are
smaller in size than 2744 in the case of CCs_AND_NIST. These limits are obtained by solving
the following equations4:
	 28668−
(‖G1‖+2 ·∥∥Zp∥∥)
2 · (‖G1‖+‖GT‖+2 ·∥∥Zp∥∥) , and
u logu 	  ·
(‖G1‖+‖GT‖+2 ·∥∥Zp∥∥)
‖G1‖
.
4The ﬁrst equation is obtained from ComProtocol 4.2(u,)	Com[Sce09].
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The CCs_AND_Arfaoui scheme corresponds to the AND composition applied to Protocol 4.4.
The principal advantage of this scheme is that it replaces the elements fromGT with elements
fromG1. Thus the communication load becomes:
ComCCs_AND_Arfaoui(u,)= 4 ·
(‖G1‖+∥∥Zp∥∥)+ (‖G1‖+2 ·∥∥Zp∥∥) .
As no elements from GT are transmitted, the more restrictive recommendations from
Lenstra [Len06] will only impact the computational complexity of the prover during the
setup phase. Finding the value of u will also be achieved by solving equation (4.5), how-
ever the value of c2 is changed to c2 = 2 · ‖G1‖+2 ·
∥∥Zp∥∥. Therefore, equation (4.5) becomes
u
(
logu
)2 = 4log(B +1− A). This implies that u = 11 which in turn implies that = 9. Thus,
the communication load sums up to ComCCs_AND_Arfaoui(11,9) = 19200 bits. Compared to
previous range proofs with similar security requirements, the CCs_AND_Arfaoui scheme is
more efﬁcient for 	 13. This is obtained by solving:
	 28668−
(‖G1‖+2 ·∥∥Zp∥∥)
4 · (‖G1‖+∥∥Zp∥∥) .
The restriction (B − A) < u implies that u (logu) 	 4. Therefore, the CCs_AND_Arfaoui
scheme is more efﬁcient for ranges smaller than 50 bits.
Last but not least, the communication load of the sumset based range proof presented in
Protocol 4.5, is obtained by:
ComProtocol 4.5(u,)= 2 ·
(‖G1‖+∥∥Zp∥∥)+ (‖G1‖+2 ·∥∥Zp∥∥) .
Note that the computation of u is identical to the one of the CCs_AND_Arfaoui scheme.
However, the deﬁnition of  differs from the previous cases. The value of  for the sumset
based range proof is equal to the  for the CCs_AND_Arfaoui scheme plus one. Therefore,
ComProtocol 4.5(11,10)= 11008 bits. Compared to previous range proofs with similar security
requirements, the sumset based range proof is more efﬁcient for 	 26. This is obtained by
solving:
(+1)	 28668−
(‖G1‖+2 ·∥∥Zp∥∥)
2 · (‖G1‖+∥∥Zp∥∥) .
The restriction (u−1)H <u+1 implies that u (logu)	 4. Therefore, the sumset based range
proof is more efﬁcient for ranges smaller than 122 bits. Above this limit, the sum of squares
method becomes more efﬁcient.
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In the contentious case of [Gro11], their range proof is supposed to be more efﬁcient for ranges
between 39 and 941 bits. Bellow 39 bits, the sumset based range proof remains more efﬁcient,
and above 941 bits, the sumof squaresmethod from [Gro05] becomesmore efﬁcient. The lower
bound limit can be derived by assuming that 4 = u(log2u), that 4log2 (B − A) = u(log2u)2,
and by solving:
0	
(
17+10(log2 (B − A))1/3)− (4(+1)+3) .
The upper bound is found by solving: 29440

(
17+10(log2 (B − A))1/3)‖G1‖ .
123

Chapter 5
Non-Interactive Range Proofs,
Without Random Oracles
This chapter starts by presenting the non-interactive range proof primitive in Section 5.1.
Section 5.2 then describes prior and related work, as well as the recent results of Fauzi, Lipmaa,
and Zhang [FLZ13], and Lipmaa [Lip14b, Lip16]. The difﬁculties in creating a non-interactive
range proof will be illustrated in Section 5.3, by showing that the non-interactive range proof
of Yuen et al. [YHM+09] is insecure. Section 5.4 will explain a non-interactive subargument
that is necessary for the non-interactive range proof presented in Section 5.5. The main results
of sections 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 are published in the proceedings of FC 2012 [CLZ12] as a joint work
with Helger Lipmaa and Bingsheng Zhang.
5.1 Non-Interactive Range Proofs Primitive
In this chapter, the problem being solved is an extension of the range proof explained in the
previous chapter. This extension restricts the type of interactions between the prover and
the veriﬁer. In the last chapter, provers and veriﬁers were allowed to interact with each other,
meaning that they could reply to one another until the necessary messages were exchanged
to complete the range proof. In this chapter, the interactions are suppressed and communi-
cations are reduced to a single message sent by the prover to any veriﬁers. The focus in this
chapter is, therefore, to provide non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) range arguments to
solve the non-interactive range proof primitive. The straightforward solution consists of using
a generic transformation of the interactive protocols in order to obtain their non-interactive
counterpart in the random oracle model (see Section 2.3.6). The goal of this chapter is to
provide an alternative without the random oracle model. The security will thus be proven in
the common reference string model (see Section 2.2.4) instead of the random oracle model.
Users will thus have the possibility of selecting protocols according to which security model
suits them best, as explained in Section 2.3.6.
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In addition to the usual interest for range proofs (as explained in Section 4.1), the non-
interaction property is also gaining popularity. Indeed, an increasing number of applications
require some statements to be veriﬁed multiple times by different parties, provided that these
veriﬁers are disallowed to interact with provers. Thus, the non-interaction property solves
the problem by sending (or broadcasting) a single message containing the entire proof of a
statement to be proven. Concrete examples of applications that require non-interactive range
proofs include e-voting and e-auctions. Non-interactive range proofs are also starting to be
considered as cryptographic building blocks, as they are included in new primitives such as
graded signatures.
In the case of e-voting, the validity of ballots needs to be veriﬁed. Not only does this veriﬁcation
need to be performed by the tallying server when votes are being cast, veriﬁcation also needs
to be possible by third parties for election monitoring purposes. However, these third parties
do not have access to voters. Instead they receive validity proofs as single non-interactive
messages. Therefore, non-interactive range proofs are essential for election monitoring in
e-voting. A similar requirement is present in e-auctions. For instance, in the case of proxy
auctions, the auction server manages bids, updates the current price of items to the winning
bid, and keeps the maximum bid of the winning client private. However, the trust of users
in the auction server is questionable as it could artiﬁcially set the price to the maximum
bid of the winning client. Hence, clients need to check the correctness of all of the updates
performed on the price of the item, as well as the current price, without being able to contact
the other bidders. This is achieved by transmitting non-interactive proofs to the clients,
as demonstrated in [CHS04]. The new primitive called graded signatures was introduced
recently by Osmanoglu in [Osm15]. In this primitive, the signature process of registered users
is assimilated as a positive grade. Thus, the aim of the primitive is to collect and combine these
signatures into a general graded signature, that conceals the identity of the signers. Osmanoglu
shows in [Osm15] how to construct such a graded signature scheme from a non-interactive
range proof.
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Non-Interactive Range Proof)
Let C = (Gencom ,Com,Open) be the generation, the commit, and the open algorithm of a
string commitment scheme in the common reference string (CRS) model. A non-interactive
range proof with respect to the commitment scheme C in the CRS model is a special case of
the interactive range proof, where communications are reduced to a single message and a
common reference string is assumed to be shared among users. Hence, for an instance c, a
non-interactive range proof with respect to commitment scheme C and integer range [A,B ] is
a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (NIZK-PK) for the following statement:
NIZK-PK
{
(σ,ρ) : c ←Com(σ; ρ)∧σ ∈ [A,B ]} , where A,B ∈N.
Remark: As in the case of interactive range proofs, the proof system for non-interactive
range proofs is deﬁned for any commitment scheme. The statement being proven is the ability
for the prover to open his commitment to an element contained in the public range [A,B ]. It is
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also important to note that non-interactive range proofs are often non-interactive arguments,
for the same reasons as for interactive range proofs. Since the cryptographic literature (past,
recent, and related) refers to the problem as a “non-interactive range proof”, that term is used
in this thesis. Some additional explanations are provided in the remarks that are in Section 4.1
and Section 3.1.
An alternative deﬁnition can be obtained by replacing the string commitment scheme with a
public key cryptosystem.
Deﬁnition 5.2 (Non-Interactive Range Proof with respect to public key cryptosystems)
Let E = (Genpkc ,Enc,Dec) be the generation, the encryption, and the decryption algorithm
of a public key cryptosystem. A non-interactive range proof with respect to the public key
cryptosystem E is a special case of the non-interactive range proof with respect to the com-
mitment scheme C in the CRS model. For an instance e, a non-interactive range proof with
respect to the public key cryptosystem E and integer range [A,B ], is a non-interactive proof of
knowledge for the following statement:
NIZK-PK
{
(σ,ρ) : e ← Enc(σ; ρ)∧σ ∈ [A,B ]} , where A,B ∈N.
Remark: In Deﬁnition 5.2, the proof system for non-interactive range proofs is deﬁned for
any public key cryptosystem. The statement being proven is the ability for the prover to
decrypt his ciphertext into an element contained in the public range [A,B ] .
The common approach to construct non-interactive arguments is to apply known generic
transformations to interactive arguments. However, generic transformations often require
speciﬁc conditions and impose drawbacks. For instance, several generic transformations such
as the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86], require the security to be proven in the random oracle
model.
A better, but more complex, approach is to directly construct the non-interactive argument
with a security proof alongside it. Unfortunately, the difﬁculty of this approach can easily lead
to insecure protocols. This is, for instance, the case with the protocol presented by Yuen et al.
in [YHM+09]. The insecurity of their protocol is demonstrated in Section 5.3, where the main
idea of the attack comes from using Pedersen commitments in a group of known order. As they
rely on the Lagrange theorem to prove that a non-negative number is the sum of four squares,
their protocol can only conclude that the sum of four squares is computed modulo the group
order. Hence an attacker can prove that any number is “non-negative” and completely break
the protocol in [YHM+09].
A correct solution is achieved in Section 5.5, where the NIZK range proof presented works in
the common reference model for an encrypted secret σ, with respect to the lifted BBS public
key cryptosystem [LZ12, BBS04] (see Section 2.4.4). Note that if σ needs to be committed, one
can use the lifted BBS cryptosystem as a perfectly binding commitment. The construction of
theNIZK range proof is achieved by using recent NIZK arguments by Groth and Lipmaa [Gro10,
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Lip12a]. It also uses the additive combinatorics results from Section 4.4, that decompose the
range proofσ ∈ [0,H ] based on the fact that (u−1)σ ∈ (u−1)·[0,H ] if and only ifσ=∑−1i=0 Giσi
and σi ∈ [0,u−1], where Gi are as deﬁned in Section 4.4. However, in contrast to Section 4.5,
the proof that σi ∈ Zu is done without the use of a signature scheme, but rather with a
recursive use of the method in Section 4.4 and from [LAN02]. This recursive method shows
that σi =∑v−1j=0 G ′jσ′j ,i with σ′j ,i ∈ [0,1]. Here, v := ⌊log2(u−1)⌋. By using the commitment
scheme of [Gro10, Lip12a] that enables the succinct commitment to a vector (σ0, . . . ,σ−1),
and the Hadamard product argument of [Gro10, Lip12a] (see Section 2.4.7), all v small range
proofs can be done in parallel. The new range proof does not rely on the random oracle
model nor use any proofs of knowledge of signatures. Furthermore, the NIZK range proof
achieves sublinear communication and computational complexity by using the Groth-Lipmaa
knowledge commitment [Gro10, Lip12a] (see Section 2.4.2) in conjunction with the lifted BBS
cryptosystem [LZ12, BBS04] (see Section 2.4.4).
As a brief reminder, to commit to a vector a = (a0, . . . ,an−1), the Groth-Lipmaa knowledge com-
mitment ﬁrst takes the following as input: a common reference string crst , a, and randomness
r . It then outputs the commitment
(
A, Â
)
such that(
A, Â
)=Comt (crst ;a;r )
=
(
g rt
n−1∏
i=0
g ait ,λi , ĝ
r
t
n−1∏
i=0
ĝ ait ,λi
)
,
where gt ,λi and ĝ t ,λi are parameters contained in crst such that ĝ t ,λi = g α̂t ,λi for some secret
α̂, and gt ,λi = g x
λi
t for some secret x and where {λi }i∈Zn ⊂N is such that ∀i < j : 0< λi < λ j .
Furthermore, t ∈ {1,2} deﬁnes either a generator g1 ∈G1 or g2 ∈G2.
The lifted BBS cryptosystem [LZ12, BBS04] encrypts a message σwith randomness r f and rh
with the following ciphertext: (
cg ,c f ,ch
)= Encpk (crs1;σ;r f ,rh)
=
(
g
r f +rh+σ
1 , f
r f ,hrh
)
,
where the secret key is sk= (sk1,sk2) and the public key is pk=
(
g1, f ,h
)= (g1,g 1/sk11 ,g 1/sk21 ).
Further details can be found in Section 2.4.4.
The NIZK range proof described in this chapter requires a subargument that a knowledge-
committed value is equal to a lifted BBS encrypted value. A novel solution for this subargument
is described in Section 5.4, where the use of knowledge assumptions enables this subargu-
ment to be computationally more efﬁcient than the one constructed by using Groth-Sahai
proofs [GS08, GS12a], while keeping an identical communication load.
128
5.2. Prior, Recent, and Related Work
5.2 Prior, Recent, and Related Work
Although the interest in interactive range proofs started as early as 1987 with the work of
Brickell et al. in [BCDvdG87], it is only in 2009 that the ﬁrst NIZK range proof without random
oracles was proposed by Di Crescenzo, Herranz, and Sáez in [CHS04]. However their solution
is mainly of theoretical value. Their range proof targets statements of the form σ> L, where σ
is decomposed in its binary form. Using the technique of Fischlin [Fis01] (although not cited),
they reduce the complexity of their algorithm to the bit length of L. Let n = log2L be the bit
length of L, then the proof system of [CHS04] requires at least n NIZK proofs of quadratic non
residuosity from [SCP94].
The second attempt was undertaken by Yuen et al. in [YHM+09]. Their scheme uses the
Lagrange theorem to decompose a positive number as the sum of four squares, similarly to
the interactive version proposed by Lipmaa in [Lip03]. However the scheme in [YHM+09] uses
Pedersen commitments with known group order, which render the scheme insecure as will be
demonstrated in Section 5.3.
The range proof from Rial et al. [RKP09] combines the range proof of [CCs08] (described
in Protocol 4.1 and explained in Section 4.3) with the Groth-Sahai NIZK proofs [GS08] and
P-signatures [BCKL08]. However, the [RKP09] range proof is not claimed to be zero-knowledge,
but only non-interactivewitness indistinguishable (NIWI). It is nevertheless claimed in [RKP09]
that NIZK should be achievable with the techniques from Groth-Sahai [GS08].
The range proof of Chaabouni, Lipmaa, and Zhang in [CLZ12], which is the focus of this
chapter, opened the way for two more recent improvements [FLZ13, Lip14b, Lip16]. The
improvement proposed by Fauzi, Lipmaa, and Zhang in [FLZ13] is to replace the permutation
argument used in [CLZ12] by a shift argument. This replacement made it possible for them
to obtain a protocol that is computationally more efﬁcient with a slight communication
efﬁciency improvement as well. Furthermore, the latest improvements brought by Lipmaa
in [Lip14b, Lip16], enhance not only the shift argument, but also the product argument
needed in [CLZ12] and in [FLZ13]. These enhancements allow for a major improvement in
the computational complexity and in the communication load.
A related argument to the NIZK range proof is described in [FLZ14] with the construction
of several NIZK set operations. The most notable set operation achieved is the pairwise
multiset sum equality test (PMSET), where the prover aims to show that for four committed
setsA1,A2,A3, andA4, all the elements contained inA1 and inA2 appear as many times
as inA3 and inA4, regardless of their sorting or of their set membership proof. The PMSET
argument then allows them to achieve other set operations such as the NIZK subset argument,
the NIZK set intersection and union argument, or the NIZK set difference argument.
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5.3 Breaking the COCOON 2009 NI Range Proof
In [YHM+09], Yuen et al. proposed a non-interactive range proof. This section shows that
their argument is not secure.
Their goal was to prove that a committed secret σ is in some range [A,B ]. To do so they prove
that both (σ− A) and (B −σ) are non-negative by making use of the Lagrange theorem stating
that any non-negative integer can be decomposed as the sum of four squares. Hence,
σ− A =
4∑
j=1
x21 j and B −σ=
4∑
j=1
x22 j , (5.1)
for some xi j . The range proof of [YHM+09] is based on (symmetric) bilinear groups of com-
posite order, that is, on bilinear groups (n,G1,GT,e), where n = pq . To commit to a messageσ,
the committer picks a random1 r ∈Zq and computesC = gσhr , where g is a random generator
ofG1 (of order n), and h is a random generator of the subgroupGq ofG1 with order q . Given
C , σ is uniquely determined inZp , as Cq = gσq .
In their range proof, the prover ﬁnds the witnesses xi j of equation (5.1) and outputs a proof
π=
({
C1 j ,C2 j
}
j∈{1,2,3,4} ,C ,ϕ1,ϕ2
)
,
where
C ≡ gσhr ∈G1,
Ci j ≡ g xi j hri j ∈G1 for i ∈ {1,2} and j ∈ {1,2,3,4},
ϕ1 ≡ g−r+2
∑4
j=1 r1 j x1 j ·h
∑4
j=1 r
2
1 j ∈G1,
ϕ2 ≡ g r+2
∑4
j=1 r2 j x2 j ·h
∑4
j=1 r
2
2 j ∈G1.
The veriﬁer checks if
e(h,ϕ1)= e(g AC−1,g )
4∏
j=1
e(C1 j ,C1 j ), and (5.2)
e(h,ϕ2)= e(Cg−B ,g )
4∏
j=1
e(C2 j ,C2 j ). (5.3)
Now assume that a malicious prover P picks an integerσ∗ ∈ {0, . . . ,p−1}\[A,B ]. This implies
that either (σ∗ − A) or (B −σ∗) is negative as an integer. Suppose (B −σ∗)< 0, then P chooses{
x∗2 j
}
j∈{1,2,3,4} such that n+ (B −σ
∗) =∑4j=1(x∗2 j )2. Then P sets C ← gσ∗hr , C2 j ← g x∗2 j hr2 j ,
ϕ1 as above, and ϕ2 ← g r+2·
∑4
j=1 r2 j x
∗
2 j ·h
∑4
j=1 r
2
2 j . Let h = gα for some α. It is easy to see that the
1In [YHM+09], the scheme uses r ∈Zn to facilitate their security proof.
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veriﬁcation equation (5.3) still holds:
e(Cg−B ,g )
4∏
j=1
e(C2 j ,C2 j )= e(g ,g )(σ
∗−B)+αr+∑4j=1(x∗2 j+αr2 j )2
= e(g ,g )(σ∗−B)+αr+
∑4
j=1(x
∗
2 j )
2+∑4j=1α2r 22 j+2∑4j=1αr2 j x∗2 j
= e(g ,g )α·
(
r+2∑4j=1 r2 j x∗2 j+α·∑4j=1 r 22 j )
= e(h,ϕ2).
An identical construction can be made for the case that (σ∗ − A)< 0, where the focus will be
put on the veriﬁcation equation (5.2). Therefore, it can be concluded that P is a polynomial
time adversary who can always break the scheme. Hence, the NIZK range proof in [YHM+09]
is not sound.
5.4 Equality Subargument of a lifted BBS Encryption
and a Knowledge Commitment
The range proof of Section 5.5 requires a subargument that if (Ac , Âc ) is a knowledge-commitment
of some σ (with n = 1 and some randomness r˜ = rc + r f + rh), and (Ag , Af , Ah) is a lifted BBS
ciphertext of some σ′ (with randomness r = r f + rh), then σ = σ′. That is, Ac = g r˜1gσ1,λ0 =
g
r f +rh+rc
1 g
σ
1,λ0
and (Ag , Af , Ah)= (g r f +rh+σ1 , f r f ,hrh ) for randomness (rc ,r f ,rh) and public key
( f ,h). The generator g1,λ0 will be required in Section 5.5.
Computational assumptions. Beyond the need for asymmetric bilinear groups (see Sec-
tion 2.1.3) and the associated computational hardness assumptions, the Groth-Lipmaa knowl-
edge commitment additionally requires both the Λ-power symmetric discrete logarithm
(Λ-PSDL) assumption and the Λ-power knowledge of exponent (Λ-PKE) assumption. Let
PGa be an asymmetric pairing group generator that on input 1κ outputs descriptions of mul-
tiplicative cyclic groups G1, G2, and GT of prime order p where
∥∥p∥∥ = κ. Let G∗1 =G1 \ {1},
G∗2 =G2 \ {1} and let g1 ∈G∗1 , g2 ∈G∗2 . The generated groups are such that there exists an
admissible bilinear map e :G1×G2 →GT, meaning that:
• for all a,b ∈Zp it holds that e(g a1 ,gb2 )= e(g1,g2)ab ;
• e(g1,g2) = 1; and
• the bilinear map is efﬁciently computable.
One can implement an optimal asymmetric Ate pairing [HSV06] over a subclass of Barreto-
Naehrig curves [BN05] very efﬁciently [GSNB11] (in that case, at a security level of 128-bits, an
element ofG1/G2/GT can be represented in, respectively, 256/512/3072 bits).
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TheΛ-PSDL assumption illustrates the difﬁculty for an adversary to produce the secret element
x from the set
{
g x
i
1 , g
xi
2
}
i∈{0}∪Λ, where Λ = {λi }i∈Zn ⊂N such that ∀i < j : 0 < λi < λ j . The
Λ-PKE assumption regarding a bilinear groupG1 for t = 1 or G2 for t = 2, states that given
the set
{
g x
i
t , g
α̂xi
t
}
i∈{0}∪Λ where α̂ is secret, an adversaryA can output a pair (c, ĉ) such that
ĉ = c α̂, only if he knows a set {ai }i∈{0}∪Λ such that c =
∏
i∈{0}∪Λ
(
g x
i
t
)ai
. Note that t deﬁnes the
generators g1 ∈G1 \ {1} and g2 ∈G2 \ {1}. The Λ-PSDL and Λ-PKE assumptions from [Lip12a]
are formally explained in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.5. The lifted BBS cryptosystem requires the
decision linear (DLIN) assumption. This assumption states that for either a bilinear groupG1
for t = 1 orG2 for t = 2, the adversary is unable to distinguish between gσ+τt and g zt for random
σ, τ, z, when the adversary input is
(
f ,h, f σ,hτ
)
with f , h taken randomly from the bilinear
group corresponding to t . Therefore, the Λ-PSDL, the Λ-PKE, and the DLIN assumptions are
needed for the subargument of this section.
System parameters: Λ= {λi }i∈Zn ⊂N such that ∀i < j : 0<λi <λ j .
Common reference string generator Gencrs_sub(1κ):
Set parambp := (p,G1,G2,GT,e)←PGa(1κ);
Generate random αg ,α f ,αh , α̂,αg/c ,x ∈R Z∗p ;
Let g1 ∈R G1 \ {1} and g2 ∈R G2 \ {1},
denote g1,λ0 ← g x
λ0
1 , g˚1 ← g
αg
1 , ĝ1 ← g α̂1 , ĝ1,λ0 ← g α̂1,λ0 ,
g2,λ0 ← g x
λ0
2 , g˚2 ← g
αg
2 , ĝ2 ← g α̂2 , ĝ2,λ0 ← g α̂2,λ0 ,
g˚1, f ← gα f1 , g˚1,h ← gαh1 , g˚1,g/c ← g
αg/c
1 ,
g˚2, f ← gα f2 , g˚2,h ← gαh2 , g˚2,g/c ← g
αg/c
2 ,
and g˚1,λ0 ← g
αg/c
1,λ0
;
Set the common reference string
crs←
{
parambp; g1, g1,λ0 , g˚1, ĝ1, ĝ1,λ0 , g˚1, f , g˚1,h , g˚1,g/c , g˚1,λ0 ,
g2, g2,λ0 , g˚2, ĝ2, ĝ2,λ0 , g˚2, f , g˚2,h , g˚2,g/c
}
;
A third party also creates sk := (sk1,sk2) ∈R (Z∗p )2,
and sets pk := ( f ,h, f˚ , h˚)← (g 1/sk11 ,g 1/sk21 , g˚ 1/sk11, f , g˚
1/sk2
1,h ).
Common inputs: (crs; pk, Ag , Af , Ah , Ac ),
where (Ag , Af , Ah)=
(
g
r f +rh+σ
1 , f
r f , hrh
)
,
and Ac = g r˜1gσ1,λ0 = g
r f +rh+rc
1 g
σ
1,λ0
.
Protocol 5.1a – Setup of the equality subargument
of a knowledge committed value and its lifted BBS encryption
Protocol explanation. The subargument of this section, described in Protocol 5.1a and 5.1b,
is constructed by combining ideas from [GS08, GS12a] and [Gro10, Lip12a]. Intuitively, for
132
5.4. Equality Subargument of a lifted BBS Encryption and a Knowledge Commitment
Argument generated by the prover:
NIZK-PK
{
(σ,r f ,rh , r˜ ) :
(
Ag , Af , Ah
)= (g r f +rh+σ1 , f r f , hrh ) ∧ Ac = g r˜1gσ1,λ0}
Set rc ← (r˜ − r f − rh), Âc ← ĝ r˜1 ĝσ1,λ0 , A˚g/c ← g˚
σ−rc
1,g/c g˚
−σ
1,λ0
,(
A˚g , A˚ f , A˚h
)← (g˚ r f +rh+σ1 , f˚ r f , h˚rh ).
Pick random Rf ,Rh ∈R Z∗p .
Set
(
C f , Ĉ f
)← (gRf2 g r f2,λ0 , ĝ R f2 ĝ r f2,λ0) ∈G22,(
Ch , Ĉh
)← (gRh2 g rh2,λ0 , ĝ Rh2 ĝ rh2,λ0) ∈G22,(
πg , π˚g
)← (g r˜+Rf +Rh1 , g˚ r˜+Rf +Rh1 ) ∈G21,(
π f , π˚ f
)← ( f Rf , f˚ R f ) ∈G21,
(πh , π˚h)←
(
hRh , h˚Rh
)
∈G21.
Send to the veriﬁer the argument:
πce ← (A˚g , A˚ f , A˚h , Âc , πg , π˚g , C f ,Ĉ f ,π f , π˚ f , Ch ,Ĉh ,πh , π˚h , A˚g/c) .
Veriﬁcation
(
crs; (Ag , Af , Ah , Ac ),π
ce
)
:
Verify that
e( f˚ ,g2)
?= e( f , g˚2, f ), e(h˚,g2) ?= e(h, g˚2,h),
e(A˚g ,g2)
?= e(Ag , g˚2), e(A˚ f ,g2) ?= e(Af , g˚2, f ),
e(A˚h ,g2)
?= e(Ah , g˚2,h), e(Âc ,g2) ?= e(Ac , ĝ2),
e(π˚g ,g2)
?= e(πg , g˚2), e(π˚ f ,g2) ?= e(π f , g˚2, f ), e(π˚h ,g2) ?= e(πh , g˚2,h),
e(g1,Ĉ f )
?= e(ĝ1,C f ), e(g1,Ĉh) ?= e(ĝ1,Ch),
and e(A˚g/c ,g2)
?= e(Ag /Ac , g˚2,g/c ).
Verify that
e( f ,C f )
?= e(π f ,g2) ·e(Af ,g2,λ0 ),
e(h,Ch)
?= e(πh ,g2) ·e(Ah ,g2,λ0 ),
and e(g1,C f Ch)
?= e(πg A−1c ,g2) ·e(Ag ,g2,λ0 ).
Protocol 5.1b – Equality subargument of a knowledge committed value
and its lifted BBS encryption
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every multi-exponentiation hσ11 . . .h
σm
m = t that needs to be proven, a veriﬁcation equation
e(h1,Com(σ1))·· · ··e(hm ,Com(σm))= e(π,g2)e(t ,Com(1)) is provided, where π “compensates”
for the fact that Com(σi ) are probabilistic commitments. In addition, knowledge commit-
ments are used (though for small values 0 or 1 of n) so that all committed values can be
extracted. Since the argument uses three committed values (σ, r f , and rh) and three equa-
tions, according to Figure 4 of [GS07]2 (the full version of [GS08, GS12a]), the corresponding
pure Groth-Sahai argument has a length of 15 group elements. The subargument presented
here has the same length, but is computationally more efﬁcient.
Theorem 5.1
The argument in Protocol 5.1b is a perfectly complete and perfectly zero-knowledge argument
that for some σ ∈Zp , r˜ ,r f ,rh ∈Z∗p, Ac = g r˜1gσ1,λ0 and (Ag , Af , Ah) = (g
r f +rh+σ, f r f ,hrh ). If
the {λ0}-PSDL assumption and the {λ0}-PKE assumption (in bothG1 andG2) hold, then this
argument is computationally sound.
Clearly, this argument has a CRS of length Θ(1), its argument consists of 11 elements of
G1 and 4 elements of G2. The computational complexity of the prover is dominated by 13
exponentiations in G1 and 8 exponentiations in G2. The computational complexity of the
veriﬁer is dominated by 33 pairings.
Proof
To show that the argument described in Protocol 5.1b is a NIZK argument, three security prop-
erties are proven: perfect completeness, computational soundness, and perfect zero-knowledge.
PERFECT COMPLETENESS: all veriﬁcation equations hold as follows:
e( f˚ ,g2) = e( f ,g2)α f = e( f , g˚2, f );
e(A˚g ,g2) = e(Ag ,g2)αg = e(Ag , g˚2);
e(A˚h ,g2) = e(Ah ,g2)αh = e(Ah , g˚2,h);
e(π˚g ,g2) = e(πg ,g2)αg = e(πg , g˚2);
e(π˚h ,g2) = e(πh ,g2)αh = e(πh , g˚2,h);
e(g1,Ĉ f ) = e(g1,C f )α̂ = e(ĝ1,C f );
e(h˚,g2) = e(h,g2)αh = e(h, g˚2,h);
e(A˚ f ,g2) = e(Af ,g2)α f = e(Af , g˚2, f );
e(Âc ,g2) = e(Ac ,g2)α̂ = e(Ac , ĝ2);
e(π˚ f ,g2) = e(π f ,g2)α f = e(π f , g˚2, f );
e(g1,Ĉh) = e(g1,Ch)α̂ = e(ĝ1,Ch);
e(A˚g/c ,g2) = e(g˚σ−rc1,g/c g˚−σ1,λ0 ,g2) = e(g
(σ−rc )·αg/c−σ·αg/c ·xλ0
1 ,g2) = e(gσ−rc1 g−σx
λ0
1 ,g2)
αg/c
= e(gσ−rc1 g−σ1,λ0 , g˚2,g/c ) = e(Ag /Ac , g˚2,g/c ).
2This publication has several versions. The one referred here is the version published in April 2016.
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e( f ,C f )= e( f ,gRf2 g
r f
2,λ0
)= e( f ,gRf2 ) ·e( f ,g
r f
2,λ0
)
= e( f Rf ,g2) ·e( f r f ,g2,λ0 )
= e(π f ,g2) ·e(Af ,g2,λ0 ).
e(h,Ch)= e(h,gRh2 g rh2,λ0 )= e(h,g
Rh
2 ) ·e(h,g rh2,λ0 )
= e(hRh ,g2) ·e(hrh ,g2,λ0 )
= e(πh ,g2) ·e(Ah ,g2,λ0 ).
e(Acπ
−1
g ,g2) ·e(g1,C f Ch)= e(g r˜1gσ1,λ0 · g
−r˜−Rf −Rh
1 ,g2) ·e(g1,g
Rf +Rh
2 ) ·e(g1,g
r f +rh
2,λ0
)
= e(gσ1,λ0 · g
−Rf −Rh
1 ,g2) ·e(g
Rf +Rh
1 ,g2) ·e(g
r f +rh
1 ,g2,λ0 )
= e(gσ1 ,g2,λ0 ) ·e(g
r f +rh
1 ,g2,λ0 )
= e(g r f +rh+σ1 ,g2,λ0 )
= e(Ag ,g2,λ0 ).
COMPUTATIONAL SOUNDNESS: By the {λ0}-PKE assumption inG1/G2, one can open the next
values:
(
Ac , Âc
) = (g r˜1gσ1,λ0 , ĝ r˜1 ĝσ1,λ0) ,(
Ag , A˚g
) = (gσ′′1 , g˚σ′′1 ) ,(
Af , A˚ f
) = ( f r f , f˚ r f ) ,(
Ah , A˚h
) = (hrh , h˚rh ) ,(
C f ,Ĉ f
) = (gRf2 g r ′f2,λ0 , ĝ R f2 ĝ r ′f2,λ0
)
,
(
Ag /Ac , A˚g/c
) = (gσ′r1 g−σ′1,λ0 , g˚σ′r1,g/c g˚−σ′1,λ0) ,(
πg , π˚g
) = (g r ′′σ1 , g˚ r ′′σ1 ) ,(
π f , π˚ f
) = (g r ′′f1 , g˚ r ′′f1, f ) ,
(πh , π˚h) =
(
g
r ′′h
1 , g˚
r ′′h
1,h
)
,
and
(
Ch ,Ĉh
) = (gRh2 g r ′h2,λ0 , ĝ Rh2 ĝ r ′h2,λ0) .
Since Ac = g r˜1gσ1,λ0 , Ag = g
σ′′
1 , and Ag /Ac = g
σ′r
1 g
−σ′
1,λ0
, it implies that gσ
′′
1 = g
σ′r+r˜
1 g
σ−σ′
1,λ0
. Thus, if
σ =σ′, an adversary can compute xλ0 ← (σ′′ −σ′r − r˜ )/(σ−σ′), and from this compute x and
thus break the {λ0}-PSDL assumption. (To verify whether x is the correct root, the adversary
can check that g x
λ0
1 = g1,λ0 .) Thus σ=σ′, and thus also σ′′ =σ′r + r˜ and Ag = g
σ′r+r˜
1 .
As C f = gRf2 g
r ′f
2,λ0
, π f = g
r ′′f
1 , Af = f r f , and e( f ,C f ) = e(π f ,g2) · e(Af ,g2,λ0 ), this implies that
e( f ,g
Rf
2 g
r ′f
2,λ0
)= e(g r
′′
f
1 ,g2)e( f
r f ,g x
λ0
2 ), for an unknown x. Taking the discrete logarithm in both
sides of the last equation, the following is obtained:
Rf /sk1+ r ′f xλ0/sk1 = r ′′f + r f xλ0/sk1
⇐⇒ (r f − r ′f )xλ0 =Rf − r ′′f · sk1.
If r f = r ′f , then xλ0 could be computed, and from it x can be derived which would break the
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{λ0}-PSDL assumption. Therefore, r f = r ′f and also C f = g
Rf
2 g
r f
2,λ0
. Moreover, π f = g
r ′′f
1 = f Rf .
With the same reasoning, rh = r ′h is obtained and therefore Ch = g
Rh
1 g
rh
1,λ0
and πh = hRh .
AsC f = gRf2 g
r f
2,λ0
,Ch = gRh2 g rh2,λ0 ,πg = g
r ′′σ
1 , Ac = g r˜1gσ1,λ0 , Ag = g
σ′r+r˜
1 , and e(g1,C f Ch)= e(πg A−1c ,g2)·
e(Ag ,g2,λ0 ), this implies that
e(g1,g
Rf +Rh+(r f +rh)xλ0
2 )= e(g
r ′′σ
1 g
−r˜
1 g
−σ
1,λ0
,g2) ·e(gσ
′
r+r˜
1 ,g2,λ0 )= e(g
r ′′σ−r˜+(σ′r−σ+r˜ )xλ0
1 ,g2)
for an unknown x. Taking the discrete logarithm in both sides of the last equation, the equation
becomes Rf +Rh+(r f +rh)xλ0 = r ′′σ−r˜+(σ′r −σ+r˜ )xλ0 . Again, if (r f +rh) = (σ′r −σ+r˜ ), then it is
possible to compute xλ0 and thus also x. Thus,σ′r+r˜ = r f +rh+σ, and thus also r ′′σ = r˜+Rf +Rh .
This means that Ac = g r˜1gσ1,λ0 and (Ag , Af , Ah)= (g
r f +rh+σ
1 , f
r f ,hrh ).
PERFECT ZERO-KNOWLEDGE: to prove computational zero-knowledge, the following simulator
(Sim1,Sim2) is constructed. Sim1 creates a CRS according to the protocol together with a trap-
door td= (αg ,α f ,αh , α̂,αg/c ,x). On input (crs, pk, Ag , Af , Ah , Ac , td), Sim2 picks z f ,zh ∈R Zp ,
then sets C f ← g zf2 , π f ← f z f A−x
λ0
f , Ch ← g
zh
2 , πh ← hzh A−x
λ0
h , and πg ← g
zf +zh
1 Ac A
−xλ0
g . The
elements C f and Ch have the same distribution as the honestly generated ones, as z f and zh
have respectively the same distributions as
(
Rf + r f xλ0
)
and
(
Rh + rhxλ0
)
. The success of the
veriﬁcation equations can be checked for the choices of π f , πh , and πg . For example:
e(π f ,g2)e(Af ,g2,λ0 )=e( f z f A−x
λ0
f ,g2) ·e(Af ,g2,λ0 )= e( f z f ,g2)e(A−x
λ0
f ,g2)e(Af ,g2,λ0 )
=e( f z f ,g2)= e( f ,C f ),
and ﬁnally, e(Acπ−1g ,g2) · e(g1,C f Ch)= e(g
−z f −zh
1 A
xλ0
g ,g2) · e(g1,g
zf +zh
2 )= e(Ag ,g2,λ0 ). Hence
π f , πh , and πg will be accepted by the veriﬁcation. Moreover, because these veriﬁcation
equations ﬁx π f , πh , and πg uniquely (given the inputs of Sim2 and as C f ,Ch are set with the
correct distribution), the tuple
(
C f ,π f ,Ch ,πh ,πg
)
comes from the correct distribution
Sim2 creates the knowledge elements (A˚g , A˚ f , A˚h , Âc , π˚g ,Ĉ f , π˚ f ,Ĉh , π˚h , A˚g/c ) by using the
trapdoor, which will result in elements with the same distribution as the honestly generated
ones. For example, A˚g/c ← (Ag /Ac )αg/c and A˚g ← Aαgg . The simulated argument will thus be:
πce ← (A˚g , A˚ f , A˚h , Âc , πg , π˚g , C f ,Ĉ f ,π f , π˚ f , Ch ,Ĉh ,πh , π˚h , A˚g/c) .
As the simulator Sim2 outputs an accepting argument πce with the exact same distribution as
the one from the honest prover, the argument achieves perfect zero-knowledge.
Remark: Professor Groth pointed out that the initial description [CLZ12] of the equality
subargument had the value A˚g/c set to A˚g/c = g˚σ1,g/c . This is obviously an issue for the zero-
knowledge property, as a simulator Sim2, without the knowledge of σ, cannot produce the
element A˚g/c with the same distribution as the prover would. Furthermore, perfect zero-
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knowledge is achieved with the corrected version present in this thesis, contrarily to the
claimed computational zero-knowledge from the initial description.
5.5 Lifted BBS Encryption Based Non-Interactive Range Proof
In the NIZK range proof presented in this section, the prover has an encrypted σ ∈Zp , and his
aim is to convince the veriﬁer that σ ∈ [0,H ]. The encryption protocol used comes from the
lifted BBS cryptosystem (Genpkc ,Enc,Dec), as described in Section 2.4.4. It can be thought of
as a perfectly binding commitment scheme as long as decryption is not necessary. The Lipmaa
computationally binding knowledge commitment scheme (Gencom ,Com,Open), as described
in Section 2.4.2, will be used here to obtain a sublinear argument. Furthermore, the range
proof is based on results from Section 4.4. As a reminder, for H > 0, u > 1, and (u,H) deﬁned
as in Section 4.4,Theorem 4.10 states that σ ∈ [0,H ] if and only if for some σi ∈ [0,u−1], the
following holds:
(u−1)σ=
(u,(u−1)H)−1∑
i=0
Giσi ,
where Gi ∈Z are values deﬁned by equations 4.6 and 4.7. Moreover, for the binary decom-
position case (where u = 2), Lemma 4.8 implies that  	 log2 H , which in turn implies that
	 ⌊log2 H⌋ as must be an integer. Therefore, from Corollary 4.12 and Theorem 4.10, it can
be concluded that σ ∈ [0,H ] if and only if for some σi ∈ [0,1], the following holds:
σ=
log2 H−1∑
i=0
⌊
H +2i
2i+1
⌋
σi .
The precise values of (u,H) and Gi are not important for the protocol explanation. It is
sufﬁcient to know that they can be efﬁciently evaluated.
Computational assumptions. The NIZK range proof of this section uses the Hadamard
product argument (see Section 2.4.7), the Lipmaa permutation argument (see Section 2.4.8),
and the subargument for lifted BBS encryption of a Lipmaa knowledge committed value
(explained in the previous section). The following assumptions are therefore required for the
NIZK range proof presented in this section: the bilinear groups associated computational
hardness assumptions (see Section 2.1.3), theΛ-power symmetric discrete logarithm (Λ-PSDL)
assumption, theΛ-power knowledge of exponent (Λ-PKE) assumption, and the decision linear
(DLIN) assumption. The Λ-PSDL and the DLIN assumptions are explained in Section 2.2.2.
The Λ-PKE assumption is explained in Section 2.2.5.
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System parameters: H ,u,Gi ,,v :=
⌊
log2(u−1)
⌋
, and G ′j :=
⌊
(u−1+2 j )/2 j+1⌋,
a progression-free setΛ= {λi }i∈Z ⊂N such that ∀i < j : 0<λi <λ j ,
Λ̂ := {0}∪Λ∪2̂Λ,
Λ˜ :=Λ∪{2λk −λ j }i ,k∈{0,...,−1}∪2̂Λ∪ ({2λk +λi −λ j }i , j ,k∈{0,...,−1}∧i = j \2 ·Λ).
Common reference string generator Gencrs_nir p (1κ):
Set parambp := (p,G1,G2,GT,e)←PGa(1κ);
Generate random α̂, α˜,αg ,α f ,αh ,αg/c ,x ∈R Z∗p ;
Let g1 ∈R G1 \ {1} and g2 ∈R G2 \ {1},
denote gt ,s ← g xst , ĝ t ,s ← g α̂x
s
t , g˜ t ,s ← g α˜x
s
t , where s ∈ {0}∪ Λ˜, and t ∈ {1,2} ,
g˚1 ← gαg1 , g˚1,g/c ← g
αg/c
1 , g˚1, f ← g
α f
1 , g˚1,h ← gαh1 ,
g˚2 ← gαg2 , g˚2,g/c ← g
αg/c
2 , g˚2, f ← g
α f
2 , g˚2,h ← gαh2 ,
and g˚1,λ0 ← g
αg/c
1,λ0
;
Set D ←∏−1i=0 g2,λi , D˜ ←D α˜, Erot ←∏−1i=0 g2,2λrot(i )−λi , E˜rot ← E α˜rot
and
(
T ∗, T̂ ∗,T ∗2
)← (∏−1i=0 gTΛ,rot(i )1,λi , ∏−1i=0 ĝ TΛ,rot(i )1,λi , ∏−1i=0 gTΛ,rot(i )2,λi ) ,
where TΛ,rot(i )=
∣∣{ j ∈Z : 2λi +λ j = 2λrot( j )+λrot−1(i )}∣∣;
Set the common reference string
crs←
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
parambp;
(
g1,s , ĝ1,s , g˜1,s
)
s∈{0}∪Λ , g2,
(
ĝ2,s
)
s∈Λ̂ ,(
g2,s , g˜2,s
)
s∈Λ˜ ,
{
g˚ t , g˚ t ,g/c , g˚ t , f , g˚ t ,h
}
t∈{1,2} ,
g˚1,λ0 , D, D˜ , Erot, E˜rot, T
∗, T̂ ∗, T ∗2
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ ;
Set crs1 ←
{
parambp;
(
g1s , ĝ1s , g˜1s
)
s∈{0}∪Λ
}
⊂ crs,
ĉrs1 ←
{
parambp;
(
g1s , ĝ1s
)
s∈{0}∪Λ
}
⊂ crs, and
c˜rs1 ←
{
parambp;
(
g1s , g˜1s
)
s∈{0}∪Λ
}
⊂ crs;
The prover creates a secret key sk := (sk1,sk2) ∈R (Z∗p )2,
and sets pk := ( f ,h, f˚ , h˚)←
(
g 1/sk11 , g
1/sk2
1 , g˚
1/sk1
1, f , g˚
1/sk2
1,h
)
.
Common inputs: (pk, Ag , Af , Ah , Ac , Âc ), where (Ag , Af , Ah)= (g r+σ1 , f r f ,hrh )
and (Ac , Âc )=
(
g r˜1g
σ
1,λ1
, ĝ r˜1 ĝ
σ
1,λ1
)
, for r = r f + rh and r˜ = r + rc .
Protocol 5.2a – Setup of the non-interactive range proof protocol for the range [0,H ]
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Argument generated by the prover:
NIZK-PK
{
(σ,r f ,rh) :
(
Ag , Af , Ah
)= (g r f +rh+σ1 , f r f , hrh ) ∧ σ ∈ [0,H ]}
1. Compute (σ0, . . . ,σ−1) ∈Zu such that (u−1)σ=
∑−1
i=0 Giσi .
2. For i ∈Z compute
(
σ′0,i , . . . ,σ
′
v−1,i
)
∈Zv2 such that σi =
∑v−1
j=0 G
′
j ·σ′j ,i .
3. For j ∈Zv :
• Let r j ∈R Z∗p ,
(
B ′j , B̂
′
j
)
←Com1
(
ĉrs1;σ′j ,0, . . . ,σ
′
j ,−1;r j
)
,
B ′j ,2 ← g
r j
2 ·
∏−1
i=0 g
σ′j ,i
2,λi
.
• Create a Hadamard product argument
(
π′j , π̂
′
j
)
for
(
B ′j , B̂
′
j
)
=
(
B ′j , B̂
′
j
)
◦
(
B ′j , B̂
′
j ,B
′
j ,2
)
.
4. For i ∈Z, let ci ←
∑−1
k=i Gkσk .
5. Set r ′0,r
′
1,r
′
2 ∈R Z∗p ,
(
B†, B̂†
)←Com1 (ĉrs1;G0σ0, . . . ,G−1σ−1;r ′0),(
C ,Ĉ ,C˜
)←Com1 (crs1;c ;r ′1),
and
(
Crot,Ĉrot,C˜rot
)←Com1 (crs1;c1, . . . ,c−2,c−1,c0;r ′2).
6. Create a Hadamard product argument
(
π×1 , π̂
×
1
)
for
(
B†, B̂†
) = 
(∏v−1j=0 (B ′j )G ′j ,∏v−1j=0 (B̂ ′j )G ′j ) ◦(
Com1 (ĉrs1;G0, . . . ,G−1;0) ,
∏−1
i=0 g
Gi
2,λi
)
.
7. Create Lipmaa permutation argument
(
A∗, Â∗,π×2 , π̂
×
2 ,π
rot
2 , π̂
rot
2
)
for
rot
((
C ,C˜
))= (Crot,Ĉrot,C˜rot).
8. Create a Hadamard product argument
(
π×3 , π̂
×
3
)
for
(
C/B†,Ĉ/B̂†
) =(
Crot,Ĉrot
)◦(Com1 (ĉrs1;1,1, . . . ,1,0;0) ,∏−2i=0 g2,λi ).
9. Create a Hadamard product argument
(
π×4 , π̂
×
4
)
for
(
Au−1c , Âu−1c
) =(
C ,Ĉ
)◦ (Com1 (ĉrs1;1,0, . . . ,0,0;0) ,g2,λ0).
10. Create an equality subargument πce5 that Ac commits to the same value
that
(
Ag , Af , Ah
)
encrypts, using the argument from Section 5.4.
11. Send to the veriﬁer the argument:
π←
((
B ′j , B̂
′
j ,B
′
j ,2,π
′
j , π̂
′
j
)
j∈Zv
,
(
B†, B̂†
)
,
(
C ,Ĉ ,C˜
)
,
(
Crot,Ĉrot,C˜rot
)
,(
π×1 , π̂
×
1
)
,
(
A∗, Â∗,π×2 , π̂
×
2 ,π
rot
2 , π̂
rot
2
)
,
(
π×3 , π̂
×
3
)
,
(
π×4 , π̂
×
4
)
,πce5 .
)
Protocol 5.2b – Argument of the non-interactive range proof protocol
for the range [0,H ]
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Veriﬁcation
(
crs; (pk, Ag , Af , Ah , Ac , Âc ),π
)
: The veriﬁer does the following:
1. For j ∈Zv :
(a) Check that e(B ′j ,g2)= e(g1,B ′j ,2) and e(B ′j , ĝ2)= e(B̂ ′j ,g2).
(b) Verify the Hadamard product argument (π′j , π̂
′
j )
for the corresponding inputs.
2. For K ∈ {Ac ,B†,C ,Crot}: check that e(K , ĝ2)= e(K̂ ,g2).
3. For K ∈ {C ,Crot}: check that e(K , g˜2)= e(K˜ ,g2).
4. Verify the Hadamard product arguments (π×1 , π̂
×
1 ), (π
×
3 , π̂
×
3 ), (π
×
4 , π̂
×
4 ), the
Lipmaa permutation argument (A∗, Â∗,π×2 , π̂
×
2 ,π
rot
2 , π̂
rot
2 ), and the equal-
ity subargument πce5 for the corresponding inputs.
Protocol 5.2c – Veriﬁcation of the non-interactive range proof protocol
for the range [0,H ]
Protocol explanation. The NIZK range proof of this section is detailed in Protocols 5.2a, 5.2b,
and 5.2c. Its basic idea is explained hereinafter. The common input for both parties is equal to
a lifted BBS encryption (Ag , Af , Ah) of σ, accompanied by a knowledge component Â such
that (A, Â) is at the same time a knowledge commitment to σ. In the setup of the protocol,
u > 1 has to be chosen according to the communication objectives. A short proof will impose
a large u and a large CRS. If the CRS needs to be small, which is obtained with a small u, this
will lead to a longer proof. After a u > 1 has been chosen, let  = (u, (u−1)H) be deﬁned
as in Section 4.4. According to Theorem 4.10, σ ∈ [0,H ] if and only if for Gi computed from
equations 4.6 and 4.7 one has (u−1)σ=∑−1i=0 Giσi for some σi ∈Zu . Thus, the ﬁrst step of the
prover is to decomposeσ intoσi . Then the prover shows by using parallel versions of the range
proof from [LAN02], that for i ∈Z, σi ∈Zu . Note that the range proof in [LAN02] is the binary
version of the sumset based range proof presented in Section 4.5. Showing thatσi ∈Zu is done
by writing σi as σi =∑v−1j=0 G ′jσ′j ,i , where v = ⌊log2(u−1)⌋, G ′j = ⌊(u−1+2 j )/2 j+1⌋, for some
σ′j ,i ∈ {0,1}. The latter results from the binary case of Theorem 4.10 and from Corollary 4.12.
Showing that σ′j ,i ∈ {0,1} is achieved by using a Hadamard product argument. This product
argument will be performed on commitments on (σ′j ,0, . . . ,σ
′
j ,−1) for j ∈ Zv . These last
commitments will be informally denoted B ′j .
The prover then commits to the vector c = (c0, . . . ,c−1), where c j =
∑−1
i= j Giσi , and shows that
the values c j are correctly computed by using a small constant number of Hadamard product
and Lipmaa permutation arguments. Moreover (and informally), the prover ﬁrst computes the
values c j in the forth step of the protocol, then he creates in the ﬁfth step, the commitments B†
on (G0σ0, . . . ,G−1σ−1), C on (c0, . . . ,c−1), and Crot on (c1, . . . ,c−1,c0). The sixth step of the
protocol uses a Hadamard product argument to show that B† has been correctly formed, from
G ′j and from the commitments B
′
j . The seventh step uses a permutation argument to show that
Crot is a correct rotation permutation by one element of C . Then, in the eighth step, the prover
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uses a Hadamard product argument to show that c j+1 = c j −Gjσ j , with c−1 =G−1σ−1. This
latter argument is obtained from the commitment on (c1, . . . ,c−1,0), which is derived from
Crot. It shows that:
(c1, . . . ,c−1,0)= (c0, . . . ,c−1)− (G0σ0, . . . ,G−1σ−1) .
Thus, the veriﬁer will be convinced that c j = ∑−1i= j Giσi . But then, by Theorem 4.10, c0 =∑−1
i=0 Giσi ∈ [0, (u−1)H ]. After this step, the prover shows, using a single Hadamard prod-
uct argument, that (Au−1c , Âu−1c ) commits to (c0,0, . . . ,0). This will imply that the secret σ
committed in (Ac , Âc ) is indeed in the range [0,H ]. The last required step links the secret σ
contained in the knowledge commitment (Ac , Âc ) to the lifted BBS encryption (Ag , Af , Ah) of
σwith randomizers (r f ,rh), where r = r f +rh . This last step is achieved with the subargument
explained in Section 5.4.
As in [Lip12a], in a few cases, instead of computing twodifferent commitmentsComt (ĉrst ;a;r )=
(g rt ·
∏
g ait ,λi , ĝ
r
t ·
∏
ĝ aitλi ) and Com
t (c˜rst ;a;r )= (g rt ·
∏
g ait ,λi , g˜
r
t ·
∏
g˜ ait ,λi ), the following composed
commitment is computed:
Comt (crst ;a;r )= (g rt ·
∏
g ait ,λi , ĝ
r
t
∏
ĝ ait ,λi , g˜
r
t ·
∏
g˜ ait ,λi ).
Theorem 5.2
Let u > 1. Let H = pol y(κ) and  = (u, (u − 1)H) be deﬁned as in Section 4.4. Let Λ =
{λi }i∈Z ⊂N be such that∀i < j : 0<λi <λ j . Let Λ̂ := {0}∪Λ∪2̂Λ, and Λ˜ as in Protocol 5.2a.
Let rot be a permutation fromZ toZ, where rot(i )= i −1 if i > 0, and rot(0)= −1. Deﬁne
Gi with equations 4.6 and 4.7. The argument detailed by Protocols 5.2a, 5.2b, and 5.2c, is
perfectly complete. If the asymmetric bilinear group generator PGa isΛ-PKE secure and DLIN
secure inG1, then the argument detailed by Protocols 5.2a, 5.2b, and 5.2c, is computationally
zero-knowledge. If PGa is Λ˜-PSDL secure and Λ-PKE secure in both G1 and G2, then the
argument detailed by Protocols 5.2a, 5.2b, and 5.2c, is computationally sound.
Proof
To show that the argument described by Protocols 5.2a, 5.2b, and 5.2c, is a NIZK argument,
three security properties are proven: perfect completeness, computational soundness, and
computational zero-knowledge.
PERFECT COMPLETENESS: Recall that in the case of the product arguments, the inputs of the
prover are (A, Â,B , B̂ ,B2,C ,Ĉ ). Within this proof, it is presumed that (B , B̂ ,B2) (assuming B2 is
correctly deﬁned, that is, e(B ,g2)= e(g1,B2)) commits to the same values as (B , B̂).
The pairing veriﬁcations (for example, that e(K , ĝ2) = e(K̂ ,g2)) hold by construction of the
protocol. Since (B ′j , B̂
′
j ) commits to (σ
′
j ,0, . . . ,σ
′
j ,−1) for binary σ
′
j ,i then the argument (π
′
j , π̂
′
j )
veriﬁes.
Note that
(∏v−1
j=0 (B
′
j )
G ′j ,
∏v−1
j=0 (B̂
′
j )
G ′j
)
commits to (σ0, . . . ,σ−1). Thus argument (π×1 , π̂
×
1 ) ver-
iﬁes. Since (Crot,Ĉrot) commits to a rotation of (C ,Ĉ ), then (A∗, Â∗,π×2 , π̂
×
2 ,π
rot
2 , π̂
rot
2 ) veriﬁes.
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Since (Crot,Ĉrot) commits to (c0, . . . ,c−1,0) and (C/B†,Ĉ/B̂†) commits to
(c0−G0σ0,c1−G1σ1, . . . ,c−1−G−1σ−1)= (c0, . . . ,c−1,0),
then (π×3 , π̂
×
3 ) veriﬁes. Finally, since (u−1)σ =
∑−1
i=0 Giσi and c0 =
∑−1
i=0 Giσi , then (π
×
4 , π̂
×
4 )
veriﬁes.
COMPUTATIONAL SOUNDNESS: letA be a non-uniform PPT adversary who creates a statement
(pk, Ag , Af , Ah , Ac , Âc ) and an accepting range proof π. By the DLIN assumption, the lifted
BBS cryptosystem is IND-CPA secure, and thus the adversary obtains no information from
(Ag , Af , Ah). By the Λ-PKE assumption, there exists a non-uniform PPT extractor XA that,
running on the same inputs and seeingA ’s random tape, extracts the following openings:(
Ac , Âc
)= (g r˜1gσ1,λ0 , ĝ r˜1 ĝσ1,λ0) ,(
B ′j , B̂
′
j
)
=Com1
(
ĉrs1;b
′
j ;r j
)
for j ∈Zv ,(
B†, B̂†
)
=Com1
(
ĉrs1;b
†;r ′0
)
,(
C , Ĉ
)=Com1 (ĉrs1;c ;r ′1) ,(
Crot, Ĉrot
)=Com1 (ĉrs1;crot;r ′2) ,(
π×1 , π̂
×
1
)= (∏
s∈Λ̂
g
f ′(×1,s)
2,s ,
∏
s∈Λ̂
ĝ
f ′(×1,s)
2,s
)
,
(
A∗, Â∗
)=Com1 (ĉrs1;a∗;ra∗) ,(
π×2 , π̂
×
2
)= (∏
s∈Λ̂
g
f ′(×2,s)
2,s ,
∏
s∈Λ̂
ĝ
f ′(×2,s)
2,s
)
,
(
πrot2 , π̂
rot
2
)= (∏
s∈Λ˜
g
f ′(rot2,s)
2,s ,
∏
s∈Λ˜
g˜
f ′(rot2,s)
2,s
)
,
(
π×3 , π̂
×
3
)= (∏
s∈Λ̂
g
f ′(×3,s)
2,s ,
∏
s∈Λ̂
ĝ
f ′(×3,s)
2,s
)
, and
(
π×4 , π̂
×
4
)= (∏
s∈Λ̂
g
f ′(×4,s)
2,s ,
∏
s∈Λ̂
ĝ
f ′(×4,s)
2,s
)
.
The extractor XA will also create the openings that correspond to πce5 . Since the Λ˜-PSDL
assumption is supposed to hold, all the following is true. In the contrary (in the case that it is
not true), one can efﬁciently test it, and thus break the PSDL assumption.
Since e(B ′j ,g2) = e(g1,B ′j ,2) for j ∈Zv , then (B ′j , B̂ ′j ,Bj ,2) commits to b′j . Therefore, due to
the Λ̂-PSDL assumption, Theorem 2.3, the fact that the adversary knows the openings of((
B ′j , B̂
′
j
)
,
(
π′j , π̂
′
j
))
, and since (π′j , π̂
′
j ) veriﬁes, then σ
′
j ,i ∈ {0,1} for all j ∈Zv and i ∈Z.
Thus, by Theorem 4.10, b = (σ0, . . . , σ−1) := (
∑v−1
j=0 G
′
jσ
′
j ,0, . . . ,
∑v−1
j=0 G
′
jσ
′
j ,n) ∈Zu , and thus
(
∏v−1
j=0 (B
′
j )
G ′j ,
∏v−1
j=0 (B̂
′
j )
G ′j ) commits to b with σi ∈Zu .
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Due to the Λ̂-PSDL assumption, Theorem 2.3, the fact that the adversary knows the openings
of
((
B ′j , B̂
′
j
)
,
(
B†, B̂†
)
,
(
π×1 , π̂
×
1
))
, and since
(
π×1 , π̂
×
1
)
veriﬁes, then σ†i =Giσi .
Due to the Λ˜-PSDL assumption, Theorem 2.3, Theorem 2.5, the fact that the adversary knows
the openings of
((
C ,C˜
)
,
(
Crot,Ĉrot
)
,
(
A∗, Â∗,π×2 , π̂
×
2 ,π
rot
2 , π̂
rot
2
))
, and since(
A∗, Â∗,π×2 , π̂
×
2 ,π
rot
2 , π̂
rot
2
)
veriﬁes, then crot,−1 = c0 and crot,i−1 = ci for −1
 i 
 1.
Due to the Λ̂-PSDL assumption,Theorem 2.3, the fact that the adversary knows the openings
of
((
Crot,Ĉrot
)
,
(
C ,Ĉ
)
,
(
B†, B̂†
)
,
(
π×3 , π̂
×
3
))
, and since
(
π×3 , π̂
×
3
)
veriﬁes, then c−1−G−1σ−1 =
crot,−1 = 0 and ci −Giσi = crot,i = ci+1 for −1 > i 
 0. Therefore, c−1 =G−1σ−1, c−2 =
G−2σ−2 +G−1σ−1, and by induction ci =
∑−1
j=i G jσ j for i ∈ Z. This implies that c0 =∑−1
i=0 Giσi for σi ∈Zu .
Due to the Λ̂-PSDL assumption, Theorem2.3, the fact that the adversary knows the openings of((
C ,Ĉ
)
,
(
Ac , Âc
)
,
(
π×4 , π̂
×
4
))
, and since
(
π×4 , π̂
×
4
)
veriﬁes, then
(
Ac , Âc
)= (g r˜1gσ1,λ0 , ĝ r˜1 ĝσ1,λ0) com-
mits to (σ, 0, . . . , 0) such that (u−1)σ=∑−1i=0 Giσi forσi ∈Zu , and therefore by Theorem 4.10,
σ ∈ [0,H ].
Due to the {λ0}-PSDL assumption and since πce5 veriﬁes, then
(
Ag , Af , Ah
)
encrypts σ ∈ [0,H ].
COMPUTATIONAL ZERO-KNOWLEDGE: to prove computational zero-knowledge, the follow-
ing simulator Sim = (Sim1,Sim2) is constructed. Firstly, Sim1 creates a correctly formed
common reference string together with a simulation trapdoor td= (α̂, α˜,αg ,α f ,αh ,αg/c ,x).
After that, the prover creates a statement input r˜ := (pk, Ag , Af , Ah , Ac , Âc) and sends it to the
simulator Sim. Secondly, Sim2
(
crs; input r˜ ;td
)
uses a knowledge extractor to extract (a, r˜ )
from the random coins of the prover and
(
Ac , Âc
)
. The goal of the simulator Sim is to simulate
the argument of an honest prover. Therefore, the statement input r˜ is considered to have been
generated by an honest prover. This implies that a = (σ, 0, . . . , 0) with σ ∈ [0,H ]. Thus, using
the fact that the knowledge commitment scheme is also trapdoor, the simulator computes
r ′′ ←σxλ0 + r˜ , which implies the equality Ac = g r ′′1 . Since both r˜ and r ′′ are uniformly random,
r ′′ does not leak any information on the input of the prover. Thereafter, the simulator creates
all commitments
(
B ′j , B̂
′
j ,B
′
j ,2
)
j∈Zv
,
(
B†, B̂†
)
,
(
C ,Ĉ ,C˜
)
, and
(
Crot,Ĉrot,C˜rot
)
as in the argument,
but replacing a with 0 and r˜ with r ′′. Therefore, all of the aforementioned commitments just
commit to 0. Thus, the simulator can simulate all product and permutation arguments, the
equality subargument of Section 5.4, and form the general simulated argument πsim . Clearly,
this simulated argument πsim is perfectly indistinguishable from the real argument π.
Note that the use of a cryptosystem makes achieving perfect zero-knowledge impossible.
Furthermore, (Ac , Âc ) is provided by the prover and not generated during the argument. To
achieve zero-knowledge, one must be able to open (Ac , Â) having been given only the CRS
trapdoor. That is, one has to use an extractable commitment scheme [Cre02, ACP09]. It is easy
to see that the knowledge commitment scheme is extractable, however, extractability is only
achieved under the PKE assumption.
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Theorem 5.3
Let u > 1. Let Λ be deﬁned as in Theorem 2.1 and let  = (u, (u − 1)H) 	 1− logu 2+
logu ((u−1)H − (u−2))	
⌈
logu (H)
⌉
, where (·, ·) is deﬁned as in Section 4.4.
Let v =
⌊
log2(u−1)
⌋
. Assume that the Hadamard product argument from Section 2.4.7 and
the Lipmaa permutation argument from Section 2.4.8 are used. The range proof described
with Protocols 5.2a, 5.2b, and 5.2c, has a common reference string of length 1+o(1) elements,
a communication complexity of 2v +21 elements fromG1 and 3v +14 elements fromG2.
The computational complexity of its prover is dominated by Θ(2v ) scalar multiplications
in Zp and v ·1+o(1) exponentiations (inG1 orG2). The computational complexity of its
veriﬁer is dominated by 9v +72 pairings.
Proof
TheCRS is composed of: the parameters of the asymmetric bilinear groups
(
parambp
)
, (9+3 |Λ|)
group elements inG1, and
(
10+ ∣∣Λ̂∣∣+2 ∣∣Λ˜∣∣) group elements inG2. As the following hold,
|Λ| = ,∣∣Λ̂∣∣= 1++(−1)
= 2+1,∣∣Λ˜∣∣	 +2+(−1)+2(−1)
	 3−2,
the CRS length is composed of:
(
parambp
)
, (9+3) group elements in G1, and less than(
23−2+11) group elements inG2. Therefore, the CRS length is 1+o(1) elements.
The communication complexity is composed of:
• v tuples (B ′j , Bˆ
′
j ,B
′
j2,π
′
j , π̂
′
j ),
where each tuple has 2 elements ofG1 and 3 elements ofG2,
• 8 extra elements fromG1,
• 3 Hadamard product arguments, where each argument has 2 elements fromG2,
• the permutation argument, which has 2 elements fromG1 and 4 elements fromG2,
• and the equality subargument πce ,
which has 11 elements fromG1 and 4 elements fromG2.
Thus, in total, the communication complexity is of 2v +8+2+11= 2v +21 elements from
G1 and 3v +3 ·2+4+4= 3v +14 elements fromG2.
The computational complexity of the prover is dominated by v +3 Hadamard product ar-
guments (Θ(2) scalar multiplications inZp and 1+o(1) exponentiations in bilinear groups
each), by the permutation argument (Θ(2) scalar additions in Zp and 1+o(1) exponentia-
tions in bilinear groups), and by the equality subargument (13 exponentiations inG1 and 8
exponentiations inG2). In total, the computational complexity of the prover is thus domi-
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nated by Θ(2 ·v )=Θ(2 · logu) scalar multiplications in Zp and v ·1+o(1) = 1+o(1) · logu
exponentiations in bilinear groups.
The computational complexity of the veriﬁer is dominated by verifying v + 3 Hadamard
product arguments (5 pairings each), the permutation argument (12 pairings), and the equality
subargument πce (33 pairings). In addition, the veriﬁer performs 4v +4 ·2+2 ·2= 4v +12
pairings. The total number of pairings is thus 9v +72.
The communication complexity is minimized when v (and thus u) is as small as possible, that
is, u = 2. Then v =
⌊
log2 1
⌋= 0. In this case the communication consists of 21 elements from
G1 and 14 elements fromG2. The same choice u = 2 is also optimal for the computational
complexity of the veriﬁer (72 pairings). As noted before in Section 5.4, at the security level of
2128, elements ofG1 can be represented in 256 bits, and elements ofG2 in 512 bits. Thus, at
this security level, if u = 2 then the communication is 21 ·256+14 ·512= 12544 bits. Therefore,
the communication complexity is even smaller than that of positivity testing based arguments
like [Bou00, Lip03, Gro05, Sce09].
The optimal computational complexity for the prover is achieved when the number of ex-
ponentiations, 1+o(1) ·v = (logu H)1+o(1) ·
⌊
log2(u−1)
⌋
, is minimized. This happens when
u =H . The computation of the prover is then dominated by Θ(logH) scalar multiplications
and exponentiations. Moreover, in this case the CRS length 1+o(1) is constant.
Finally,the summatory length of the CRS and the communication may be required to be
minimal, that is, 1+o(1)+Θ(v ). Considering  	 logu H and v 	 log2u, the sum becomes
(logu H)
1+o(1)+Θ(logu). This sum can be approximately minimized by choosing u = 2

logH .
Then the summatory length becomes
(
logH
)1/2+o(1). In this case, it would make sense to
change the role of groupsG1 andG2 to get better efﬁciency. The efﬁciency of the lifted BBS
encryption based non-interactive range proof (Protocols 5.2a, 5.2b, and 5.2c) in all three cases,
is given in Figure 5.1.
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Chapter 6
Machine Readable Travel Documents
In this chapter, which is with minor revisions based on sections of [CV09] and [Cha13], the
Machine Readable Travel Document (MRTD) standard evolution is surveyed and the remain-
ing problems explained. The next chapter will propose directions and solutions for the next
upgrades in order to suppress these problems. In Section 6.2 an overview will be provided
of prior and related work. Section 6.3 will then explain and give the drawbacks of the Radio
Frequency IDentiﬁcation (RFID). The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) stan-
dard will be explained in Section 6.4, and the Extended Access Control (EAC) version 1 (EACv1)
and version 2 (EACv2) respectively in Sections 6.5 and 6.6. Conclusions will be provided in
Section 6.7.
6.1 Introduction
Since 2004, a majority of countries have adopted the ICAO standard [ICAO04a, ICAO04b] for
Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTDs). Among other things, this standard speciﬁes
how to store and use biometrics in passports in order to have more secure identiﬁcation of the
holder. Since it is based on the RFID technology [ISO10a], an access control is necessary for
privacy protection. The optional one proposed in the ICAO standard is based on symmetric-
key cryptography with a key printed on the passport. It is called Basic Access Control (BAC),
offers very little privacy protection, and is the only mechanism which can be used to protect
mandatory data groups (DGs) containing the identiﬁers of holders.
In response to the initial weak standard for MRTDs produced by the ICAO, the European
Union has mandated the Federal Ofﬁce for Information Security (BSI) to provide and main-
tain a stronger standard for MRTDs. In that regard, the BSI has issued the Extended Access
Control (EAC) which provides a stronger privacy protection for MRTDs. Its ﬁrst initial release,
EACv1 [BSI06], was made in 2006 to have a reasonably secure privacy protection for other data
groups. It is based on public-key cryptography and requires a public key infrastructure to be
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deployed for readers. Since passports are not online, they cannot receive certiﬁcate revocation
lists. Thus, revocation can only be based on expiration dates. Unfortunately, passports do not
have a clock, so they can only compare the validity period with the latest accepted certiﬁcate
date. EACv1 protects against cloning but only where it is being used in a country with the
ability to read EAC compatible MRTDs. Although not mandatory, countries with the ability
to read EACv1 compatible MRTDs but being unauthorized to pass terminal authentication,
could use privacy-enhanced protocols.
The second and latest version EACv2 [BSI15a, BSI15b, BSI15c, BSI15d] was introduced in
2009 and corrected in 2012 and in 2015. EACv2 makes sure that passports are only read by
authorized terminals, which puts an end to the cloning issue. Indeed, EACv2 goes further by
protecting access to ICAO-mandatory data groups, even for countries unauthorized to read
other data groups. It was believed that with the introduction of EACv2 in 2009, the majority
of threats were solved. Unfortunately, ICAO-mandatory data groups must be readable by
countries not implementing EAC so this protocol is likely to be bypassed for interoperability
reasons. Furthermore, several ﬂaws and threats remain. The major ﬂaw that can be pointed
out is the absence of a good terminal revocation. The other issues are now consideredmarginal
as they are or will gradually be solved with the evolution of previous standards (notably the one
from the ICAO [ICAO08, ICAO13]). However, no progress has been made regarding terminal
revocation nor with regard to terminal authentication.
6.2 Prior and Related work
A substantial amount of work has already been achieved on MRTDs. Juels, Molnar, and Wagner
[JMW05] presented one of the ﬁrst (if not the ﬁrst) security analysis on e-passports in 2005.
They identiﬁed several ﬂaws in the ICAO standard, namely clandestine scanning, clandestine
tracking, skimming then cloning, eavesdropping, biometric data-leakage, and weaknesses in
the cryptographic setups of the ICAO standard. Kc and Karger [KK05] presented their research
on similar tracks in 2005 and introduced some other attacks, namely the “splicing” attack
and the “fake ﬁnger” attack. In 2006, Kosmerlj et al. [KFHS06] studied the weakness of facial
recognition. Hoepman et al. [HHJ+06] focused in 2006 on passive attacks against the Basic
Access Control (BAC) and provided some thoughts on biometrics. They showed that the
entropy of the symmetric key used between the reader and the MRTD is less than 80 bits,
and can easily be guessed. Regardless of the knowledge of this secret key, they also explained
how a MRTD can be traced back to individuals or groups in the classical case of skimming.
Hancke [Han06] and Carluccio et al. [CLRPS06] reported experimental attacks against BAC in
2006. Hancke showed a practical eavesdropping together with a relay attack, and Carluccio
et al. emphasized the traceability issue of MRTDs. Liu et al. [LKLRP07] explained how to
make a passive decryption attack. In 2009, Danev, Heydt-Benjamin, and Cˇapkun [DHBC09]
demonstrated how to identify individual MRTDs through the physical-layer of RFID tags. They
explained that this fact can help in the determination of cloned passports whilst on the other
hand suppressing location privacy.
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In 2007, Hlavácˇ and Rosa [HR07] studied the case of Active Authentication (AA) and presented
a man-in-the-middle cloning attack against AA. AA is also subject to a challenge semantics
attack as shown in [BSI08a] and explained in section 6.4.
In 2006, Lehtonen et al. [LMSF06] proposed a potential solution for MRTDs. As a necessary
optical contact has to be achieved between a reader and the MRTD to retrieve the MRZinfo,
they proposed to combine an optical memory device with the actual RFID chip. This would
enable the establishment of a secure channel, as a line of sight is necessary. Eavesdropping
and skimming will therefore no longer be possible. Herrigel and Zhao [HZ06] proposed to
use a digital watermarking technique to increase the seed entropy, which would be readable
by optical scanning. However the main disadvantage of these two papers is that a hardware
improvement needs to be performed on passports.
Vaudenay and Vuagnoux [VV07] presented a survey on existing protocols for MRTD and their
corresponding weaknesses in 2007, namely the ICAO standards (BAC and AA) and the EU
standard (EAC). In the same year, Monnerat, Vaudenay, and Vuagnoux [MVV07] focused on the
privacy concerns attached to the release of the passport Security Object Document (SOD). The
latter leaks the hash of protected data groups and evidence on private data (see also [Vau07]).
In 2007, Lekkas and Gritzalis [LG07] worked on the possibility of using the ICAO standard in
order to build a globally interoperable Public Key Infrastructure. However they drew negative
conclusions due to several issues such as the lack of a passport revocation mechanism. In 2008,
Pasupathinathan, Pieprzyk, and Wang [PPW08a, PPW08b, PPW08c] achieved a formal security
analysis on the Australian e-passport and identiﬁed several ﬂaws in EACv1, after which they
proposed an enhanced version called OSEP. They introduced the need to execute terminal
authentication before chip authentication. In 2008, Abid and Aﬁﬁ [AA08] incorporated the use
of elliptic curves in OSEP.
All of these studies pushed the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), in
charge of the EAC standardization, to present a new version (EACv2) in October 2008 [BSI08b].
Nithyanand [Nit09] released the ﬁrst survey on EACv2 in 2009. It claimed that EACv2 solved
all of the previous problems except one vulnerability. It is possible to use a reader with an
expired certiﬁcate to read passports whose internal date is outdated. Unfortunately, this is not
the only problem left within EACv2. The current version of EAC is Version 2.20 published in
February 2015. It is split into four parts [BSI15a, BSI15b, BSI15c, BSI15d] and contains several
minor changes compared to the 2.0 version released in 2008 [BSI08b].
6.3 ISO Standard for RFID
In order to discover the RFID tags in proximity, according to the ISO standard for RFID
[ISO10a], readers send a discovery signal. Any RFID tag receiving this signal will reply with
a speciﬁc identiﬁer in order to allow readers to enter in communication with them. For
regular RFID tags, this identiﬁer is constant to enable an easy way to track chips. However
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this property is not always desirable for tags, especially when location privacy needs to be
protected. This is the case for MRTDs. The solution proposed by the ISO standard is to
use a session-dependent randomly generated identiﬁer. This solution has been adopted by
almost all countries. Unfortunately, there are discrepancies in the way it is implemented
[MVV07]. There are other protocol implementation differences such as availability of optional
features, lower layer protocols, and speed of transmission, which allow for the identiﬁcation
of a passport nationality [VV07].
It is a well known fact that privacy must be addressed accross all protocol layers [AO05]. As a
matter of fact, recent work byDanev et al. [DHBC09] shows that any RFID tag can be accurately
identiﬁed according to its physical-layer communication properties, namely by some kind
of radio ﬁngerprint. Although their work uses this property to enable cloning detection, the
straightforward drawback is the tag tracking feature.
Furthermore, the distance to eavesdrop or to interact with RFID tags is highly underestimated.
According to an announcement by the Swiss Federal Ofﬁce of Communication (OFCOM)
[BK08] inNovember 2008, and even though currently commercialized readers can interact only
within a few centimeters, it would be possible to access MRTD from far away (up to 25 meters)
by changing readers antenna. In addition, it was announced that radio communication
between a legitimate reader and a passport induce a signal on the power line that can be
captured 500 meters away.
6.4 ICAO Standard and BAC
Following the ICAO standard, passports must provide passive authentication for two manda-
tory data groups (DGs):
• Data group DG1 is a digital copy of the printed Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) which
includes some basic information about the holder: name, nationality, gender, date of
birth, as well as passport serial number and expiration date.
• Data Group DG2 is a digital picture of the face which is optimized for automatic face
recognition.
Passive authentication is performed by means of the Security Object of the Document (SOD),
which is essentially a digital signature on the list of the hash of data groups together with the
certiﬁcate of the verifying key. This certiﬁcate is computed by the issuing country and the root
verifying key of the PKI is assumed to be authenticated by special protocols. Following the
state of the art in cryptography, digital signatures are unforgeable and identities can no longer
be forged maliciously.
Biometric identiﬁcation is mostly performed by 2D facial recognition, and soon will be by
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ﬁngerprint as well. It could use iris recognition but this technology does not appear to be
implemented yet. Nevertheless, 2D-facial recognition is fairly weak and ﬁngerprints could be
faked. Fake ﬁngerprints can be made using candy [Mat02] or medecine against constipation
[BT09].
Passports could limit themselves to providing DG1, DG2, and SOD in a passive way. Indeed,
they could be printed using a 2D barcode or a Quick Response (QR) Code, but ICAO preferred
RFID-based technology in order to accommodate more data and functionalities in the future.
Radio access then opened the way to privacy threats, forcing passports to be secured with
some access control.
The ICAO standard includes an optional Basic Access Control (BAC), based on 3DES [ISO10b],
which essentially consists of making the reader prove that it knows a piece of information on
the printed MRZ. This information called MRZinfo consists of the passport serial number,
the date of birth of the person, and the expiration date of the passport. That is, BAC uses
symmetric-key cryptography with an access key which is printed on the passport. Further-
more, MRZinfo has a low entropy (roughly 56 bits as explained in [ICAO06]). BAC is currently
implemented in almost every passport, as the ICAO standard has been internationally im-
posed.
The BAC protocol is followed by some key agreement to open secure messaging. Again, it is all
based on symmetric cryptography with a low-entropy initial key (the MRZinfo), so it does not
resist passive adversaries.
The ICAO standard also includes an optional Active Authentication (AA) protocol which is
based on a digital signature scheme. The MRTD authenticates itself by signing with its private
key, a presumably random challenge from the reader. As this private key is securely stored and
used in the chip of the MRTD, AA protects against cloning attacks but is time-consuming for
the powerless chip. The AA protocol is currently implemented and used in Belgium and the
Czech Republic. Unfortunately, AA is not secure against man-in-the-middle attacks [HR07]
and leads to privacy concerns by adding the threat of challenge semantics [BSI09a]. A challenge
semantics attack happens in the case where the reader chooses an unpredictable veriﬁable
challenge, such as a signature of its location, date, and time. As the signature provided by
the MRTD is transferable, it will attest to anyone trusting the reader that the MRTD was at a
speciﬁc location, date, and time.
There are two clear advantages to the ICAO passports: the identities are unforgeable, and
access to the chip requires knowing MRZinfo. Unfortunately, the drawbacks are many. First
of all, the cryptographic protocols used do not resist passive adversaries. Since AA is seldom
used, the ICAO standard does not resist cloning attacks. Furthermore, MRZinfo grants an
unlimited permanent access: once the adversary obtains it, he can access the chip without the
consent of the holder. Contrarily to popular belief, the release of DG2 and SOD is not privacy
insensitive. Releasing DG2 means releasing an optimized picture which is used as a reference
template for biometric recognition. Once an adversary obtains it, he can train himself to
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match the template. Releasing DG2 can therefore ease identity theft. Furthermore, some
countries, such as Switzerland, have put in place a national database storing all biometrics
of their citizens. If the database gets compromised, identity theft will be even easier as the
adversary will simply run a search on the closest match present in the database (excluding
himself). Hence the assumption 2.3 in section IV of [ICAO06] is wrong.
“The digitally stored image of the face is assumed not to be privacy-sensitive
information. The face of the MRTD holder is also printed in the MRTD and can be
readily perceived.”
In addition, releasing SOD means providing transferable evidence of the correctness of the
identity. For instance, it could be used as an undeniable identity proof against whistle blowers,
which would compromise their safety if they need to remain anonymous.
6.5 EAC v1
The European EAC standard [BSI06, BSI08a] was made to add better protection for non-
mandatory data groups such as DG3: the ﬁngerprint template. It includes:
• secure messaging based on Elliptic Curve Difﬁe-Hellman [CR00];
• a chip authentication protocol, protecting against cloning attacks; and
• a terminal authentication protocol.
Terminal authentication is meant to be mandatory for accessing non-mandatory data groups,
but mandatory data groups must remain readable without EAC due to the ICAO standard
interoperability.
In the terminal authentication protocol, the reader proves that he owns the secret key as-
sociated to a given public key. Typically, this proof consists of signing a challenge from the
passport. The public key has a certiﬁcate chain whose root belongs to the home country of
the passport. That is, authorization is given to readers by signing a certiﬁcate with a given
validity period. The problem with this method is that passports do not have any reliable clock.
They keep a trusted past date in memory, which plays the role of a clock. When they check the
validity of a certiﬁcate, they only check that the expiration date is posterior to the clock value.
If veriﬁcation succeeds and the issuing date of the certiﬁcate is posterior to the clock value,
the clock value is updated. Clearly, passports which do not run terminal authentication often,
will not even have a reliable approximation of the current date. Others may have a date which
is accurate within a range of a few weeks. Consequently, a terminal certiﬁcate may be usable a
long time after expiration.
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The details of the general PKI required to authenticate readers will be given in the following
section.
The advantage of EAC compared to ICAO, is the introduction of anti-cloning protection, a
better key agreement resisting passive adversaries, and that readers are given time-limited
privileges. One of the remaining problems is that revocation is based on a weak clock. Privacy
issues relating to the release of DG2 and SOD to everyone remain. The hash of protected data
groups also leaks from the SOD [BSI09a].
6.6 EACv2
EACv2 was initially released in 2008. The latest update was provided in the BSI TR-03110
Technical Guideline [BSI15a, BSI15b, BSI15c, BSI15d]. It was released in February 2015 as
version 2.2. It speciﬁes the mutual authentication between terminal readers and all kinds of
MRTDs, including biometric passports.
The aim of EACv2, with its mutual authentication, is threefold. It ﬁrst of all allows authorities
to verify that a MRTD is genuine. It also allows authenticated terminals to access sensitive
data contained in the MRTDs, such as ﬁngerprints. Lastly, it provides a secure channel
between the MRTD and the terminal. This authentication process relies on an international
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), described in [BSI09b] and in the EACv2 standard [BSI15c].
This PKI is mainly composed of three entity types : Country Verifying Certiﬁcate Authorities
(CVCAs), Document Veriﬁers (DVs), and terminals. Each participating country will possess a
national CVCA that will act as a national root authority. The national CVCA will be in charge
of issuing national MRTDs and DVs certiﬁcates (especially foreign DVs certiﬁcates). DVs are
organizational units within countries, in charge of managing a group of terminals, notably
by issuing their certiﬁcates. Their role is to enable the certiﬁcation link between its terminal
readers and CVCAs. Hence they need to apply for a DV certiﬁcate at each CVCAs corresponding
to the country of MRTD that might be encountered by its terminals. DVs are also in charge of
creating and maintaining terminal certiﬁcates for each terminal location. The validity period
and the access rights of the terminal certiﬁcate are inherited from the DV certiﬁcate. Obviously,
these authorizations can be further reduced by a decision of the DV in charge of the terminal.
In the same way, the validity period and the access rights contained in the DV certiﬁcate is
decided by the CVCA issuing the certiﬁcate.
The access rights for all data groups are encoded in binary in each certiﬁcate, as an object
identiﬁer. These rights are set according to the role of the certiﬁcate holder (inspection
systems, authentication terminals or signature terminals). A member in the certiﬁcate chain
cannot provide more access rights than it has itself. Thus, to determine the access rights of a
particular reader, the MRTD has to compute the boolean AND of all the binary authorizations
contained in the certiﬁcate chain.
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Furthermore, two types of terminals can be distinguished: integrated terminals and dis-
tributed terminals. An integrated terminal is a unique hardware device including a single
reader. A distributed terminal is composed of a terminal control center, several readers, and a
permanent, secure online channel between all readers and the terminal control center.
The EACv2 general authentication procedure is composed of four steps in the following order:
Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE), Terminal Authentication, Passive
Authentication, and Chip Authentication. PACE is a Difﬁe-Hellman key agreement protocol
based solely on a shared password. This password is either known by the MRTD bearer, or is
directly printed on the MRTD. The goal of PACE is twofold: on one hand it provides a password
based mutual authentication, and on the other hand it arranges a secure messaging channel
with ephemeral symmetric sessions keys, one for encryption and another one for the Message
Authentication Code (MAC).MACs are codes that help attest the authenticity ofmessages, even
when sent over an insecure channel (see Section 2.2.3). Nevertheless, PACE yields a secure
authenticated key agreement as proven by Bender, Fischlin, and Kügler in [BFK09]. Once PACE
has succeeded, the MRTD is ensured that the terminal has knowledge of the shared password
and thus gives access to its less-sensitive data. Moreover, all further communications are
protected against eavesdroppers as secure messaging is put in place. However, an adversary
with knowledge of the shared password, obtained either by guessing or by social engineering,
will be able to mount a man-in-the-middle attack.
Terminal Authentication is then performed as the second step of the EACv2. Regarding termi-
nal authentication and terminal revocation, no progress was made between version 2.01 in
2009 and the current version 2.20 of the EAC standard of 2015. Detailed explanations about
them will be provided below. After the terminal has been authenticated, Passive Authenti-
cation enables terminals to conﬁrm that a MRTD has not been altered. This step does not
protect against cloning attacks. In order to achieve cloning protection, Chip Authentication is
performed. This last step insures that the MRTD is genuine.
6.6.1 Terminal Authentication
A complete description of the terminal authentication can be found in Section 3.3 of [BSI15b].
It is essentially composed of three major phases. First, the terminal sends a certiﬁcate chain
starting from the CVCA certiﬁcate corresponding to the MRTD country. The chain ends with
the certiﬁcate of the terminal itself. In the second phase, the MRTD checks the certiﬁcates
contained in the certiﬁcate chain with a Certiﬁcate Validation process (section 2.5 of [BSI15c]).
The third phase consists of setting up an authenticated ephemeral Difﬁe-Hellman key pair for
the terminal. The resulting ephemeral public key will then be used to secure messages from
the MRTD to the terminal.
If the terminal authentication succeeds, the MRTD will grant access rights to its sensitive
data, according to the terminal effective authorization. The terminal effective authorization is
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derived from the certiﬁcate chain as the smallest authorization set present in all certiﬁcates of
the certiﬁcate chain.
6.6.2 Terminal Revocation
The terminal revocation status is checked during the terminal Certiﬁcate Validation (section
2.5 of [BSI15c]). Surprisingly enough, the revocation process is performed only with the
expiration date contained in the certiﬁcate and with a “Current Date” approximation stored
in the MRTD. The major problem, as expressed in [CV09], is that MRTDs do not have a
reliable clock. This is why they try to approximate the current date. Unfortunately, due to the
requirements for this approximation, the “Current Date” could be outdated by as much as a
month. Indeed, this update is executed solely with the date of certiﬁcate creation, contained
in a certiﬁcate issued by the same country as the MRTD. Note that there is no passport control
within the Schengen zone. For departures from the Schengen zone, an identity control will be
required only at the last Schengen airport before a non-Schengen country. More information
can be found in [Eur06]. As it is quite rare for a MRTD to encounter a terminal of its own
country, the update will be executed with the date of certiﬁcate creation contained in foreign
DV certiﬁcates. These are issued by the same country as the MRTD one.
Hence, a stolen terminal can still be used for a long period of time, even if its expiration date
has passed. This is an important threat that must not be neglected. Without a proper terminal
revocation scheme, a stolen terminal could be set up to use solely EACv1 without PACE, and
thus be used to detect and target individuals or a speciﬁc group of persons, while the attacker
is absent from the crime scene. Even in the case where EACv2 with PACE has to be used, if the
shared password is compromised, then all sensitive data will be accessed after completion of
the terminal authentication.
Oliver Bausinger from BSI claimed during the BIOSIG 2013 conference, that this issue is
solved with distributed terminals and only integrated terminals remain vulnerable. Indeed,
Section 1.2.1 of [BSI09b] mentions the following regarding integrated terminals:
“The disadvantage of this architecture is, that a stolen reader can be used to
perform Terminal Authentication at least as long as the current CV certiﬁcate is
valid.”
Moreover, Section 1.2.2.1 of [BSI09b] contains the same argument regarding distributed
terminals, as that of Oliver Bausinger :
“The advantage of this architecture is, that a stolen reader cannot be used for
Terminal Authentication. Therefore each reader can be operated easily in an
insecure environment.”
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Unfortunately the solution provided by distributed terminals introduces a single point of
failure with the dedicated online terminal control center. As soon as this server fails, the entire
terminal authentication procedure is stalled for all readers. The permanent online channel
required for them is also a potential target for attackers. In highly visited border controls,
this can become a major drawback or even a potential threat. An attacker only needs to jam
communication between readers and the terminal control center in order to paralyze an entire
border control.
6.7 Conclusion
Putting aside the weak ICAO standard, EACv2 resolves one of the issue of EACv1, namely the
privacy issue linked to releasing DG1, DG2, and SOD. The main difference introduced by this
version is in the order of authentication between a chip and the terminal that is attempting to
read it. In this new speciﬁcation, the terminal authentication must be performed before the
chip authentication. EACv2 even introduces a replacement for BAC, named PACE. PACE is a
state-of-the-art password-based access control resisting active attacks. Another improvement
is that the access password for PACE is now a speciﬁc secret printed inside the passport and
no longer private data which has other purposes such as the MRZinfo.
This modiﬁcation could be considered, at ﬁrst glance, a major improvement. Indeed, by
forcing authentication of the terminal before the chip authentication, the release of DG2 and
SOD is restricted to ofﬁcially allowed terminals only. However, this is not the case in the full
view of the speciﬁcations. A careful read of the speciﬁcations of the EACv2 in [BSI15a] reveals
the following in a footnote of section 2.4.1:
“For an ICAO-compliant ePassport application the MRTD chip MUST grant access
to all less-sensitive data (e.g. DG1, DG2, DG15, etc. and the Document Security
Object).”
What this note states is that if compatibility with ICAO is required, then the MRTD must
behave as in the ICAO standard. In other words, any fake terminal reader can require the
MRTD to use the crippled ICAO standard.
Furthermore, the date contained in the MRTD is still an approximation of the current date.
The date is updated only with national domestic certiﬁed dates, by means of certiﬁcate effective
dates (date of the certiﬁcate generation), contained in a national domestic CVCA certiﬁcate, a
DV authorization certiﬁcate issued by the national domestic CVCA, or an accurate terminal
certiﬁcate. The latter is a terminal certiﬁcate issued by an ofﬁcial domestic DV. As a MRTD will
rarely encounter a domestic terminal, it is more likely that its date will be updated through the
certiﬁcate effective date contained in a foreign DV. Hence the revocation of terminals is far
from being solved with the current EACv2 standard.
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Enhancing the EAC
This chapter, which is based on a revised version of [CV09], and on an extension of [Cha13],
proposes several enhancements and solutions for the next EAC upgrades. Section 7.2 em-
phasizes the prior attempts to solve the issues associated with EACv2. Section 7.3 proposes
a light hardware modiﬁcation for new passports. Section 7.4 discusses an ICAO standard
improvement that consists of replacing its Basic Access Control (BAC) with the Password
Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) of EACv2. In the event that no hardware
modiﬁcation will be tolerated, Section 7.5 suggests to increase domestic controls in order
to improve the time-based revocation of terminals. Furthermore, Section 7.6 presents a full
solution for terminal revocation, which limits itself to a software upgrade.
7.1 Introduction
Two types of threat are studied in this chapter. The ﬁrst one is related to the threat of a stolen
integrated terminal device. These are considered to be Portable Computing Devices (PCD) in
the Technical Guideline TR-03110 [BSI15a, BSI15b, BSI15c, BSI15d]. An integrated terminal,
as explained in [BSI09b], consists of a single reader with an integrated hardware security
module and a proximity coupling device. Moreover, a stolen integrated terminal could still
be used to read MRTDs, as long as its certiﬁcate has not expired. This threat applies even
with an expired certiﬁcate if the date approximated in the MRTD is outdated. Hence there
is no real revocation system present for terminals. This is a known problem for the BSI, and
is even mentioned in [BSI09b] (Section 1.2.1). The second type of threat originates from an
inside attack. This incites for the study of the threat case where a compromised terminal has
remained in place, acting maliciously. With the current standard, a stolen or compromised
terminal could be used to target a group of persons, for instance by nationality, or a speciﬁc
person, such as Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs).
The implications of these threats are threefolds. First of all, they introduce an obvious privacy
breach in the sense that any compromised integrated terminal will have an illegitimate access
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to all MRTD data including biometrics. From there, an attacker can ﬁlter and target speciﬁc
individuals, or even groups with speciﬁc attributes, such as a speciﬁc nationality. Moreover,
the terminal can be used to acquire all information from all MRTDs that come in geographic
proximity with it, in order to build an illegitimate database of biometrics. With this kind of
database, attackers can train themselves and select the closest match for a cloned identity.
Lastly, efﬁciency needs to be taken into account. In [Fri], it is mentioned that more than 56
millions passengers traveled through Frankfurt airport in 2011. As around half of them are
only transfer passengers, and thus do not necessarily need a passport control, big hubs need
to process more than 2 million passport checks per month.
7.2 Prior and Related Work
As shown in the previous chapter, there is still room for improvement in the EAC standard. In
that regard, some results have already been proposed.
In 2009, Monnerat, Pasini, and Vaudenay [MPV09] constructed an Ofﬂine Non-Transferable
Authentication Protocol to achieve a Zero-Knowledge proof of knowledge of a valid SOD,
which has been neglected by the BSI.
Regarding the issue of terminal revocation, it has received only a small amount of interest as
the BSI community is convinced that the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
(PACE) protocol mitigates this threat, as explained in [BDFK12]. Indeed, when executing
EACv2, PACE is the initial phase before Terminal Authentication. After its successful comple-
tion, the MRTD is ensured that the terminal has knowledge of a shared password, and can
proceed with Terminal Authentication. However, no guarantees are provided in the obtention
of this password. If the shared password has been obtained by social engineering, or read
directly by eavesdropping on the MRTD, then a successful terminal authentication will allow
the stolen terminal to access all sensitive data contained in the MRTD. This issue has been
raised by Belguechi et al. in [BLR12]. Unfortunately, the BSI concentrate on the protection of
biometric data and do not provide a solution for terminal revocation.
Li et al. in [LZJX10] also mention the threat of terminal revocation, but concentrate on pre-
senting the Singapore solution that implicates Authorized Smartcard with Identity Based
Cryptography. Hence, to solve terminal revocation they require heavy hardware modiﬁcations.
In [BB13], Buchmann and Baier presented two solutions for terminal revocation. Both of their
solutions imply that MRTDs communicate securely with a trusted home server. In their ﬁrst
solution, this communication is needed twice: it is ﬁrst used to retrieve the current authenti-
cated and precise date with the Network Time Protocol (NTP), and it is also used to identify the
terminal revocation status by accessing an Online Certiﬁcate Status Protocol (OCSP) server. In
their second solution, MRTDs transfer the entire authentication check to the trusted home
server with the Server-based Certiﬁcate Validation Protocol (SCVP).
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Not only do both of these solutions require new heavy hardware incorporation, they also
require the establishment of a secure and permanent high speed bandwidth connection be-
tween dedicated country servers and every potential terminal in the world. This might become
an issue for mobile terminals aboard international cruise ships, with poor and unreliable
connectivity. Furthermore, both of their solutions introduce several single points of failure.
Indeed, if one of the network links or if one of the servers for either NTP, OCSP, or SCVP fails,
both of their entire terminal revocation solutions become unusable.
7.3 Light Hardware Improvement
Currently, it is easy to distinguish between passports from different countries without any
direct contact with them. The only way to protect against this is to prevent the chip from
responding. In order to avoid traceability of passports, the solution that people currently have
is to place their MRTD in a Faraday cage. Obviously this solution is cumbersome. For the case
of biometric passports, a better solution would be to incorporate an RFID switch to deactivate
the chip. Some sensors could even detect if the passport is opened or closed and manipulate
the switch accordingly. This last solution can be accomplished by placing a secondary RFID
tag antenna in the back cover of the passport, and joining both antennas with a NAND gate.
When the passport is closed, the RFID tag would simply ignore all discovery signals sent by
readers, as both antenna will provide a power source. In order to interact with the RFID tag,
the passport would need to be opened, allowing for a single antenna to be powered. This
solution is logical, as the access password for PACE printed inside the passport is supposed to
be scanned by border patrols. The main drawback, although being cheap, is that it involves a
small physical modiﬁcation to passports (for instance an additional RFID tag antenna and a
NAND gate).
7.4 Improving ICAO Standard
Several changes need to be made to the current EACv2 speciﬁcations as well as to the ICAO
standard. The ﬁrst issue to be considered for the ICAO is that BAC should be abolished and
replaced by PACE. For interoperability between the EAC and the ICAO standard, the latter
should stop mandating the availability of DG1, DG2, and SOD without PACE from the EAC.
Moreover, EAC would have to be implemented outside Europe in order to fully deploy its
capacity. As for the EAC and ICAO standards, they only require eliminating a few lines in
their speciﬁcations. This proposed enhancement has been taken into account, and the ICAO
working group ISO/IEC JTC1 SC17 WG3 mentioned in [ICAO13] that:
“At present the fact that BAC MUST always be present on the eMRTD ensures that
inspection systems that do not support PACE (yet) will still be able to access the
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MRTD’s chip. To access eMRTDs supporting only PACE, inspection systems MUST
support PACE. In its meeting on 19-21 February 2013 the NTWG concluded that as
of the date 01 January 2018 eMRTDs supporting only PACE will be considered to
be ICAO compliant. The chosen date should provide enough time for inspection
system owners and vendors to implement the necessary modiﬁcations to their
systems.”
Deployment does not necessarily imply a heavy PKI for terminals. A country not ready to
have such a PKI could still use a dummy one with a single key shared between all readers.
The passport issuing country, aware of this, could adjust the read access to mandatory data
groups and maintain the possibility of stopping the renewal of a certiﬁcate for this key if the
reading country does not make enough effort to avoid leakage of its secret key. EAC-reading
is a matter of software update and is inexpensive. A ﬁrst step has been made by the ICAO
towards mandatory pure EAC, however BAC will still be present for MRTDs supporting it.
7.5 Improving Behavioral Practices
To be more accurate in the date contained in the MRTD, a solution would be to have identity
checks even when leaving a domestic country or a community space if the community space
members trust each others. For instance, some domestic clock-update booths could be made
available on a voluntary basis before departure. As the identity check will correspond to an
interaction with an accurate terminal, the date in the MRTD will be updated with the terminal
certiﬁcate effective date. The date contained in the MRTD is still an approximation in this
scenario, but with a reduced date error when compared to EACv2. Ideally, future chips should
be equipped with a real clock. If no improvements are made to the EAC standard, the only
solution left for holders of MRTDs to maintain their privacy, is to shield their MRTD in a
Faraday cage.
7.6 Solving Terminal Revocation
The new method presented in this section uses threshold signatures in order to verify the
revocation status of terminals. The background is explained in detail in Section 2.5 and in
particular in Sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3. Document Veriﬁers (DVs) in the EAC standard are here
assumed to be trusted participants. In general, several terminals are present. If the number
of terminals is considered too low, this scheme can easily be modiﬁed to provide equivalent
properties. It is also assumed that a communication channel between terminals exists. This
is a common feature of terminals nowadays, such as the 3MT M Mobile ID Reader. Moreover,
the modiﬁcations needed to enable this method are solely software upgrades: no hardware
modiﬁcation to MRTDs is required.
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Let us now see how to go from threshold signatures to terminal revocation. The main idea
is to introduce terminal collaboration in order to achieve terminal authentication. Terminal
revocation will thus be achieved with the help of neighboring terminals. Protocol 7.1 depicts
the general view of how the EAC terminal authentication should be augmented to provide a
better revocation mechanism. The terminal interacting directly with the MRTD will be called
the requesting terminal Tr , as it will request collaboration from neighboring terminals to
achieve authentication. The set of terminals participating in a speciﬁc terminal authentication
is denoted by TΨ. This set includes Tr . Furthermore,Ψwill be the index set of these terminals.
MRTD Tr TΨ
Certiﬁcate
Validation
Cer tDV , Cer tTr
DH Key Agreement
rM
rM  rM  Check revocation status
Check σ [Check σ]
σ
σ=
Si gnSKDV
(
HFDH
(
IDTr , rM
))σ
E AC Terminal Authentication
Protocol 7.1 – Augmented terminal authentication
The additional interactions needed for terminal revocation are added after the EAC terminal
authentication is performed and before giving access rights to Tr for the MRTD sensitive data.
They consist of three main steps. In the ﬁrst step, the MRTD generates a fresh random nonce
rM , that will be transmitted to Tr and forwarded to the set TΨ. In the second step, TΨ will check
the revocation status of Tr . As terminals have real clocks and better computation capabilities
than MRTDs, they will be able to check this revocation status much more efﬁciently. In the
third and ﬁnal step, TΨ will produce, with the shared DV secret key SKDV , a full domain
hash (FDH) threshold signature σ. This signature will be performed on the MRTD challenge
rM joined with the identity IDTr of the requesting terminal. This signature σ will then be
forwarded to the MRTD which will check it against the DV public key. If the check succeeds,
then the MRTD will be ensured that the terminal Tr is authentic and non-revoked.
Following the classiﬁcation of authentication protocols proposed by Park, Boyd, and Dawson
in [PBD00], this proposed addition is an origin authentication protocol with forced challenge,
where the prover signs with his secret key a random nonce generated by the veriﬁer. The inclu-
sion of the terminal Tr identity in the signature is necessary to avoid a Lowe attack [Low96].
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The identity of the MRTD is unnecessary when sending the challenge as the objective is only
to provide a strong argument that Tr is not revoked. Moreover, linkage to this identity might
raise a privacy issue. The disclosure of the signature would reveal the location of the MRTD at
a given time if it is joined with a timestamped signature.
The security assumptions will be speciﬁed ﬁrst. Detailed explanations will then be provided
on how to extend terminal authentication in order to achieve a better terminal revocation.
Thereafter, some efﬁciency improvements will be discussed. The security requirements will
then be explained, a complete security proof will be provided, and a general analysis will
conclude this section.
Security Assumptions
Regarding the environment, the same structure of participants as the EAC model is assumed,
however some clariﬁcations are provided. Each DV is responsible for  terminals ( differs
from one DV to the other), where DVs and terminals are polynomial-time algorithms. DVs
play the role of trusted authority amongst their terminals. The existence of secure and authen-
ticated channels between all  terminals is assumed. This is easily achieved with public key
encryption as it is the same DV (a trusted party) that issued every terminal key pairs. When a
terminal is stolen, its certiﬁcate will be revoked. This revocation will disable its use. Moreover,
the lack of online connectivity should apply only to CVCAs and DVs as they are Public Key
Generators. As such, they should be turned ofﬂine once their keys setup generation has been
achieved (as explained in [Sha84]). This is not the case for terminals. As for MRTDs, recall that
they have no internal clock. Regarding time, MRTDs should therefore consider it as indicative
but not decisive.
Furthermore, attackers are assumed to be computationally bounded. Focus will be placed on
threats relating to terminals, as they are somehow neglected in the current EAC. Nevertheless,
both CVCAs and DVs are assumed to be honest. The threshold security requirement, where
the adversary can corrupt up to t terminals among 
 2t +1, is also assumed to hold. This
last assumption can be lessened if proactive security is included (Section 2.5.2). After each
revocation, the value ’0’ would be shared amongst the remaining valid terminals, and added
to their current shares. More details on the matter will be explained in the general analysis of
Section 7.6. With proactive security, t has to be set such that no more than t terminals could
be corrupted before a resharing.
Adversaries will be expected to be either passive adversaries, where attackers corrupt targets
by reading their contents, their secrets, and all the communications involving them, or active
adversaries, where attackers will additionally be allowed to change the behavior of corrupted
terminals. Lastly, adversaries will be restricted to static adversaries, meaning that the adver-
sary will select which terminals to corrupt before the start of the protocol. Moreover, the
adversary is free to corrupt them whenever he wants to. When a terminal is corrupted, all his
communications will be revealed to the adversary. Dynamic adversaries are set aside, as the
corresponding solutions will induce a high loss of efﬁciency. Nevertheless, it would still be
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possible to handle dynamic adversaries by using a threshold signature scheme secure against
them [LY12].
Regarding revocation, only the case of accurate revocation is considered, meaning that cor-
rupted terminals are immediately identiﬁed and thus revoked, and non-revoked terminals
are considered honest and non-corrupted. This limitation makes sense as the initial goal
of the suggested solution is to protect MRTDs against stolen terminals. Corrupted and non-
revoked terminals are outside the scope of the adversarial model considered. It is important
to note here that any non-revoked malicious participant will always be able to succeed in an
authentication if the participant behaves honestly. Moreover, the threat of a cloned terminal is
not covered with the following solution, as it will be explained in more detail in the general
analysis of Section 7.6.
Augmented Terminal Authentication
Protocol 7.3 gives the general structure of the additional part to the current terminal authen-
tication protocol. The required Setup phase, depicted in Protocol 7.2, is very similar to the
original EAC one.
Ti (1	i	) DV CVC A
(
pk, {ski }

i=1
)
←KG(1k , t ,) Cer treq 
Cer tDV
Cer tDV , Cer tTi , ski , pk
Protocol 7.2 – Terminal authentication setup
DVs are in charge of the setup phase. They will ﬁrst run a key generation algorithm KG to
obtain the system public key pk and the different terminal secret key shares ski intended for
each terminal Ti . The secret key shares ski are shares of the DV secret key SKDV . They are
computed such that every terminal authentication will require the collaboration of at least
t +1 terminals. Hence, the following scheme tolerates up to t corrupted terminals. As long as
t +1 honest terminals are available, terminal authentication will be able to proceed. Recall
thatΨ is the index set of terminals participating in a speciﬁc terminal authentication. Hence
Ψ⊂ {1, · · · ,} and |Ψ| 
 t +1. Furthermore, the system public key pk includes the DV public
key PKDV , the veriﬁcation key vki of each terminal, as well as some system parameters.
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After KG has been run, the DV will have to contact CVCAs from every other country with a
certiﬁcate request, in order to obtain its DV certiﬁcates. Hence, a DV will have one certiﬁcate
for each country whose MRTDs may likely encounter the terminals of that DV. This is already
the case with the current EAC. The difference in certiﬁcates is that they will additionally
include PKDV . They will not include the entire pk as only PKDV is used in the interaction
between MRTDs and terminals. Moreover, certiﬁcates will contain additional information
regarding how many terminals are required to collaborate with the requesting terminal Tr in
order to complete its authentication (parameter t ), as well as how many terminals are present
under the DV (parameter ).
The DV ﬁrst receives its certiﬁcates. Each terminal i then receives the public key of the system
pk, its corresponding secret key ski , its certiﬁcate and the DV certiﬁcates, all from the DV.
Once the Setup phase has been completed, SKDV can be safely erased. Future interactions
will include terminals and MRTDs only. Hence the DV can be turned ofﬂine as described in
the EAC standard.
MRTD (PKDV ) Tr (pk, skr ) Ti =r (pk, ski )
M ∈R M M  M˜ =F (IDTr , M)
M  Check revocation status
σr =Σi=r (M˜) M˜ =F (IDTr , M)
Check Σv (σi ,πi ) (σi ,πi )=Σi (M˜)
σi ,πi
Check
Vσ(F (IDTr , M))
σ=Σc ({σi }Ψ)σ
Protocol 7.3 – Terminal authentication with revocation
The terminal authentication takes place after the setup phase and the Certiﬁcate Chain
Validation process. Protocol 7.3, which depicts the general terminal authentication, makes use
of Section 2.5.2 notations. At ﬁrst, a MRTD will select a random challenge M in the message
space M . It will then challenge the requesting terminal Tr with this random challenge M .
Moreover M must be independent from the MRTD identity, otherwise a tracking threat would
arise in relation to location privacy. Indeed, in the case where M is related to the MRTD
identity, the signature will prove that a given identity was at a speciﬁc location at a speciﬁc
time. Maliciously replaying this challenge does not pose any real threat as it will only reveal a
previous valid signature for the authenticity and the non revocation status of a given terminal.
As the communication channel between the MRTD and the terminal is only secured with
PACE, there is no authentication guarantee or revocation status check provided on the terminal
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certiﬁcate. They will be provided on the ability of the terminal to perform the signature on the
MRTD challenge. After the certiﬁcate is validated by verifying the correctness of the signature,
the MRTD will be able to use the keys contained in the certiﬁcate to establish a secure and
authenticated channel.
In order to get a valid signature on the MRTD challenge, the requesting terminal Tr will have
to collaborate with at least t other terminals. The revocation process takes place during the
terminal collaboration. It will be the role of other terminals to determine the revocation status
of Tr . To do so, an honest Tr will contact solely non revoked terminals for the collaboration.
Any standard strong revocation mechanism can then be used here. The basic solution is to
apply Certiﬁcate Validation as described in Section 2.5 of [BSI15c], except that a real clock
can now be used. The advantage of this solution is that no additional hardware is introduced.
Nevertheless, more complex solutions can also be used, such as Certiﬁcate Revocation Lists
(CRL) or the Online Certiﬁcate Status Protocol (OCSP), if an OCSP responder is set up under
the DV authority and is just for terminal interactions.
The constant participation of the DV in the revocation process should be avoided as it breaks
the principle of closing the Public Key Generator (PKG) after key generation (as mentioned
in [Sha84]). Furthermore, the case of OCSP introduces two drawbacks. It requires the intro-
duction of additional hardware, and the OCSP responder becomes a single point of failure.
The CRL solution should be favored, as it can be manually pushed towards terminals when
necessary. The CRL size remains small as it targets only collaborating terminals under a same
DV.
If a CVCA considers that the threshold t used in an organizational unit managed by a DV is too
low, it can request the participation of a special terminal that will act as a revocation server.
Nevertheless, as was the case for the OCSP, this method introduces a single point of failure
with the revocation server. Ideally, the set up of the organizational unit under a DV should
include enough terminals for the revocation process. As CVCAs provide foreign DVs the ability
to read their passport, it would be desirable that these DVs protect this privilege, and avoid
its misuse. If the number of terminals required is low (in a hotel, for example), then these
terminals should join the infrastructure of another existing DV organizational unit.
If the requesting terminal Tr is revoked, then its request will simply be ignored by other honest
terminals. If the Tr status is still valid (not revoked) then partial signaturesσi can be computed
and sent to it, possibly with veriﬁcation proofs πi . Moreover, the partial signatures will also
contain the identity of the terminal Tr requesting this signature. To include this identity,
terminals will use a full domain hash functionF on the MRTD challenge M and on the Tr
identity IDTr . The hash outputs should cover the full input domain of the signature scheme, in
other words the message space of the signature scheme. Tr will then collect all valid t partial
signatures and combine them with its own to create a full domain hash (FDH) threshold
signature σ on the MRTD challenge. This global signature σ will be sent to the MRTD as a
proof of authenticity and its non revocation status.
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It is important to note here thatF should be second-preimage resistant. This requirement is
a necessary condition to avoid relay attacks. For a given legitimate challenge M and an honest
terminal IDTr , an attacker with the ability to undertake a second-preimage attack could
forge a request MA to Tr such that F (IDTr , MA ) =F (IDTA , M), where TA is a terminal
corrupted and controlled by the adversary. The requirement that all terminals compute
independently F (IDTr , M) is also essential. If this computation is achieved solely by the
MRTD and transmitted to Tr for signature, an adversary controlling a rogue terminal could
mount aman-in-the-middle attack. Such an attackwould consist of threemain steps. First, the
adversary would initiate an interaction with a MRTD by sending it his identity IDTA . Then the
adversary, pretending to be a MRTD, would initiate an interaction with a legitimate terminal
Tr . In this interaction, the adversary would simply ignore the identity of Tr . To obtain a valid
signature onF (IDTA , M), the adversary can simply forward it to Tr , asF (IDTA , M) has been
computed and sent by the MRTD. IfF (IDTr , M) is computed solely by Tr and later by the
MRTD in the veriﬁcation step, terminals Ti would have no means to verify if the terminal
interacting directly with the MRTD is indeed Tr , and another similar attack could be achieved.
Once the MRTD receives the global threshold signature σ, the MRTD will have to verify it with
the global public key of the DV, PKDV . If the check is successful, the MRTD can be ensured that
either the terminal is able to forge signatures on behalf of the DV (for instance the terminal
knows the DV secret or it can cheat on its revocation status), or that the terminal has gone
through a threshold signature involving revocation checks. As the DV is assumed to have
correctly achieved the initial setup and that terminals communicate over an authenticated
channel, the MRTD is ensured of the non revocation status of the terminal.
At this point, any efﬁcient, unforgeable, robust, and secure threshold signature scheme can be
used. Optionally, it can also be proactive secure. All of these properties are achieved by the
threshold RSA signature of Shoup [Sho00], explained in Section 2.5.3. This choice is favored
for its efﬁciency and simplicity. A detailed description of the KG in the DV setup phase follows
in Protocol 7.4, whereas the description of the protocol is given in Protocol 7.5. Both cases
follow the notation introduced in Section 2.5.3.
In the KG , note that some precomputations are done by the DV for its terminals, namely the Δ
computation, as well as the computation of parameters a and b. Furthermore, if proactive
security is targeted, then the KG must also provide n˜ as part of the DV secret key SKDV . The
latter will be explained in the general analysis of Section 7.6. In all cases, once the setup phase
has been entirely completed, the DV secret d from SKDV can be safely erased. Note, however,
that this is not meaningful in the case of proactive security because p and q can be recovered
from (n, n˜), and hence computing the inverse of e (mod n˜) is easy.
After the setup phase, the threshold signature of Shoup [Sho00] is used and applied to the
general case (Protocol 7.3), which results in Protocol 7.5. The Lagrange coefﬁcients λΨ0, i are
computed as in equation 2.3. For obvious reasons, the best choice for |Ψ| is |Ψ| = t +1. This
implies that Tr will only need to contact t other non revoked terminals. Moreover, after
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receiving their credentials, each terminal can deﬁne a preferred setΨ, which would include
themselves. This would allow them to precompute the Lagrange coefﬁcients corresponding
to their set Ψ. Nevertheless, if a terminal from their preferred set Ψ fails to reply or fails to
provide a valid veriﬁcation proof, then the requesting terminal can contact other terminals
and recompute the Lagrange coefﬁcients for the new set Ψ. As for the choice of the one-
way permutation FTr (IDTr , M), it can only be based on SHA-512 as this is the best hash
function implemented in current MRTDs. In order to provide a uniform output inZ∗n , which
is the message space of the chosen signature scheme (threshold RSA), Bellare and Rogaway
suggested in [BR96] to concatenate the same hash function where the hash input would be
appended with a constant and a counter ctri . As IDTr can be used as the constant,F would
correspond to:
FTr (IDTr , M)= SHA-5120(IDTr ‖ctr0‖M)...SHA-512i (IDTr ‖ctri‖M)...
Furthermore, to obtain the right output length, the last hash block can be truncated as sug-
gested by Bellare and Rogaway in [BR93]. Unfortunately, the output will not be perfectly
uniform in Z∗n , as a modular operation will still be required. Last but not least, there is a
(n−ϕ(n))
n probability thatFTr fails to provide a valid output, corresponding to the cases where
the output falls inZn \Z∗n .
An efﬁciency gain can be obtained by altering the way in which the veriﬁcation proofs are
conducted. This will be explained in the next section.
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DV
Choosen as a composite RSA modulus from 2 safe primes:
n= (2p+1)(2q+1) ; and n˜ = pq .
Pick e,d such that ed= 1 (mod n˜).
SetSKDV =d andPKDV = (n, e).
Set Δ= !.
Pick v ∈R QRn , where QRn is the subgroup of squares in
Z∗n .
Compute a,b such that a ·4Δ2+b ·e ≡ 1 (mod n˜)
(with the Extended Euclidean Algorithm).
SetΩ= {0, · · · ,2‖n‖+2L −1}, where L is a security parameter
(at least 128 according to [Sho00]).
SetH as a hash function that has L bits output.
Pick IDTi ∈R Z∗n˜ , for all 1	 i 	 .
Pick a function f (x)=
t∑
i=0
fi x
i (mod n˜)
with f0 = SKDV and fi =0 ∈R Zn˜ .
Set vki = vski , where ski = f (i ) for all 1	 i 	 .
Set pk= (PKDV , Δ, v, a, b, Ω, H , {IDTi , vki }∀i ).
DV
Certreq  CVC A
DV CVC A
CertDV
DV
CertDV , CertTi , ski, pk  Ti
Protocol 7.4 – DV key generation and setup
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Efﬁciency Analysis and Enhancement
In Protocol 7.5, the MRTD computation is dominated by one single exponentiation. The
terminal communicating directly with the MRTD and in charge of combining the partial
signatures, has a computational complexity dominated by (5t +4) exponentiations. However,
this computational cost can be reduced to (t +4) exponentiations as explained below. For the
collaborating terminals, the computational cost is dominated by 4 exponentiations. Simple
squaring is considered as a multiplication.
With regard to computational costs, several modiﬁcations can be made to reduce them.
First, the terminal in charge of combining partial signatures could perform the robustness
checks only if the resulting combined signature is invalid. Hence instead of computing 4t +1
exponentiations, the validity of the signature can be checked ﬁrst with a single exponentiation,
as depicted in Protocol 7.6.
The overhead, in time, should be less than 0.1 seconds, assuming 30 MHz CPU for MRTDs, 520
MHz CPU for terminals, 802.11g wireless communication between terminals (net average of 22
Mbit/s) and 200 Kbit/s communication speed between MRTDs and terminals. Each message
sent is around 1 Kbit except the messages from collaborating terminals that are around 3 Kbits.
Note that in Protocol 7.4, the DV precomputes Δ and (a, b). It can go even further by precom-
puting the Lagrange coefﬁcients λΨ0, j ,∀Ψ, and storing them in each terminal during the set up
phase. The drawback of this method is that it requires a storage space in terminals. This can
be an issue as there are (t +1)Ct+1

= !t !(−t−1)! Lagrange coefﬁcients to compute.
Furthermore, in the case of a large  (> 100), the exponentiation by Δ to obtain the general
signature will greatly slow down the system. In this scenario, the threshold signature scheme
of Gennaro et al. [GHKR08] will be preferable as it would be more efﬁcient.
The existence of multisignatures should also be noted. These are a type of threshold signature,
where the identity of signers is provided in the general signature. However, even the latest
result in multisignatures that can be used here, namely the scheme from Boldyreva [Bol03],
would imply a signiﬁcant decrease in efﬁciency.
Finally, a modest efﬁciency gain could be obtained by using the threshold signatures of
King [Kin00], which are derived from the Desmedt-Frankel [DF94] scheme. However, the
gain in efﬁciency achieved necessitates a more complex implementation and a higher storage
requirement.
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Security Requirements
The solution suggested here for terminal revocation is simple but uncommon. Authentication
is achieved by means of authorization to perform a threshold signature given after a revocation
check. Hence, the security requirements have to be clariﬁed in order to provide an acceptable
security proof. They include the following:
• MRTDs privacy;
• signature scheme unforgeability, threshold security, and robustness;
• randomness freshness;
• signature freshness and second preimage resistance for the hash function;
• revocation implications; and
• completeness and soundness.
Furthermore, the scheme can have proactive security as an optional requirement, depending
on the complexity tolerated and the security targeted.
Before going into the details of these requirements, three oracles that will be accessible by the
adversary for the security proof are deﬁned: OΣi , Oσ, and Op . Passive adversaries will only be
allowed to query Op , while active adversaries may use all three of them.
Oracle OΣi (IDTr , M , {IDTi }). Upon being queried with a challenge M , an identity IDTr , and
a set of identities IDTi , the oracle OΣi checks the revocation status of all identities. If IDTr is
revoked, then⊥i is returned for all IDTi . Otherwise, OΣi runs the partial signature algorithm
of the threshold signature scheme for each non-revoked identity IDTi with input message
F
(
IDTr , M
)
. At the end, the oracle returns all partial signatures σi with their veriﬁcation
proof πi , corresponding to the non-revoked identities in {IDTi }. For the revoked identities
contained in {IDTi },⊥i is returned.
Oracle Oσ(IDTr , M). Upon being queried with a challenge M and a non-revoked identity
IDTr , Oσ returns a signature σ such that σ
e =F (IDTr , M). Otherwise,⊥i is returned.
Oracle Op . For a random choice of (IDTr , M , {IDTi }), where the identities are not revoked,
Op returns the outputs of Oσ(IDTr , M) and of OΣi (IDTr , M , {IDTi }).
MRTDs privacy. The MRTD privacy should be protected at all time before the completion of
augmented terminal authentication. In other words, no information regarding time or the
MRTD identity should be extractable from the MRTD challenge. Hence the challenge must
be completely independent from the MRTD identity, and from time too. This means that the
challenge should not contain them, nor be derived from them.
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Unforgeability, threshold security and robustness. The signature scheme used must be
existentially unforgeable, to provide security against existential forgery under an adaptive
chosen message attack where the adversary is allowed to query the signing oracles OΣi and Oσ.
This unforgeability requirement prevents an attackerA from forging a valid signature σ or a
valid partial signature σi forF
(
IDTA , M
)
, where IDTA is the identity of a terminal controlled
byA .
As threshold security is assumed, the signature will have to be threshold secure and robust, as
deﬁned in Section 2.5.2.
Randomness freshness. Replaying a given challenge should happen only with negligible
probability, in order to ensure the freshness of the authentication procedure.
Signature freshness. Terminals should not be able to reuse previously emitted signature,
except with negligible probability. To enforce this, F is required to be second preimage
resistant. This is so as to avoid that an attacker A , upon receiving a challenge M , forges a
challenge MA such that
F
(
IDTA , M
)=F (IDTr , MA ) ,
in which caseA would be able to pass any authentication by requesting a signature on MA
from terminal Tr .
Revocation implications. For revocation, terminals that are revoked should be forbidden
from participating in any authentication procedure. They should not be able to succeed in
any terminal authentication request except with negligible probability.
Completeness. In the ideal case where there are no adversaries and where all participants
are honest, the protocol should always succeed with overwhelming probability.
Deﬁnition 7.1 (Completeness)
A protocol for terminal authentication is said to be complete if the following holds:
If all participants are honest and non-revoked, the MRTD should accept the authentication
procedure with overwhelming probability.
Soundness. This property exhibits the fact that Tr should not be able to cheat, except with
negligible probability. To achieve that, consider the advantage of the adversary in winning
some speciﬁc games. The case of passive adversaries is taken into account with the game 7.1,
while game 7.2 handles the case of active adversaries. In both cases, the goal of the attackerA
is to produce a valid signature σA such that the requesting MRTD will accept it. Furthermore,
A is allowed to query oracle Op for both passive and active attacks. In the case of active
adversaries,A will additionally be allowed to query oracles OΣi and Oσ, with one restriction.
The oracles can not be queried with the pair (IDP , M), where M is the challenge sent by the
veriﬁer MRTD and IDP is the identity of the prover expected by the veriﬁer MRTD. At the end
of the game,A produces a signature σA and wins the game if the veriﬁer MRTD accepts it.
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Game 7.1 – Soundness game for passive adversaries (SGpa)
1. A selects t terminals to corrupt. This set is ﬁxed.
2. The DV Key Generation and Setup are run. A retrieves (Cer tDV , pk) and for
each corrupted terminal Ti ,A also retrieves (Cer tTi , ski ).
3. A interacts solely with Op .
4. A selects a terminal TA from his set of corrupted terminals. TA will be the
terminal interacting with the MRTD, hence IDTA is sent to the MRTD.
5. The MRTD generates a random challenge M and sends it back toA .
6. A interacts again with Op .
7. A outputs a guess on σA and wins the game if the signature is accepted by
the MRTD. In other words, A wins if σA is a correct signature for the pair
(IDTA , M).
Game 7.2 – Soundness game for active adversaries (SGaa)
1. A selects t terminals to corrupt. This set is ﬁxed.
2. The DV Key Generation and Setup are run. A retrieves (Cer tDV , pk) and for
each corrupted terminal Ti ,A also retrieves (Cer tTi , ski ).
3. A interacts with Op , with OΣi and with Oσ, in a completely free manner.
4. A selects a terminal TA from his set of corrupted terminals. TA will be the
terminal interacting with the MRTD, hence IDTA is sent to the MRTD.
5. The MRTD generates a random challenge M and sends it back toA .
6. A interacts again with Op , with OΣi , and with Oσ, with the restriction that the
pair (IDTA , M) can be fed neither to the oracle OΣi nor to the oracle Oσ.
7. A outputs a guess on σA and wins the game if the signature is accepted by
the MRTD. In other words, A wins if σA is a correct signature for the pair
(IDTA , M).
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The advantage of A is deﬁned as the probability that A has to win the previous games:
AdvASGpa for passive adversaries, and Adv
A
SGaa
for active adversaries.
Deﬁnition 7.2 (Soundness)
A protocol for terminal authentication is sound against passive adversaries ifA has a negli-
gible advantage in the game 7.1:
AdvASGpa ∈O (1/n) .
It is sound against active adversaries ifA has a negligible advantage in the game 7.2:
AdvASGaa ∈O (1/n) .
Proactive security. Recall that proactive security is deﬁned in Section 2.5.2. In this case, the
attacker is allowed to corrupt more than t terminals, as long as no more than t terminals are
corrupted, and hence revoked, before a secret resharing.
Deﬁnition 7.3 (Global security)
A protocol for terminal authentication is considered secure if it is complete, sound, and if it
achieves all previous security requirements.
Security Proof
In order to achieve authentication, terminals have to provide undeniable evidence of their
authenticity and non revocation status. This section will prove that the security requirements
for the protocols depicted in 7.5 and in 7.6 are all met.
It is easy to see that the challenge M is indeed picked randomly, independently from time and
from the MRTD identity. Hence the privacy requirement is provided.
The underlying threshold signature scheme used is the RSA threshold signature from [Sho00].
This guarantees existential unforgeability, threshold security, and robustness.
The probability that a given challenge is replayed against a speciﬁc terminal identity is:
1∣∣Z∗n∣∣ = 1ϕ(n) = 14n˜ ∈O (1/n) .
As this probability is negligible, the randomness freshness is ensured.
The signature scheme unforgeability requirement, combined with the second preimage re-
sistance of the hash function F , enables signature freshness. Indeed, reusing a previously
emitted signature would imply one of the following three cases:
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1. That the randomness freshness requirement failed, which happens with negligible
probability as seen above.
2. That the adversaryA was able to obtain an identical hash functionF output from two
different inputs, where one of the inputs is ﬁxed and the other one is selected byA . This
case breaks the second preimage resistance ofF .
3. ThatA was able to obtain the same signature for two differentF outputs. This case
breaks the unforgeability security of the signature scheme.
As concerns revocation, any revoked terminal TA will be completely ignored by all other
honest terminals. These latter terminals will refuse to reply to any partial signatures requests
from TA , and they will also avoid contacting TA for any partial signature requests. Hence,
revoked terminals are isolated. Their success probability in passing a terminal authentication
procedure is limited to guessing the correct signature for a given challenge. Due to the
signature freshness security property, this probability is negligible (O (1/n)).
Lemma 7.1 (Completeness)
Assuming an honest MRTD, honest non-revoked terminals, and a robust threshold signature
scheme, the protocol depicted in Protocol 7.3 is complete with overwhelming probability.
Proof
As all participants are assumed to be honest andnon-revoked, Tr will pass the revocation check
from the contacted group of t non-revoked terminals Ti . The terminals Ti will be able to com-
pute their partial signatures and their corresponding veriﬁcation proofs, ifFTr
(
IDTr , M
) ∈Z∗n .
As Ti are also honest, their veriﬁcation proofs and partial signatures will both be correct. Due
to the robustness of the threshold signature scheme, Tr will succeed to verify their partial
signatures and will correctly compute the general signature σ, using these t valid partial
signatures and its own partial signature. The probability thatFTr
(
IDTr , M
) ∈Z∗n is equal to:
Pr
[
FTr
(
IDTr , M
) ∈Z∗n] = ϕ(n)n .
Hence the veriﬁcation check by the MRTD will always succeed with overwhelming probability,
which completes the proof.
Corollary 7.2 (Completeness)
Assuming an honest MRTD, honest non-revoked terminals, and a robust threshold signature
scheme, Protocol 7.5 and Protocol 7.6 are complete with overwhelming probability.
Proof
For Protocol 7.5, the proof is straightforward from Lemma 7.1 as Protocol 7.3 is a generalization
of Protocol 7.5. As for Protocol 7.6, the robustness property of the threshold signature scheme
ensures that the combined general signature will be valid, as all partial signatures are also
valid. Hence it is also straightforward from Lemma 7.1 that Protocol 7.6 is complete.
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Lemma 7.3 (Soundness)
Assuming threshold security and existential unforgeability for the threshold signature scheme
used, accurate revocation, and a second preimage resistant full domain hashF , the protocol
depicted in Protocol 7.3 is sound against passive and active adversaries.
Proof
In order to achieve this proof, its transposition will be proven: if an adversary A is able to
win in games SGpa or SGaa , depicted respectively in game 7.1 and game 7.2, thenA is able to
break one of the lemma assumptions.
Let us ﬁrst consider the case of active adversaries playing the game SGaa .
A ﬁrst selects up to t terminals for corruption and retrieves their secrets after the DV Key
Generation and Setup are run. Corrupted terminals are immediately identiﬁed and revoked,
due to the accurate revocation assumption. A revoked terminal is implicitly considered as
corrupted. Due to the unforgeability of the threshold signature scheme and as long as no more
than t terminals are corrupted, the adversary will not be able to recover SKDV . Furthermore,
A is allowed to interact with the oracles Op , OΣi , and Oσ. From it,A will collect signatures
and partial signatures for chosen and random combinations of challenges MA and identities
IDTr . AfterA selects the terminal TA interacting with the MRTD, the latter will challengeA
with M . A will continue to interact with the oracles, without querying the MRTD challenge,
and at the end of the game will output a valid signature σ on M for identity IDTA .
To begin with,A could have received, from Op , either the signature on (IDTA , M), or a sig-
nature on a different pair but with the same hash value M˜ =F (IDTA , M)=F (IDTr , MA ).
Both cases could happen with a negligible probability in O(1/n). As they are negligible, it
can be assumed for the rest of the proof that A did not receive them. If the existential un-
forgeability assumption is considered valid, and if F is indeed second preimage resistant,
then TA being revoked implies that A is able to produce a signature solely from the t cor-
rupted terminals, breaking the threshold security assumption. If TA was not revoked, it
would be the accurate revocation assumption that would be failing. If the signature scheme
used is now considered threshold secure and that the accurate revocation is successful, then
eitherA breaks the second preimage resistance ofF or the existential unforgeability assump-
tion. Indeed, eitherA has produced a σ from a forged different pair
(
IDTr , MA
)
, on which
F
(
IDTA , M
)=F (IDTr , MA ), orA can be used as a black box in order to forge signatures
for new choices of M , by simply challenging A with these new choices of M , breaking the
existential unforgeability assumption.
In order to be able to produce σwhile all the lemma assumptions hold,A would then need to
know the DV secret key SKDV . Hence AdvASGaa ∈O (1/n).
The proof for passive adversaries playing the game SGpa is identical, except that A is re-
stricted to using Op only. Hence, A is not allowed to make speciﬁc queries for his choices
of
(
IDTr , MA
)
. The main implication is that even if a passive adversary is able to break the
second preimage resistance ofF , it will still need to wait for Op to provide the corresponding
signature. Hence AdvASGpa ∈O (1/n).
179
Chapter 7. Enhancing the EAC
Corollary 7.4 (Soundness)
Assuming threshold security and existential unforgeability for the threshold signature scheme
used, accurate revocation and a second preimage resistant full domain hashF , Protocols 7.5
and 7.6 are sound against passive and active adversaries.
Proof
For Protocol 7.5, the proof is straightforward from Lemma 7.3 as Protocol 7.3 is a generalization
of Protocol 7.5. As for Protocol 7.6, if at least one of the partial signatures is invalid, the Lagrange
interpolation will fail to provide a valid signature σ. Hence it is also straightforward from
Lemma 7.3 that Protocol 7.6 is sound.
Theorem 7.5
Assuming threshold security and existential unforgeability for the robust threshold signature
scheme used, accurate revocation and a second preimage resistant full domain hashF , the
protocol depicted in Protocol 7.3 is secure.
Proof
The proof is straightforward from Lemma 7.1 and from Lemma 7.3.
Corollary 7.6
Assuming threshold security and existential unforgeability for the robust threshold signature
scheme used, accurate revocation and a second preimage resistant full domain hash F ,
Protocols 7.5 and 7.6 are secure.
Proof
The proof is straightforward from Corollary 7.2 and from Corollary 7.4.
General Analysis
A stolen or malicious terminal will not be able to authenticate itself, nor to impersonate
another valid terminal. A corrupted collaborating terminal will learn no information except
that a MRTD with some random challenge has requested an authentication process. However,
a corrupted terminal interacting with a MRTD will be granted access to the MRTD sensitive
data if the corrupted terminal behaves honestly. As long as at most t terminals are corrupted,
the DV secret key used to authenticate terminals remains protected.
In the case that the requesting terminal is non-revoked and compromised, the adversary could
gain access to sensitive data from the MRTDs that it encounters. However in order to do so, the
requesting terminal will have to collaborate honestly with the other terminals. This adversarial
behavior can be mitigated by monitoring the network and making sure that terminals only
communicate with other known terminals.
When the requesting terminal is honest and some collaborating terminals are corrupted and
non-revoked, these terminals will be easily identiﬁed if they fail to provide valid veriﬁca-
tion proofs on their partial signatures. Moreover, the adversary will only learn contents of
challenges without being able to link them to the MRTDs that generated them.
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Proactive security can be achieved by frequently renewing the global secret of the threshold
signature scheme. This can be done efﬁciently by resharing the same secret by means of
sharing the “secret” value ’0’ and adding the obtained partial secrets to the previous ones.
This technique can be easily explained by the Lagrange interpolation. Assume the general
secret is contained in f (0) and that another function g , with g (0) = 0 is shared and added
to the previous secret shares. The resulting addition will form another function fˆ such that
fˆ (0) = f (0). This method reduces the threat of terminal keys being exposed. In order to
compromise the general secret key, an adversary would have to obtain t +1 key shares in the
same time frame. This allows DV certiﬁcates to protect their general secret used for threshold
signature throughout their entire period of validity. Notice that this step is highly efﬁcient if
performed by the DV. The DV would generate the additional secret key shares and distribute
them to their corresponding terminal. Veriﬁcation keys will also have to be redistributed
to every participant. However, this can also be achieved without the DV by using secure
multiparty computation techniques [DK01], although this will imply a loss of efﬁciency.
In conclusion, a stolen terminal will not be able to authenticate itself. A corrupted collaborat-
ing terminal will learn no information except that a MRTD has requested an authentication
process. However, a corrupted requesting terminal interacting with a MRTD will be granted
access to theMRTD sensitive data if the terminal behaves honestly with the other collaborating
terminals. As long as at most t terminals are corrupted, the secret key used to authenticate
terminals remains protected. Furthermore, in case of proactive security, the leakage of the
secret key can be achieved only if at least t +1 key shares are compromised within the same
time frame of a resharing phase. These security properties are desirable as they improve
the current state of the EAC. By lowering the trust in terminals, the level of trust in the DV is
increased. This is an acceptable change as DVs are less exposed than terminals.
Remarks
Where the requesting terminal Tr is both corrupted and not revoked remains an open problem.
SKDV would remain protected but the adversary would be able to collect data from passports.
A potential mitigation would be to perform a continuous network analysis to check if terminals
are connected with illegitimate entities.
It is important to note that the solution presented in this chapter does not solve the problem of
a malicious DV. Indeed the DV can lower the requirements for its terminal in order to retrieve
as much data as possible among the people who transit its borders. Hence if a country is
subject to privacy infringement or if a country is known to disrespect the privacy of people,
DVs from that country should be forbidden to access sensitive information contained in
MRTDs. The only alternative solutions to disrespectful DVs and/or countries are expensive
and cumbersome. For instance, a possibility would be the solution provided by Buchmann
and Baier in [BB13], where the authentication and revocation of terminals are enabled by a
home server from the MRTD country.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
Due to a high level of public interest in privacy and e-services, this thesis focused on:
• improving cryptographic primitives necessary for enhancing privacy protection; and
• surveying and improving the standards for Machine Readable Travel Documents.
In relation to the former, two primitives were studied and improved: set membership and
range proofs. Moreover, solutions for range proofs were provided in the interactive and non-
interactive communication models. For the latter, the ICAO and the EAC standards were
surveyed, and improvements were elaborated.
For set membership proofs, a ﬁrst solution was constructed based on the Boneh-Boyen
signature scheme. The scheme relies on proving that a signature for the committed secret
element is known to the prover. This thesis argued that other signature schemes could be
employed and provided an example with the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme,
although slightly less efﬁcient. This thesis then provided a general explanation of how to
build a set membership proof based on any secure signature scheme. Furthermore, this
thesis showed that cryptographic accumulators could also replace signature schemes in the
construction of set membership proofs. The most efﬁcient secure protocol for set membership
proof is currently the one based on the Boneh-Boyen signature scheme. A variant of this
scheme was proposed by Arfaoui et al. in [ALT+15a], which attempted with limited success, to
reduce the computation complexity of verifying the Boneh-Boyen signatures.
Regarding interactive range proofs, this thesis improved range decomposition methods and
combined them with a proof of signature knowledge. This led to efﬁcient protocols, where
elements are ﬁrst decomposed and their digits are then proven with the set membership
proofs developed in this thesis. The interactive range proofs schemes presented in this thesis
reached the efﬁcient asymptotical communication complexity of O
(
κ
logκ−loglogκ
)
, where κ is
the security parameter. Furthermore, the author of this thesis conjectures that this communi-
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cation complexity is an asymptotical lower bound, with current commitment schemes. This
bound might be lowered by using different security requirements, especially for commitments.
A possible solution might be achieved with commitments built on unconventional security
requirements. For instance, if a secret element is outside a given range, its commitment would
no longer be hiding and the secret would be leaked.
It is important to keep in mind that the choice of protocol for interactive range proofs is
dependent on the range size and the security desired. If the range size is larger than 2256
for 1024 bits group elements or 21642 for 20 bytes group elements, then the Groth positivity
test method [Gro05] is more efﬁcient than the schemes presented in this thesis, regarding
the communication complexity. If it is acceptable to lower the security requirements from
zero-knowledge to witness indistinguishability, then for a range size that is larger than 232,
Groth binary decomposition [Gro11] is supposed to be more efﬁcient, although it induces a
7 rounds protocol. For range sizes smaller than 232 or if zero-knowledge is preferred, then
the sumset based range proof presented in this thesis remains the most efﬁcient and secure
choice. Last but not least, for very small ranges (for instance less than 32 elements), the set
membership proof primitives presented in this thesis are more efﬁcient.
For efﬁcient non-interactive range proofs without random oracles, this thesis proved the
insecurity of the ﬁrst attempted protocol, which was elaborated by Yuen et al. in [YHM+09].
This thesis then presented a construction of a ﬂexible solution based on the sumset decompo-
sition, on the Λ-PKE knowledge assumption, on a lifted version of the BBS cryptosystem, on a
Hadamard product argument, and on the Lipmaa permutation argument. The protocol result-
ing from this solution achieves a minimal communication complexity of 35 group elements, in
the binary sumset decomposition case. Although this protocol was the most efﬁcient solution
when published, the current state of the art is provided by Lipmaa in [Lip14b, Lip16], which
achieves a constant communication complexity of 11 group elements.
Concerning MRTDs, this thesis explained the threats linked to the hardware choice of RFID
chips. This thesis surveyed the ICAO standard and explained the weaknesses of its terminal
authentication procedure, which is based on the Basic Access Control (BAC) protocol. This
thesis surveyed both versions of the EAC standard (EACv1 and EACv2), explained the improve-
ments achieved by these standards, and their remaining drawbacks, notably the lack of privacy
control on the data contained in the MRTDs, the weaknesses of the terminal authentication
protocol, and more importantly, the terminal revocation problem.
The outcome of the survey on the ICAO standard presented in this thesis, demonstrated that
the BAC should be replaced by its equivalent from the EACv2 standard, namely the Password
Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE). This recommendation was adopted in
February 2013 by the ICAO working group ISO/IEC JTC1 SC17 WG3 [ICAO13]. Furthermore,
this thesis recommended the introduction of an RFID switch in MRTDs, in order to easily
enable privacy protection. However, it has been mentioned to the author of this thesis by the
German Federal Ofﬁce for Information Security (BSI), that it would be too difﬁcult to obtain the
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approval for hardware modiﬁcations regarding MRTDs. Hence, terminal revocation remains
based on the expiration date of their certiﬁcate, while MRTDs only have a poor approximation
of the current date. In an attempt to reduce this problem, this thesis recommended to increase
the updates of the date approximation of MRTDs. Furthermore, this thesis elaborated a
better solution to resolve the terminal revocation problem. This solution requires terminals to
collaborate in order to authenticate themselves, which solves the threat of an isolated rogue
terminal.
Open Problems. Remark that the set membership and range proofs presented in this thesis
are all dependent on the discrete logarithm computational hardness assumption. Hence they
are not quantum secure. Constructing set membership and range proofs that are quantum
secure remains an openproblem. A potential solutionmight be obtained from latices. A further
remaining open problem consists of proving the asymptotical lower bound O
(
κ
logκ−loglogκ
)
for the computational complexity of range proofs. Regarding MRTDs, the standardization
authorities are aware of the solutions presented in this thesis and their implementation is
hindered by a lack of political will.
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Appendix A
Proof of Knowledge of a
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya Signature
Theproof of knowledge of aCamenisch-Lysyanskaya signature suggested in Figure 3 of [CL02b],
is detailed here. This proof of knowledge is needed in Protocol 3.2 in Section 3.4. The objective
of the proof of knowledge is the following:
PK {(x,r, s,e,v) :Cx = g xhr ∧ Verify(n˜,a,b,c˜)(x, s,e,v)= 1},
where the predicate Verify is the veriﬁcation algorithm of the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signa-
ture, as deﬁned in Section 3.4.
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Common Input: g ,h, commitment Cx ,
g˜ and h˜ for a commitment scheme modulo n˜,
public key (n˜,a,b, c˜)
of the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme,
commitments Cv and Cw ,
and security parameters e , m , n .
Prover Inputa: x,r such that Cx = g xhr mod n,
s,e,v,w,rw such that ve = axbsc mod n˜,
such that Cv = v g˜w and Cw = g˜ w h˜rw .
P t1,t2,t3  V • Prover picks uniformly at random values of length n :
rx , rρ , rs , re , rδ, rγ,
• Prover sends t1 ← g rx hrρ ,
t2 ←Crew g˜−rδ h˜−rγ , and
t3 ←Crev g˜−rδa−rx b−rs .
P cﬀ V • Veriﬁer picks uniformly at random c of length n ,
P sx ,sr ,sξ,sε,sδ,sγ V • Prover sends sx ← rx −cx, sr ← rρ−cr ,
sξ← rs −cs, sε← re −ce,
sδ← cδ− rδ, where δ=we and
sγ← cγ− rγ, where γ= rwe.
• Veriﬁer checks that t1 ?=Ccxg sx hsr ,
that t2
?=Csξw g˜ sδ h˜sγ , and
that t3
?=Csεv ·a−sx b−sξ c˜c · g˜ sδ .
Protocol A.1 – Proof of knowledge of a Camenisch-Lysyanskaya Signature
aThe prover also needs to additionally run, in parallel, two range proofs for x ∈
(
2m−1, 2m
)
and for
e ∈
(
2e−1, 2e
)
.
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Appendix B
Proof of Knowledge of a Committed
Accumulated Element
The proof of knowledge, used in Section 3.5, is speciﬁed here. Its goal is to prove that a
committed value is contained in a given accumulator. This protocol is based on the results
of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya from [CL02a]. The difference between the following proof of
knowledge and their result is that the committed element is not necessarily a prime number
corresponding to their requirements. Hence a mapping is needed. The objective of the proof
of knowledge is the following:
PK {(σ,r,eσ,aσ,re ,r1,r2) : C = gσhr ∧ Ce = g˜ eσ h˜re (mod n˜) ∧
Ce = (g˜ 2
k
)σg˜ aσ h˜re (mod n˜) ∧ Reσ = g˜ r1eσ h˜r2eσ (mod n˜) ∧
v =W eσ h˜−r1eσ (mod n˜) ∧ aσ ∈ [−2k−1,2k−1]}
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Common Input: g ,h, commitment C , set Φ,
n˜, accumulator v , g˜ , h˜, set §,
auxiliary commitments W, R, Ce .
Prover Input: σ,r such that C = gσhr and σ ∈Φ,
r1,r2,re ,eσ,wσ,aσ such that (eσ,wσ) ∈ §, eσ =σ2k +aσ,
such that W =wσh˜r1 (mod n˜), R = g˜ r1 h˜r2 (mod n˜),
and Ce = g˜ eσ h˜re (mod n˜).
Veriﬁer Input: p˜, q˜ such that n˜ = (2p˜+1)(2q˜+1).
P t1,t2,t3,t4,t5  V • Prover picks rσ,rρ ∈R Zqa,
picks rε ∈R
(
−B2k ′+k ′′ , B2k ′+k ′′
)
,
rξ ∈R
(
−n˜/42k ′+k ′′ , n˜/42k ′+k ′′
)
,
rα ∈R
(
−2k¯+k ′+k ′′ , 2k¯+k ′+k ′′
)
,
rδ,rγ ∈R
(
−n˜/4B2k ′+k ′′ , n˜/4B2k ′+k ′′
)
,
sends t1 ← g rσhrρ , t2 ← g˜ rε h˜rξ , t3 ←
(
g˜ 2
k
)rσ
g˜ rα h˜rξ ,
t4 ←Rrε g˜−rδ h˜−rγ and t5 ←W rε h˜−rδ .
P cﬀ V • Veriﬁer picks and sends c ∈R {0,1}k ′ ,
P sσ,sρ ,sε,sξ,sα,sδ,sγ V • Prover sends sσ← rσ− cσ (mod q), sρ ← rρ−cr (mod q),
sends sε← rε−ceσ, sxi ← rξ−cre , sα← rα−caσ,
sδ← cδ− rδ, where δ= r1eσ and
sγ← cγ− rγ, where γ= r2eσ.
• Veriﬁer checks that t1 ?=Ccg sσhsρ , that t2 ?=Cce g˜ sε h˜sξ ,
that t3
?=Cce
(
g˜ 2
k
)sσ
g˜ sα h˜sξ ,
that t4
?=Rsε g˜ sδ h˜sγ , t5 ?= vcW sε h˜sδ ,
and that sα ∈ [−2k−2, 2k−2].
Protocol B.1 – Proof of knowledge of a committed accumulated element σ ∈Φ
aHere, q is the order of the Pedersen commitment group.
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Appendix C
Computational Complexity
Comparisons of
Interactive Range Proofs
Schemes
Computational Complexity
Prover Veriﬁer
CCs_AND (6+2) exp., (4+7) exp.,
(Protocol 4.2) 2 pairings 4 pairings
Lipmaa [Lip03]
36 exp. + O(k2) op. 36 exp.
(Sum of 4 squares)
Boudot [Bou00]
29 exp. 24 exp.
(Square + CFT [CFT98b])
Groth [Gro05]
28 exp. + O(k2) op. 28 exp.
(Sum of 3 squares)
Scemama [Sce09]
27 exp. 21 exp.
(Square + CFT [CFT98b])
CCs_AND_Arfaoui
(6+2) exp. (4+6) exp.
(AND composition with Protocol 4.4)
Groth [Gro11] (binary decomposition O(k2/3) exp., O(k1/3) exp.,
of commitments of commitments) O(k2/3) pairings O(k1/3) pairings
Sumset based range proof
(3+5) exp. (2+5) exp.
(Protocol 4.5)
Figure C.1 – Complexity comparison for range [A,B ], with k = log2B ,
u−1 <B +1− A <u, and 128 bit security. Complexities are provided
in terms of exponentiations (exp.) and pairings.
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